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In March 2011, the global nuclear industry was struck by the 3/11 disaster which immediately and 
greatly affected the business environment for nuclear power. The purpose of my dissertation is to 
identify Toshiba's strategic response to this game-changing event from the perspectives of the 
strategy tripod. Based on a case study utilizing a variety of textual data, ethnography and semi-
structured interviews I provide unique insights into the decision-making of Toshiba when the 
company faced a critical juncture. The main conclusion is that continuing the nuclear power 
business is possible for Toshiba which not only has maintained its strategy for nuclear power but 
also strengthened its global market position through acquisitions. This continuity co-exists with the 
pursuit of related diversification and product innovation aimed at seizing new business 
opportunities relating to 3/11. To analyze my research question, I adapted the strategy tripod to the 
specific circumstances of the nuclear power industry. My framework can be used by academics as 
well as practitioners to analyze a given market for nuclear power. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research agenda 
The merits of nuclear power were seriously challenged as the Great East Japan Earthquake 
measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale triggered a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi 
Nuclear Power Plant in Japan on March 11, 2011 (3/11) (Sethi, 2012a). 3/11 spurred a lively energy 
debate worldwide (Aoki and Rottwell, 2011), as well as public anger and mistrust toward nuclear 
firms and politicians (interview, 09.02.2013; ethnography, 2013). The situation could potentially 
deteriorate the business environment of the global nuclear industry which was experiencing a 
renaissance at the time of the disaster (Pomper and Harvey, 2012). For example, Finland started to 
build its fifth nuclear power plant in 2005 after not having built a single one in the previous 30 
years. The rapidly increasing energy consumption in developing countries, the opportunity for new 
employment in areas near nuclear power plants and military strategies involving nuclear technology 
were strong drivers of this new approach to nuclear power (SPEEDA, 2015a). Recent innovations 
addressing the shortcomings of nuclear power (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015), and the 2004 
increase in oil prices had also made nuclear energy appealing (Basrur et al., 2012). By 2009, at least 
30 countries were planning to build new nuclear reactors (EY, 2009). 
The scientific basis of a nuclear industry developed in 1896 when Becquerel discovered 
invisible rays emitting uranium salts. Building on Becquerel's findings, Pierre and Marie Curie 
introduced the term radioactivity in 1898 (Kruglov, 2002), as they discovered the atom. Their 
discovery was followed by systematic research in nuclear physics (Veyrat-Masson, 1992). The 
nuclear age began in 1938 when German researchers identified the nuclear fission process 
(Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Nuclear power refers to the generation of electricity using the 
energy resulting from the nuclear fission of uranium fuel. The technology has been utilized for 
atomic bombs since 1945 and for electricity generation since 1951. It was labelled 'the white 
energy' to distinguish it from 'the black energy' from fossil fuels and 'the green energy' from 
renewables (Andrén, 2012). 
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 In this study, I define the nuclear industry as the vendors which design and manufacture 
nuclear reactors. There are four main business areas in the nuclear industry: new construction, 
maintenance, fuels and decommissioning (SPEEDA, 2015a). New construction refers to the 
establishment of a new power plant at a building site. While the construction period depends on the 
site location, reactor type, output capacity etc. at least four years are required from making the 
geological analysis until the plant may start operating. The construction cost depends on the scale of 
the plant but it is estimated that one plant costs between JPY 400 billion and JPY 500 billion. The 
main contractor of the plant is often in charge of the maintenance and repair work throughout the 
years of operation (SPEEDA, 2015a). The fuels business involves front-end work, i.e., mining to 
achieve uranium and its processing, and back-end work, i.e., the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel 
and classification of nuclear waste. In recent years it has become necessary to focus even more on 
expanding the value chain of the fuel cycle instead of just building the plants (SPEEDA, 2015a). 
Uranium is mined in about 20 countries. Companies such as Areva, Cameco, the China National 
Nuclear Corporation, ConverDyn, RosAtom's TVEL and Westinghouse convert the natural uranium 
into a suitable form for enrichment (WNA, 2015). Due to the industry's limited experience with 
decommissioning thus far, the procedure lacks consensus. The ongoing decommissioning of the 
Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant is a case in point (Krooth et al., 2015). The timeframe for 
decontamination is difficult to predict and, importantly, decommissioning does not remove the 
radioactive material but merely moves it to a different location. It is now a growing business as 
many reactors will retire in the near future (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012). Currently, 
there are four reactors planned to be under dismantlement by 2030 in North America, 60 in Europe, 
one in the former Soviet Union, two in South Asia and 17 in East Asia (mostly Japan) (WNA, 
2014).  
Nuclear power is a global business. The United States began to sell nuclear power plants on 
a turn-key basis in 1964 (Myers, 1978). Export of nuclear power technology often begins with a 
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research reactor, then a nuclear power plant. Usually, it is the supplier that defines the political 
constraints and provides at least the most important components, fuel elements and training 
facilities for operators. The buyer contributes as much as possible (Goldschmidt, 1978). The world 
export of nuclear reactors and fuels components increased from USD 1.9 billion in 2001 to USD 6 
billion in 2011 yet fell to USD 3.9 billion in 2015. The world import increased from USD 2.6 
billion to USD 5.3 billion in 2011 but fell to USD 3.7 billion in 2015 (International Trade Center, 
2016). The nuclear business is sensitive to the economic, safety and environmental risks of nuclear 
power (SPEEDA, 2015a). Investors and vendors are thus advised to pay attention to political 
statements concerning nuclear power and recognize that government support tends to be linked to 
public support (EY, 2009). Geopolitical influence and a dedicated diplomatic service are great 
assets when lobbying for nuclear contracts. In this politicized market the vendors which can 
mobilize the support of their government have better chances for success (EY, 2012). As the public 
lost confidence in nuclear power and political leaders across the world paused their nation’s atomic 
program after 3/11, many declared the end of the nuclear renaissance (Basrur et al., 2012; Samuels, 
2013; Aldrich, 2014; DeWit, 2014). Others argued that 3/11 would hardly impact on the business 
environment for nuclear power (EY, 2012). Meanwhile, the global industry leader
1
, Toshiba, soon 
realized that its customers began to demand a greater variety of energy solutions (interview, 
14.04.2015). How did Toshiba cope with this change in demand? Guided by the research question 
’How has Toshiba strategically adapted to a changing business environment following 3/11?’, my 
PhD project seeks to understand the decision-making of Toshiba when exposed to this sudden, 
exogenous shock. The company could choose among three options: divesture, downscaling or 
continuance of its nuclear power business. My dissertation shows that Toshiba opted for the latter 
because maintaining status quo is the most sensible choice for this company which is ideally 




  Toshiba can be regarded as the global leader because the company has built more reactors than any other vendor 
and possesses more technology (Toshiba annual report 2010).  
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Research on the nuclear industry is limited because nuclear activities tend to be secretive (Kruglov, 
2002). The development of nuclear power nonetheless concerns many as it has far-reaching 
implications. Sovacool and Valentine (2012: pp. 3) explain that “what happens in the nuclear power 
industry in the next few decades will influence energy market dynamics which in turn will 
significantly influence global economic conditions, climate change mitigation prospects, and 
international security”. The nuclear industry has been researched from a political angle by, e.g., 
Samuels (1987, 2013), Jasper (1990), Dauvergne (1993), Sovacool and Valentine (2012), Nielsen 
(2015), and from a technical viewpoint by Hill (2013), Uchida (2013), and others. I contribute with 
a business economic perspective. Ferguson (2011) remarked that 3/11 will test the belief that any 
major accident will harm the industry. I take up this challenge in my dissertation and find that it 
takes more than a 3/11 to severely shake the nuclear industry. 
 
International business research 
The fact that firm strategy is influenced by institutions is yesterday's news. However, scholars of 
international business (IB) still have not identified exactly how institutions and firms influence each 
other, and the relative impact of different institutions on corporate strategy formulation (Peng et al., 
2009). The future trajectory of institutions also lacks consensus. For instance, some scholars assume 
that relational governance will be replaced by rule-based governance as economies develop, 
whereas others point out that relational governance persists in a number of advanced nations 
(Hennart, 2015). Moreover, the institutional factors influencing nuclear power, for example, also 
influence each other, making it difficult to determine the relative influence of each one (Sovacool 
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and Valentin, 2012). In my dissertation, I document that the public opinion on nuclear power is a 
weaker institutional factor compared with energy policy, industrial policy and security policy. I built 
a model indicating the factors that determine the business environment, and, in turn, firm strategy 
and performance. In my subsequent case study of Toshiba I tested and thus validated the 
framework. It can be used by both academics and practitioners. 
 During the JIBS Decade Award session at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Association of 
International Business, Professor Mike Peng emphasized that there are many institutional theories 
today but the institution-based view (IBV) still cannot be regarded as a unified paradigm. Professor 
Chris Carr responded that we need more empirically driven institution-based research on global 
strategy within the major sectors by the main global players. My dissertation focusing on Toshiba's 
global strategy for its nuclear power business helps to fill this gap. 
 
Corporate political activity  
The dissertation also contributes to the growing body of literature on Corporate Political Activity 
(CPA). CPA analyzes firms’ ability to utilize the political arena to sustain competitive advantage 
(Lawton, McGuire and Rajwani, 2013). Drawing on the theory of market-political ambidexterity 
developed by Li, Peng and Macauley (2013), I highlight the close ties between the nuclear industry 
and policy-makers, show how nuclear firms attempt to influence political actors and argue that 
positive relations with the local government is crucial to achieve orders for nuclear power plants. 
 
Japanese business studies 
When Witt (2006) investigated the Japanese business groups known as keiretsu he found that they 
in some ways were weakening yet strengthening in other ways. Historically, there is a strong 
tradition for collaboration among Japanese companies (Gerlach, 1992). This network organization 
was seen as a driver for the remarkable competitiveness of Japanese companies in the 1980s, yet 
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many argue today that they advanced in spite of it (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). As the world is 
turning into a 'global village' with economic activity becoming more interdependent (Dunning 
1997), successful integration into global value chains is crucial for multinational corporations 
(MNCs) (Pudelko, 2005). Many Japanese MNCs have indeed found that limiting their partnerships 
to domestic ones no longer suffices (Teramoto and Benton, 2005). Their business environment has 
undergone significant change since what came to be known as the 'Japanese management model' 
developed after WW II. Consequently, many authors point to the fact that this model is in a state of 
flux (Kono and Clegg, 2001; Abe 2010). A key feature of the model is the keiretsu system. My case 
study of Toshiba indicates that Japanese MNCs break free from their domestic networks to enter 
into international partnerships that better enhance their global competitiveness. This finding is in 
line with the hypothesis of Aoki (1994) and Dore (1994) implying that a shared sense of 
'Japaneseness' in the Japanese corporate world, which is well documented by many authors (e.g, 
Aoki, 1994; Anchordoguy, 2005; Dore 1994; Porter, Sakakibara, and Takeuchi, 2000), is likely to 
diminish amid increasing pressure from global competition. 
 Finally, according to Asakawa (2014), the Japanese IB community has a long tradition of 
publishing primarily in the Japanese language which prevents foreign scholars from participating in 
the intellectual debate in Japan. My dissertation which utilizes publications in the Japanese 
language helps to build a bridge between English speaking and Japanese speaking scholars. 
 
1.3 Limitations 
During the course of my research systematic fraud involving all of Toshiba’s business units over the 
past seven years was revealed. The company published its corrected financial reports on December 
28, 2015. I have used the corrected versions in my report. Since the scandal, there have been many 
rumors about Toshiba’s nuclear power business in the media which the company subsequently has 
dismissed (see Toshiba 27.11.2015, 27.01.2016). I therefore decided to rely solely on Toshiba’s 
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corporate communication and exclude news reports from my case study. 
 My analysis of the nuclear industry shows that it always has been exceptionally 
interconnected globally. It is therefore necessary to analyze all the nuclear vendors and all the 
countries relying on, or considering adopting, nuclear power, in order to provide the full picture. 
However, I focus on Toshiba and its main markets, i.e., Japan, China and the United States due to 
the limited resources of a student. For the same reason, my public opinion survey was carried out 
only in Japan where I lived during my PhD study. Besides, a Chinese researcher informed me that it 
could be problematic to carry out this kind of survey in China. 
 
1.4 The case study firm 
Toshiba is a merger of the telegraph equipment developer Tanaka Engineering Works founded in 
1873 in Japan and the light bulp manufacturer Tokyo Denki founded in 1878 in Japan. It is a 
conglomerate currently encompassing 584 companies worldwide with 198,741 employees. The 
company features the five main business segments Lifestyle Products & Services, Electronic 
devices & Components, Healthcare Systems & Services, Community Solutions, and Energy & 
Infrastructure. In addition to nuclear power, the Energy & Infrastructure segment offers hydro, 
solar, geothermal, wind, thermal and hydroelectric power generating facilities. This business 










Table 1.1: Overview of the chapters 
Chapter Title Research question Method Summary 
1 Introduction N/A N/A In this chapter I describe my PhD 
project including its relevance and 
contributions. 
2 Methodology N/A N/A In this chapter I review the literature 
on case study methodology and 
explain how I developed my 
theoretical framework and designed 





perspectives in IB 
What is the most 
suitable theory to 
adopt in this study? 
Desk study In this chapter I review the literature 
on the leading strategy perspectives 
in IB, and find that the strategy tripod 









Desk study In this chapter I review the literature 
on the nuclear industry to identify the 
drivers of nuclear power 
development at the industry-, firm- 
and institution-levels.  
5 Case study How has Toshiba 
strategically adapted 









In this chapter, I describe the 
development of Toshiba’s nuclear 
power business up until today, and 
its current strategy. Subsequently, I 
apply my conceptual model to 
Toshiba's most important markets, 
and discuss the fit between the 
market conditions and Toshiba's 
strategy. 
6 Discussion N/A N/A In this chapter, I discuss and 
elaborate on the findings in chapter 
five. I then reintroduce my 
conceptual model and revise it based 
on these findings. 
7 Concluding 
remarks 
N/A N/A In this chapter, I answer my research 
question: after 3/11, Toshiba has 
maintained the strategy for its 
nuclear power business and 
consolidated its global leadership 
position. In addition, the company 
has entered the wind industry and 
invented equipment to respond to 






Chapter 2 Methodology 
Research is legitimate “when the methods of analysis are clearly communicated, follow from 
research assumptions and lead transparently to conclusions” (Wright, 2011: pp. 364). My PhD 
project is an IB case study. The unit of analysis is the corporate strategy and the unit of observation 
is Toshiba. Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki (2011: pp. 173) warn about confusing these two units; the 
unit of analysis is the 'what' or 'whom' being studied, while the unit of observation is the entity from 
which the researcher collects data. Knowing which unit of analysis to select may be difficult in a 
case study (Johanson, 2011). I allowed the theory (IB strategy) to determine my unit of analysis.  
 The case study approach facilitates the study of a phenomenon within its context using 
several sorts of data (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Essentially, a case study is “an intensive study of a 
single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004: pp. 
342). In my research, Toshiba is the single unit that helps me to develop a general argument about 
corporate strategy formulation in the aftermath of an unexpected exogenous shock. The case study 
has become a popular research strategy in IB (Piekkari and Welch, 2011a), which is an inter-
disciplinary field dealing with increasingly difficult research questions that seldom have 
straightforward answers (Hurmerinta and Nummela, 2011). Qualitative research indeed enables the 
study of multidisciplinary and complex phenomena (Morais, 2011). Cases can test theory 
convincingly, foster new ideas, and illustrate abstract concepts (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2008). They are excellent to gain an understanding of organizations and decision-making 
(Aharoni, 2011). The case study methodology is well suited for research questions starting with 
'how' and 'why' (Ying, 2009), such as the one that I investigate: how has Toshiba strategically 
adapted to a changing business environment following 3/11? 
 
 
2.1 Case study design 
While the case study methodology is often associated with inductive research, Piekkari and Welch 
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(2011a) emphasize pluralism in case research. Today, case studies are tailor-made to fit the 
objective and context of the specific research (Vahlne, 2011). What is more, the variations in case 
study design and application is complex and may blend into each other (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). I pursue the in vivo case study approach to theory-building conceptualized by Andersen and 
Kragh (2011) to investigate my research question. The in vivo approach takes on board critical 
realist assumptions (Andersen and Kragh, 2011), which are useful for dynamic, systemic and 
multidisciplinary IB phenomena (Morais, 2011). It uses abduction to successively modify the initial 
theoretical framework to accommodate unexpected empirical findings and theoretical insights 
throughout the process (Piekkari and Welch, 2011a). Thus, in vivo-researchers mix inductive and 
deductive approaches to build theory; they enter the empirical world with a pre-defined theoretical 
framework, but continue “to scan, select and discard theoretical perspectives as this framework 
meets empirical data” (Andersen and Kragh, 2011: p. 151). Theory is considered inspirational in the 
in vivo approach as it helps researchers to focus and structure the large pile of data typical of 
qualitative research. In fact, Andersen and Kragh emphasize that no researcher is able to erase his or 
her theoretical knowledge before embarking on a research project. Thus, purely inductive research 
is not feasible in reality. There is also a high risk of reinventing the wheel when the researcher does 
not consider theory from the beginning of the research project. Still, the in vivo approach clearly 
differs from deduction due to the iterative process. In this way, theory is both input to and output 
from the data collection and analytic processes (Andersen and Kragh, 2011). Following the 
instructions of Andersen and Kragh, (2011), my theoretical framework developed in the four steps 
shown in model 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 Theoretical framework development 
Model adapted from Andersen and Kragh (2011: pp. 157) 
 
  
They explain that the preliminary framework is typically based on a single authoritative 
perspective and considers a limited number of concepts (Andersen and Kragh, 2011). Mine was 
based on institutional theories, e.g., Hirschmann's (1970) theory of exit, voice and loyalty, and the 
Comparative Institutional Analysis (CIA) paradigm (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aoki, 2001; Morgan et 
al., 2010). The reason is that I initially focused on the interplay of corporate strategy and the 
changing institutional context. During the next stage called 'reorientation', the researcher becomes 
aware of discrepancies between the data and the theory (Andersen and Kragh, 2011). At this stage, I 
realized the need to focus much more on the industry in which Toshiba competes and the company's 
resources and capabilities than institutional theories helped me to do. At the 'exploration' stage, I 
thus turned to the strategy tripod (Peng et al., 2009), which merges the IBV with the resource-based 
view (RBV) and market-based view (MBV) to analyze the interaction effects of industry 
competition, firm resources and capabilities, as well as the institutional context and, further, how 
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this mix leads to particular strategic choices. Lastly, I identified appropriate variables for each of the 
three analytical levels based on my empirical literature review and developed my own strategy 
tripod specific to Toshiba’s situation. 
 
Case selection 
Accounting for one's research sample is essential to facilitate the interpretation of findings and 
replication of the study (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 2011). Buck (2011) emphasizes the importance 
of carefully selecting the case study with consideration to theory rather than convenience. I selected 
the industry leader, Toshiba, because the strategizing of this company is bound to impact 
substantially on the global nuclear industry. My consideration regarding case selection corresponds 
to the critical case sampling technique selecting cases which are “unusual, special or make a point 
quite dramatically” (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 2011: pp. 179). I opted for a single case study 
although the multiple case study enables cross-case search for patterns that helps to prevent jumping 
to premature conclusions based on limited data (Eisenhardt, 1989), and thus may develop better 
constructs. Advantages of the single case study include the potential for writing a thorough 
description of the case with great attention to its context and uniqueness. It allows within-case 
analysis and its high flexibility makes it suitable for abduction. Theorizing from single case studies 
focuses on causation within the particular context. The single case study tends to be less resource 
intensive. However, superior access to data is crucial in order to write the rich description which is 
characteristic of single case studies (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 2011). 
 
2.2 Triangulation 
Gerring (2004) remarks that the case study methodology is widely used but tends to be little 
understood and held in low regard. Case studies are often criticized for the difficulty to derive 
generalizations from cases, and for the tendency to gather huge amounts of data which can be 
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interpreted in several ways (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Nevertheless, “(…) the perceived hostility 
between case study and non-case study research is largely unjustified and, perhaps, deserves to be 
regarded as a misconception” (Gerring, 2004: pp. 341). Case studies can be difficult to get 
published in top tier journals (Szulanski and Jensen, 2011; Morais, 2011). This contestation of the 
case study method calls for verification of case research through triangulation whereby the 
researcher pursues multiple approaches (Olsen, 2004). The goal of triangulation is to be able to 
describe the phenomena under investigation as accurate as possible. Since different methods 
provide different perspectives, it is worth triangulating where possible (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). Triangulation helps to increase “confidence in research data, creating innovative ways of 
understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating theories, and 
providing a clearer understanding of the problem” (Thurmond, 2001: pp. 254 in Guion et al., 2011). 
Eisenhardt (1989: pp. 538) emphasizes “the combining of qualitative with quantitative evidence”. In 
my dissertation, I perform 'data triangulation' as my data stems from different sources. Since I 
collected it using different methods, i.e., desk study, ethnography, a survey and interviews, I also 
perform 'methodological triangulation'. Finally, I undertake 'theory triangulation' when interpreting 
the same data from the three theoretical perspectives in the strategy tripod. Especially in one 
instance, triangulation proved crucial in my research; after 3/11, Toshiba stated in its annual report 
that the disaster caused no change to the corporate strategy. However, in an interview with 
executives of Toshiba I learned that 3/11 was a major motivation for Toshiba to conclude a 
partnership agreement with the Korean wind turbine manufacturer Unison rather sooner than later. 
The companies had been negotiating since before 3/11 and the partnership became a reality just a 
few months after the disaster. Against this backdrop I am able to conclude that 3/11 accelerated 
developments that were taking place at Toshiba prior to the disaster. 
 Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) caution that the constructionist research design can be accused 
of anecdotalism. To guard against this accusation they recommend researchers to explain how they 
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accessed their data, the processes leading to the selection of their informants, how they created, 
recorded and summarized the data, how they transformed the data into tentative ideas and 
explanations, and how they feel about the data. Following their recommendation, I explain my 
methods in detail below. 
 
2.3 Methods 
I collected data through desk study, ethnography, a survey and interviews. This mixed-method 
approach implying to pursue both qualitative and quantitative methods is a fast-growing research 
approach, also in the context of case studies. Its use is justified if it helps to better solve the research 
question. The main advantage is that the use of different methods tends to increase the validity of 
the findings (Hurmerinta and Nummela, 2011). Relying solely on interviews can be problematic. 
For example, in daily life, Japanese people often express what they believe is required in the 
situation (tatemae) rather than their sincere opinion (honne) (Graham, 2003). In a case study of a 
Japanese company, Graham (2003) identified significant discrepancies between what the employees 
said when she interviewed them and the behavior they exercised when she observed them. She 
recommends researchers to employ more than one research method in Japan due to the tatemae and 
honne issue. Similarly, Tan (2011) experienced in China that interviewees hesitate to express 
socially unacceptable replies, indicating that this concern is not limited to Japanese interviewees. 
 
Desk study 
The wide range of relevant documents available in IB tend to be underutilized in research and 
considered inferior to interviews (Wright, 2011). When IB researchers do use archival data they 
tend to use them as a tool to triangulate their primary data. Archival material can nonetheless enable 
researchers to study factors that are unobservable or unlikely to be conveyed by interviewees (Mills 
and Mills, 2011). Similarly, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) argue that interviews are often considered 
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the best method of gathering qualitative data but in some situations other methods are more 
appropriate. I utilize relevant peer-reviewed literature, analyses by government agencies, think 
tanks and consulting firms, and the reports available on company websites, e.g., www.toshiba.co.jp. 
My analysis of the business environment for nuclear power in China, the United States and Japan 




Ethnography is another underutilized research method in IB, according to Moore (2011), who 
defines the technique as a way to study people in their everyday context to gain a holistic 
perspective. A unique opportunity to conduct ethnography in the Fukushima prefecture presented 
itself when a local NGO allowed me to live with them for four months to help with their project. In 
July, 2013 I relocated to Fukushima to experience daily life in the region and interact informally 
with some of the people directly affected by the nuclear crisis. Mir (2011) describes ethnography as 
a way to develop an understanding of the broader social and cultural fields in which a phenomenon 
is embedded. It allows the researcher to go beneath the surface to obtain a rich description of the 
research issue. I used ethnography to better understand the socio-economic implications of 3/11. 
Many claim that media reports understate the severity of the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The 
electricity firms are collectively the largest commercial sponsor in Japan with their purchase of 
advertisements for 88 billion yen annually. The need for income from advertisements allegedly 
leads to self-censorship among journalists (McNeill, 2014). Tkach-Kawasaki (2012) remarks, 
however, that it is unclear whether the journalists deliberately hesitate to inform the public or 
whether they simply are poorly informed. In any case, I doubted that I could be sufficiently 
informed about the nuclear crisis merely by following the mass media from Tokyo, and appreciated 
the opportunity to make my own observations in the field. As Brannen (2011: pp. 126) stresses, 
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ethnography is “perhaps the most effective method for gaining insights into micro-level embedded 
cultural phenomena”. In Fukushima, I lived in a traditional house owned by the NGO. I helped with 
their project by planting cherry blossom trees, raise funds and liaise with donors and journalists. 
While living in Fukushima I had the opportunity to visit the no-go-zone a couple of times to see the 
destruction caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, workers decontaminating the area and the 
numreous black plastic bags with radioactive content. A person working at the gas station informed 
me that people were beginning to stay overnight in the no-go-zone. In an area for temporary 
housing nearby I talked with people about their daily life as evacuees. The four months in 
Fukushima provided me with a deeper understanding of 3/11 and its consequences. 
 
Survey 
In August 2014, I enacted an online survey using the software SurveyMonkey. The purpose of this 
survey is to collect data about the Japanese public opinion on nuclear power. As it targets different 
Japanese demographics I decided to conduct the survey in Japanese. This also helped to limit the 
risk that other people than Japanese citizens would respond to the survey. My former Japanese 
teacher at Copenhagen Business School, Ms. Chiho Kondo, graciously agreed to proofread my 
questionnaire. I applied the logo of Rikkyo University to benefit from the legitimacy of a reputable 
Japanese university. In this way, I hoped to appeal to a larger audience. My motivation to associate 
my survey with a Japanese university is based on the experiences of foreign researchers who 
encountered difficulties conducting interviews in Asian societies where there is a traditional social 
division of insiders and outsiders, and people tend to distrust outsiders (Nojonen, 2011). 
 I designed the questionnaire based on insights from the consumer-based approach in 
marketing research. This approach assumes that the brand resides in the mind of the individual 
consumer as a cognitive construal. Therefore, the first step in formulating a branding strategy is to 
understand the consumer. In order to do so, the strategist needs to map out the associations held by 
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consumers in relation to the brand (Heding, Knutzen and Bjerre, 2009). Through this survey I seek 
to map out the respondents' perception of nuclear power, and to document a potential change in the 
Japanese public opinion on nuclear power after 3/11. 
 In questions one through four the survey asks whether the respondents have the right to vote 
at Japanese elections. This question helps to assess the potential impact of the respondents on the 
future direction of Japanese energy policy. The respondents are then asked to state where they live, 
their age group and gender. These questions help to determine potential geographic, age-related and 
gender-related patterns. 
 In question five and six, my aim is to obtain descriptions of the respondents' perceptions of 
nuclear power. Therefore, question five in the survey asks them to freely write what comes to their 
mind when they hear the word 'nuclear power'. According to Heding et al. (2009), respondents tend 
to hold back information in a research situation to protect their self-image. They further explain that 
this problem can be helped by adopting projective techniques which compel the respondents to 
allow their subconsciousness to speak. One projective technique is 'sentence completion' where 
respondents are presented with an unfinished sentence and asked to complete it. Question six 
therefore asks the respondents to complete a sentence beginning with 'nuclear power...' (in Japanese; 
原子力は。。。). While it may be a universal tendency to consciously and, especially, 
subconsciously answer in ways that do not reflect their sincere opinion, this tendency is argued to 
be particularly widespread among Japanese informants due to the aforementioned tatemae and 
honne issue (Graham, 2003). Therefore, I consider the projective technique highly useful in my 
survey. 
 In question seven through nine, the respondents are exposed to a number of statements and 
asked to indicate to which extent they agree with these statements on a Likert scale with three 
degrees. As pointed out by Caprar, Devinney, Kirkman and Caligiuri (2015) self-report surveys 
using Likert-type scales are common in, e.g., culture studies but are likely to perpetuate a 
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reductionist view to a complex phenomenon, and they warn against overreliance on a single 
approach. This is why I adopt several approaches in this questionnaire to illuminate the issue from 
different angles. 
 In question 10 and 11, the survey asks the respondents whether they have changed their 
attitude toward nuclear power after the Fukushima nuclear accident. This question helps to identify 
a potential change in the public opinion due to the accident. Those who answer 'yes' are 
subsequently asked to explain in which way the accident has changed their attitude. Whereas 
several public opinion studies have been conducted after 3/11 the majority cover only the current 
sentiment. 
 In question 12, I engage the respondents in a brand recall study as the survey asks them to 
name the companies which they associate with the Japanese nuclear industry. The brand recall study 
uncovers which brands are at the top of the mind of the respondents, thus helps to assess the 
potential reputational damage incurred by Hitachi, MHI and Toshiba due to 3/11. 
 In question 13 and 14, the survey thanks the respondents for their collaboration and 
encourages them to leave their e-mail address. There are several reasons for asking about their 
contact information. Firstly, it gives me the opportunity to inquire further into their answers. 
Secondly, I expand my network of Japanese informants. Thirdly, since I have circulated the link in 
various online fora, I cannot control who responds and there is a risk that other nationalities than 
Japanese respond. E-mail addresses often include signs of identification, e.g., a Japanese name, 
company, cell phone operator etc. 
 Lastly, the respondents are given the opportunity to freely write any comments they may 
have regarding the survey. The purpose of engaging in a dialogue was to make sure that the 
respondents had had any chance to fully express themselves about the topic.I also hoped to receive 
feedback on the questionnaire design. Fortunately, a kind soul informed me that the word I used for 
'restart' (saikidō) is used when restarting a PC, for example, but in terms of restarting a nuclear 
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reactor the word is different (saikadō). I corrected this mistake on February 27, 2015. A couple of 
respondents commented that the Likert scale questions were difficult to understand. However, I 
chose not to change them because it could make the responses obtained prior to the change useless. 
And, importantly, other Japanese people told me that the questions are understandable. 
 On August 21, 2014 I tested the questionnaire by posting the link to the survey together with 
a short message in Japanese in a closed group on Linkedin. I received the first reply to my survey 
within seconds after posting the message. The respondent was a middle-aged male with voting 
rights living in Tokyo. He had thoroughly replied to all the questions in the survey, left his e-mail 
address and written additional comments. Based on this result I felt confident about the design of 
the survey and began to broadly distribute the link to my survey. From August, 2014 through 
September, 2015 I sent 107 e-mails, 22 Facebook messages and five Linkedin messages in English; 
91 e-mails, 51 Facebook messages and seven Linkedin messages in Japanese; and 28 e-mails, 41 
Facebook messages and 17 Linkedin messages in Danish. I posted a message with the link to the 
survey in 27 LinkedIn groups which I selected based on their number of Japanese members. I also 
posted the link in seven Facebook groups with a large number of Japanese members. I posted the 
message on my personal LinkedIn and Facebook profile on August 22, 2014 and several of my 
connections helped me by sharing this message on their own profiles. A Lebanese journalist living 
in Tokyo furthermore offered to publish an article in the Japanese language on his online media 
platform about my research project with a link to the survey
2
. Finally, I approached around 10 local 
people during my field trips to various places in Japan. I benefitted from the 'snowball effect' to 
identify potential respondents as some of the people whom I contacted introduced me to other 
potential respondents. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), the essence of snowball sampling 
is to approach a person who meets the criteria for inclusion in a study and then ask him or her to 
name other eligible persons to contact. 




 Please click on the following link to access the article: http://www.panorientnews.com/jp/news.php?k=2356 
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 By the end of November, 2015, 849 people had clicked on the survey link. 840 of them had 
answered one or more questions, resulting in a response rate of 99 per cent. 313 of the respondents 
noted their contact details. As shown in table 2.1 and 2.2 below, the respondents live in 32 out of a 
total of 47 Japanese prefectures and in 32 foreign countries (10 respondents skipped this question). 
44 percent of the respondents are women and 56 per cent are male (28 respondents skipped this 
question). The respondents represent several age groups, as shown in figure 2.2 (15 respondents 
skipped this question), and 89 per cent of the respondents have voting rights at Japanese elections 
(nine respondents skipped this question). 
 
Table. 2.1:The respondents’ place of residence: foreign countries 
Country Respondents Country Respondents Country Respondents Country Respondents 
Australia 2 Hong Kong 2 Norway 1 Thailand 1 
Canada 12 India 2 Philippines 1 UAE 1 
China 5 Indonesia  2 Scotland 2 UK 5 
Czech 1 Lebanon 1 Singapore 2 USA 33 
Denmark 78 Malaysia 3 Slovakia 2 Vietnam 1 
Finland 2 Mexico 2 Spain 1 Ireland 2 
France 1 Netherlands 3 Sweden 9 Italy 3 
Germany 9 New Zealand 2 Taiwan 3 Korea 1 
 
Table 2.2: The respondents’ place of residence: Japanese prefectures 
Prefecture  Respondents Prefecture  Respondents Prefecture Respondents Prefecture  Respondents 
Iwate 15 Osaka 27 Niigata 1 Fukui 8 
Mie 2 Miyagi 7 Tokyo 264 Fukuoka 16 
Kyoto 17 Yamagata 1 Japan 4 Fukushima 27 
Sendai 1 Yamanashi 2 Tochigi 4 Akita 1 
Hyogo 14 Gifu 2 Okinawa 6 Gunma 1 
Hokkaido 2 Okayama 2 Shiga 12 Ibaraki 4 
Chiba 25 Hiroshima 2 Kumamoto 1 Shizuoka 11 
Saitama 50 Aichi 7 Kanagawa 95 Kagawa 1 
      Tottori 1 
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During the interviews listed in table 2.3 below, I inquired further into a topic that I already knew a 
little about. I sought answers to predefined questions that mainly were open-ended, following the 
guidance of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) who describe the semi-structured interview as a guided 
open interview. Each interview approach has its own advantages and limitations. A more structured 
approach allows for a high degree of standardization whereas the more open ones may have a 
higher degree of confidentiality because they are more personal. When interviewing informants face 
to face, the researcher also has the opportunity to intercept non-verbal clues. When conducting and 
analyzing the interview I considered the risk that the interviewees may hide information, not say the 
truth etc. for various reasons, as well as the risk that I could project my own opinions and feelings 









Below 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80 and 
above 
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Table 2.3 List of interviews 
Name Position Institution Expertise Location Interview technique Date 
Mr. Yukata 
Ikura 














N/A N/A Personal 
experience of 
3/11 





























 Achieving interview appointments is known to be difficult in Japan (Piekkari and Welch, 
2011b). Haghirian (2011) argues that Japanese consumers, for example, are under-investigated by 
Western researchers because they face significant challenges in navigating cultural and linguistic 
barriers. In general, cultural affinity is important to correctly code informants' speech, regardless of 
nationality and even when there is no language barrier (Piekkari and Welch, 2011). Easterby-Smith 
et al. (2008) explain that trust is also important; failure to establish trust can jeopardize an interview 
opportunity. The interviews with Mr. Yukata Iikura and Mr. Yukata Miki were facilitated by my 
supervisor Professor Hirohisa Uchida when I was an exchange researcher at Tokai University in 
Japan from January until March, 2013. The interview of eight Japanese citizens was possible when I 
visited a local NGO in Fukushima where they were working and graciously agreed to an interview 
during their break. In order to gain access to Toshiba, I established personal contact with a 
representative from the company at an energy fair in Japan on November 7, 2013. I contacted him 
by e-mail in Japanese on April 3, 2015, referring to our previous meeting, and requested an 
interview. He responded promptly with an invitation to visit their premises in Kawasaki to conduct 
an interview with himself and a more senior colleague.  
 
Writing up the case study 
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Mir (2011) argues that one of the most important tasks of a researcher pursuing the case study 
approach is to 'narrativize' the collected data, thus produce a coherent story. Writing a narrative 
requires richness of data (Johanson, 2011) and the researcher decides which data to include and 
which to neglect along the writing process (Mir, 2011). I developed my case study narrative using 
the observations from my ethnographic studies, the content of my interviews, the result of my 
survey, and my notes from the textual data. During the course of my PhD project I conducted more 
than 20 interviews in Denmark, Canada, India and Japan, but included only a handful of interviews 
in this final version as some interviewees encouraged me to refer to textual data in stead and the rest 


















Chapter 3 Theoretical literature review: the leading strategy perspectives in IB 
Markets are diverse around the world and each calls for a unique strategic approach. In the 1990s, 
amid the focus on doing business in emerging markets, IB increasingly focused on the implications 
of different institutional factors. Zaheer's (1995) attention to the 'liability of foreignness' that MNCs 
encounter abroad, and Khanna and Palepu's (2006) description of 'institutional voids' are a few of 
the many explanations offered about how the institutional context may constrain or enhance a 
strategy. An institution-based strategy perspective (IBV) complementing the established market-
based view (MBV) and resource-based view (RBV) emerged in IB (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008). 
The IBV proved especially useful for analyzing business in Asia where theories developed on the 
basis of Western firms may not work (Peng, 2002). That said, the IBV is relevant to apply in all 
parts of the world (Peng et al., 2009). In this chapter, I review the leading strategy perspectives in 
IB, i.e., the MBV, the RBV and the IBV. I then explain how and why Peng et al. (2009) unite these 
views in a so-called strategy tripod, and justify why I use the strategy tripod in my PhD project. 
 
3.1 Review of the market-based view 
Rooted in the school of Industrial Organization (IO), the MBV holds that: “the industry is the arena 
where competitive advantage is won or lost” (Porter, 1990a: pp. 34). It assumes that firm effects, to 
the extent that they exist at all, are transitory, unimportant or insubstantial (Schmalensee, 1985). 
The S-C-P model developed by Bain (1959) reflects this view by analyzing how the structure 
determines firm conduct which, in turn, determines performance. Structure is defined as the number 
of sellers in the market, the degree of product differentiation, the cost structure, the degree of 
vertical integration and other industry characteristics. The key to success is to pursue a competitive 
strategy based on these characteristics. In addition, to establish entry barriers and mobility barriers 
protecting the position of the firm by obstructing new competition (Caves and Porter, 1977). Profit 
maximization is the single goal of the firm (Tirole, 1988). 
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 Porter's (2008) five forces framework helps to map out the competitive landscape in the 
industry by analyzing the five variables rivalry, bargaining power of suppliers, new entrants, 
potential substitutes and bargaining power of buyers. The stronger the forces, the less profitable the 
industry tends to be. Rivalry refers to the competitive position and the characteristics of each 
competitor in the market. The bargaining power of suppliers refers to the risk that suppliers may 
charge the firm a higher price for their inputs. New entrants refer to the risk of increased rivalry in 
the industry that requires the firm to make additional investments. The threat of substitutes involves 
the risk that the firm loses customers as these turn to a competing product. Finally, bargaining 
power of buyers refers to the risk that customers force down prices by playing the firm and its rivals 
against each other. The five forces framework can identify game-changing events and show ways to 
increase profitability. The aim is to position the firm where the forces are weakest, exploit the 
opportunities when the forces change, and reshape them in favor of the firm (Porter, 2008).  
 Tirole (1988) remarks that early IO theories are unelaborate about the role of governments. 
To be sure, state influence is not a separate force in the five forces framework. According to Porter, 
state influence should be analyzed through the five forces rather than independently (Porter, 1980). 
The MBV also explains little about collaboration strategies at the firm-level. Rather, it emphasizes 
that alliances always involve significant costs which make them unsustainable in the long term 
(Porter, 1990). Competitive pressure can nonetheless be reduced by means of coopetition 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Yami et al., (2010) observe that firms increasingly embark on 
collaborative strategies as environmental threats frequently lead firms to pursue cooptation. 
Therefore, collaboration has been suggested as a sixth force in Porter's five forces framework 
(Barney, 2007). 
 
3.2 Review of the resource-based view 
The RBV understanding strategy as a function of firm resources and capabilities takes the analysis 
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to the firm level. While integrating economics with behavioral science, Penrose (1959) highlighted 
the role of management in sustaining the growth of the firm. She explains that firms are 
'administrative frameworks' linking and coordinating the activities of various stakeholders, and 
'bundles of productive resources' needing to be efficiently managed. Along similar lines, Prahalad 
and Bettis (1986) put forward their theory of the dominant logic of the firm explaining how the 
mindset of top management may either promote or impede competitiveness. This opens up for the 
possibility that profit maximization may not be the sole purpose of the firm as taken for granted by 
the MBV.  
 According to the RBV, the critical task of a strategist is to assess the firm's resources and 
capabilities relative to those of its competitors (Grant, 1991). Any possession that brings value by 
helping the firm to eliminate an environmental threat or exploit an environmental opportunity is 
either a resource or a capability. It is a sustained competitive advantage to the extent that it cannot 
be nullified through duplication by a rival. Rareness means that the resource or capability is only 
possessed by one firm. Resources and capabilities are costly to imitate when rivals need to make a 
significant effort to do so. It may even be impossible for rivals to imitate the resource or capability 
if it depends on the firm's history, if rivals cannot identify the particular resource or capability due 
to causal ambiguity, and if the resource or capability is socially complex meaning that it depends 
upon the firm's culture or interpersonal relationships. Finally, it is essential to organize the firm in 
such a way that it utilizes the value that its assets potentially can bring. Hence, the RBV assumes 
that performance is based on firm effects to a larger extent than structural mechanisms (Barney, 
2007). This assumption sharply contrasts with the MBV's fundamental proposition: “firm effects do 
not exist” (Schmalensee, 1985: pp. 349). Grant (1991) elaborates that when the external conditions 
are in a state of flux, an assessment of firms’ internal factors may provide a more stable basis on 
which to define their business. 
 RBV scholars find that path dependence, i.e., the proposition that firms' future trajectories 
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depend on their past performance, is key to understanding organizations. This approach calls for 
historical, comparative analysis (Nonaka and Teece, 2008). They also emphasize that 
complementarity fosters interdependence so that the presence of one mechanism sustains the 
functioning of others. This 'organizational complementarity' implies that any organizational change 
triggers a subsequent adaptation of the entire organization (Augier and Teece, 2008).  
 The RBV's attention to human assets has brought about a stream within the RBV termed the 
knowledge-based view. It emphasizes the acquisition and employment of knowledge assets to 
enhance performance (Teece, 2008). Whereas the MBV takes learning curve effects as a given 
(Silbiger, 2012), the RBV explains more thoroughly how these are obtained, e.g., through 
mechanisms that support the creation and diffusion of knowledge within the organization (Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995). Teece (2011), an advocate of the knowledge-based view, considers the firm a 
physical, social and resource allocation structure allowing knowledge to be shaped into 
competences known as 'dynamic capabilities'. Dynamic capabilities involve the ability to sense and 
seize new opportunities to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. Teece explains how these are 
built through the environmental and technological sensing apparatus that firms have established, 
their chosen organizational form, and their ability to strategize. Drawing on Teece's theory, Li, Peng 
and Macaulay (2013) argue that market-political ambidexterity is a bundle of dynamic capabilities 
which is key to corporate success in markets with considerable governmental influence. Using 
Shell's conduct in Russia as an example, they show that the ability to offer competitive products as 
well as continuously nurture government relations is crucial. While the empirical focus of Li et al. 
(2013) is emerging markets where governments continue to dominate in spite of institutional 
transition, their theory is relevant for all firms navigating politicized markets. Stobaugh (1981) 
predicted that government involvement in the global energy trade will only increase over time. 
 
3.3 Review of the institution-based view 
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The IBV focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutions and organizations, thus brings 
institutions to the forefront of the analysis (Meyer and Peng, 2005). Jackson and Degg (2008) 
caution that the interdisciplinary, eclectic institutional literature in IB is contested as it lacks 
consensus. The Comparative Capitalism (CC) advanced by Hall and Soskice (2001) and Aoki 
(2001) enriches IB with insightful descriptions of firms' social embeddedness in different countries, 
but CC is criticized for its lack of attention to MNC strategy. Therefore, I subscribe to Peng's (2002) 
conceptualization of institutions. From this perspective, strategy formulation is the outcome of the 
interaction effects of institutions and organizations. Institutions signal to organizations which 
choices are legal and legitimate. To account for this interplay, the IBV combines the new 
institutional economics (North, 1991), focusing on economic efficiency, with the new sociological 
institutionalism (Scott, 1995; Powell and DiMaggio, 1983), emphasizing legitimacy (Peng, 2002). 
 North (1991) taught us that institutions are the political, social and legal rules of the game. 
The formal institutions comprise laws and regulation, whereas the informal institutions are socially 
embedded through norms, traditions etc. They define and limit actors' choices. An institution can 
therefore be conceptualized as the equilibrium outcome of a game (Aoki, 2001). The first 
proposition of the IBV is that boundedly rational corporate actors pursue their interests and make 
strategic choices within the formal and informal constraints in a given institutional framework. The 
second proposition of the IBV is that in the absence of formal constraints, informal constraints will 
play a larger role in reducing uncertainty, providing guidance, and conferring legitimacy and 
rewards to corporate actors (Peng et al., 2009).  
 Institutions change over time. Some perspectives, e.g., the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), 
assume incremental, slow and path dependent change, whereas others, including Pragmatic 
Constructivism (PC), adopt a more dynamic approach to institutional change (Thelen, 2010). The 
IB literature indeed shows examples of rapid institutional change in emerging markets requiring 
MNCs to adapt swiftly (Meyer and Peng, 2005). In addition to structural change, the institutional 
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framework can be manipulated through agency (Lawton et al., 2013). 
 
3.4 The strategy tripod 
Peng et al. (2009) propose to unite the MBV, RBV and IBV in a strategy tripod (cf. figure 3.1) 
because they argue that the three perspectives complement each other in the sense that each of the 
tripod's legs helps to better explain firm behavior. The MBV informs that the strategic task is to 
position the firm most favorably relative to the industry dynamics. The RBV holds that firm-
specific resources and capabilities single out the successful firms, and the IBV reminds us to 
consider the strategic implications of the institutional landscape. 
 
Figure: 3.1 The strategy tripod 
Source: Peng (2006) as modified by the author 
 
 Table 3.1 below shows the level of analysis of the three views and their approach to 
environmental change. The MBV holds the industry as the unit of analysis. From the viewpoint of 
the MBV, change can be expected to impact on strategy formation to the extent that the industrial 
structure changes. On the other hand, from the perspective of the constructionist RBV, strategy 
formation will be impacted by environmental change to the extent that the strategy-makers 
recognize it. Finally, the IBV believes in co-constitution as it draws on both the functionalist 
economic institutionalism and the agency-centered sociological institutionalism. It thus 
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acknowledges that both exogenous and endogenous factors can be the starting point for strategy 
formulation. 
 
Table 3.1: Overview of the reviewed perspectives 
View Nation (macro) level Industry (meso) level Firm (micro) level Environmental change and 
strategy formation 
MBV  X  Structure 
RBV   X Agency 
IBV   X Co-constitution 
CC X   Co-constitution 
 
 Applying all three perspectives to the research issue is a way to overcome the limitation of 
the individual views (Peng et al., 2009). For example, the MBV is criticized for being unelaborate 
about business-state relations and collaboration strategies. One critique of the RBV is that the value 
of the resources and capabilities may vary depending on the institutional context in which the 
strategy operates. Hall and Soskice (2001) thus draw attention to 'institutional arbitrage' as they 
argue that organizational features tend to perform well under certain conditions but bring about 
failure in a different institutional setting. Given the relevance as well as limitations of each 
perspective, “the true determinants of firm performance probably involve a combination of these 
three-pronged forces, thus calling for a strategy tripod perspective” (Peng et al., 2009: pp. 72, 
original emphasis). All of the three strategy perspectives are evidently relevant for my PhD study. 
However, the strategy tripod offers no variables to operationalize the framework. In order to solve 
this issue, I review the literature on the nuclear industry in chapter four to identify the factors that 






Chapter 4 Empirical literature review: nuclear industry research 
Basrur, Collin and Kemburi (2012) summarize the contemporary nuclear debate as one based along 
the lines of environmental, economic and security concerns. For example, the Japanese policy-
makers chose nuclear power to enhance national energy security and build an export industry 
(Scalise, 2012), the French built nuclear reactors with the dual purpose of producing weapons grade 
material for nuclear war heads and generating electricity, while the Soviet Union adopted nuclear 
power for social, economic and political purposes to transform an agrarian, illiterate society into an 
urban, educated one (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Clearly, the business environment of the 
nuclear industry is influenced by many factors. A study of the future of nuclear power in the United 
States, for example, determined that the challenges of nuclear power promotion relate to cost, 
safety, waste management, and proliferation risk (Deutch, Forsberg, Kadak, Kazimi, Moniz, 
Parsons, Yangbo and Pierpoint, 2009). In this chapter, I identify the drivers of nuclear power 
development in a global perspective at the industry-, firm- and institution-level. The global 
perspective is important because Sovacool and Valentin (2012) found that the influencing factors to 
some extent vary among different countries  
 
4.1 Industry-level factors 
Rivalry 
The current established nuclear exporters are from Canada, France, China, South Korea, Russia, and 
Japan in close collaboration with the United States
3
. Canada became involved with nuclear power 
during WW II when the country agreed to host the Manhattan project in Montreal. In 1944, work 




In the wake of 3/11, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the phase-out of nuclear energy by 2022 amid 
pressure from a negative public opinion (Sethi, 2012b). Around the same time, Siemens announced that it will cease its 
nuclear activities but continue to offer components. The company has served clients mainly in Europe but also in India 





started to develop a LWR called the NRX. When it was complete in 1947, Canada owned the most 
powerful research reactor in the world. In 1952, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) was 
established as a government agency coordinating research and regulating nuclear export. It has a 
research monopoly over nuclear power. The government supports the development of the next 
generation of the CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors and has poured more than USD 
15.2 billion into nuclear R&D over the years. However, the current level of public debt makes it 
less able to provide nuclear investments. The CANDU reactor has been adopted by many countries 
(Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
France had become a leading country in nuclear physics by 1939. In 1945, de Gaulle set up 
the world's first civil atomic organization, the CEA. The commissioning of the military plant for 
enrichment of uranium would equip France with fuel for its nuclear plants. The 1973 oil crisis made 
France aware of its dependence on oil for its energy and the opposition to nuclear power fell silent. 
By 1983, half of French energy production was nuclear. The 1979 TMI accident was not covered 
much by the French media and hardly had any impact on the French nuclear expansion. The public 
still remembered the oil crisis and nuclear power seemed to be the only solution. When the 
Chernobyl accident struck in 1986, 70 per cent of French energy came from nuclear. French media 
covered the accident intensely and the social acceptance towards nuclear power dropped among the 
French population (Veyrat-Masson, 1992). Yet nowadays, France is the second largest nuclear 
power producer after the United States. The country shows what can be accomplished through a 
continuous commitment to nuclear power. The French vendor Areva was previously known as 
Framatome, a public corporation chosen to serve as the national champion for the manufacture of 
nuclear components. It collaborated with CEA on the design and construction of enrichment and 
reprocessing plants. In 1969, Compagnie Générale d' Electricité acquired a major stake in the 
private power generation firm, Alstom, with the intent of creating a national champion in nuclear 
turbine and generator development. Framatome now exclusively manufactured nuclear power 
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plants. CEA and Framatome merged in 2001 to create Areva with one of its divisions still operating 
all French nuclear reactors. It effectively mobilized the needed financial, scientific and human 
resources, and France managed to build reactors in the 1980s and 1990s that far exceeded electricity 
demand despite two economic recessions. The former French President Nicolas Sarkozy has stated 
that although nuclear power costs a lot it has secured energy independence, and it would be 
shortsighted to leave this instrumental national project to market forces. He also proposed an 
enhanced, better funded IAEA with more opportunities to help promote nuclear energy, as well as 
the establishment of nuclear training facilities in France (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). In 2005, the 
French announced that they would begin exporting at least 40 units after 2015 (Sovacool and 
Valentin, 2012). Around the same time, Areva agreed to a strategic collaboration with Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries to create more market dominance (Ferguson, 2011). In 2010, the French signed a 
MoU with Nuclear Power Corporation of India in order to export reactors. France is the largest 
exporter of nuclear energy as it transfers 18 per cent of its total production to Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It is one of the largest recyclers of nuclear fuel with 
17 per cent of national electricity coming from reprocessed fuel rods (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
Japanese power companies have commissioned Areva to process MOX fuels (Krooth et al., 2015). 
On the negative side, the safety features increase Areva's costs (Ferguson, 2011).  
China's plan to build up to 80 nuclear reactors by 2020 (Peimani, 2120), is the most 
extensive nuclear power expansion in history (Tay and Paungmalit, 2012). The country hopes to 
increase its nuclear generating capacity sixfold toward 2020 (Pomper and Harvey, 2012). Explosive 
economic growth has prompted a massive energy enhancement program (Sovacool and Valentin, 
2012). The country has conducted nuclear research since 1949. The Chinese and Soviets 
collaborated on nuclear science, industry, reactors and weapons throughout the 1950s, but in 1960, 
the country also pursued a self-reliance program focusing on indigenous reactor designs and 
domestic sources of fuel. The construction of China's first reactor began in 1985 by Chinese 
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engineers using domestic components, while the second reactor was constructed by a joint venture 
between a Chinese consortium, Framatome, Électricité de France and GE. China followed a 
'technology-for-market'- strategy where it partnered with Canadian, French and American 
companies to learn from them and adapt their technology to local needs. China nurtures the four key 
nuclear manufacturing companies: the Shanghai Electric Company, Dongfang Electric Corporation, 
the Harbin Power Equipment Company, and Heilongjiang Steel Casting and Forging Manufacturing 
Company. The Chinese nuclear industry now comprises more than 300 companies (Sovacool and 
Valentin, 2012).  
South Korea participated in Eisenhower’s 'Atoms for Peace' program. The country now has 
20 nuclear reactors providing 40 per cent of its energy, and plans to build another 10 reactors by 
2020. Though South Korea's right to reprocessing technology or services are limited by an 
agreement with the United States, the country plans to establish a nuclear fuel cycle to recycle spent 
fuel for energy use and to reduce high-level radioactive waste (Pomper and Harvey, 2012). A 
military coup in 1961 led to the consolidation of South Korea's regional electricity companies into a 
national entity, KEPCO, which is responsible for the construction of nuclear power plants, 
generation and distribution of nuclear electricity, and the planning, financing, training, licensing and 
management of foreign technical assistance. The government created the Korea Nuclear Fuel 
company in 1982 engaged in fuel technology and advanced reactor research, and the augmentation 
of foreign technologies. The KEPCO subsidiary Korea Hydro and Nuclear Corporation promotes 
nuclear export in Asian developing countries. It has agreed with Indonesia's PLN to conduct a 
feasibility study for Indonesia's first nuclear power plant. In 2010, the Emirates Nuclear Energy 
Corporation signed a USD 20.4 billion contract with KEPCO to build a nuclear power plant in 
Dubai (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). The UAE selected South Korea because their offer was the 
most cost-competitive and South Korea has a track record of building reactors in just about four 
years (Ferguson, 2011). The Ministry of Knowledge Economy has announced its goal to export 80 
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nuclear reactors worth USD 400 billion by 2030, which would give South Korea a 20 per cent 
global market share (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012).   
The Soviet nuclear industry was created for defense purposes. The starting point was the discovery 
in 1942 that Germany worked on an atomic bomb (Kruglov, 2002). The Soviet Union detonated its 
own nuclear bomb in 1951 (Wober, 1990a). As Soviet leaders believed that nuclear power would 
benefit all the republics they sent research reactors to Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan in 
1960. Dispatched physicists from Moscow created institutes in Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova in 
order to study how isotopes could be used in medicine, industry, and agriculture. Despite the 
Chernobyl disaster and a recently discovered wealth in natural gas, nuclear power provided about 
20 per cent of national electricity and the country plans to expand its share (Sovacool and Valentin, 
2012). Nuclear power was extremely centralized in the Soviet Union and the centralization 
continued after the fall the Soviet Union. RosEnergoAtom was established in 1992 to manage all 
nuclear power plants in Russia. RosEnergoAtom undertook an ambitious program in 1993 to 
expand nuclear across Russia. Moreover, it embarked on a successful marketing campaign to 
convince the former Soviet Republics to invest in nuclear power. Putin approved the construction of 
26 new nuclear power plants in 2007 to revive the Russian nuclear industry. They plan to export 60 
reactors over the next two decades, including a floating atomic plant in the White Sea. Russia has 
committed to starting research reactors in Myanmar and Vietnam (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
Rosatom has developed a new safety feature for its MIR 1200 preventing a Chernobyl-type accident 
(Peimani, 2012).  
 As a pioneering nuclear company, Westinghouse designed the first PWR in the United States 
in 1957, while GE built the BWRs (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012). The Japanese adopted nuclear 
power in close cooperation with the United States (Krooth et al., 2015). Japan sought to learn from 
the Americans to become independent and license reactor designs (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
The Japanese nuclear fleet has increased steadily, and past accidents have only resulted in short-
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term suspension of extension plans (Aldrich, 2012). Today, Japanese companies have taken over the 
nuclear business of the American GE and Westinghouse (Ferguson, 2011). 
 
Collaboration 
Collaboration is common in the global nuclear industry and takes place for technical, commercial, 
industrial and political reasons (Hill, 1978). It occurs multilaterally such as in March 1956, when 
China joined Russia and a coalition of 10 other communist countries to inaugurate the Joint Atomic 
Nuclear Research Institute in Dubna. More recent examples are the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) established by France, Japan, Canada, Russia, China and the United States to 
promote nuclear energy as a way to reduce greenhouse gases (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012), as well 
as the Bush administration launching the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) among the 
existing nuclear weapon states plus Japan in 2006 seeking to promote further use of nuclear power 
in a proliferation-resistant way (Ferguson, 2011). Collaboration also occurs bilaterally such as when 
the United States helped France in 1959 to access military grade uranium-235 for naval reactors. In 
1961 the countries began to share information on nuclear weapons systems and research (Sovacool 
and Valentin, 2012). It is also argued that due to the corporate link between Japanese nuclear firms 
and their foreign peers, the Japanese government cannot ignore the nuclear policy preferences of 
these countries (Hymans, 2011 in Kingston, 2014). Vivoda (2014) and Krooth et al. (2015) observe 
indirect support of nuclear power promotion in Japan from the United States due to American 
commercial and security interests. In the wake of 3/11, the United States and France assisted Japan 
to resolve the nuclear crisis because they feared that the accident would severely damage the global 
business environment for nuclear power (Krooth et al., 2015). Another example of bilateral nuclear 
collaboration is the invitation to Japanese energy companies to mine uranium in the Russian Far 
East (Burrett, 2014). Finally, nuclear collaboration occurs supra-nationally through organizations 
such as OECD, IAEA, and the UN (Lennep, 1978; Huet, 1978; Myers, 1978). 
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 Nucleaer collaboration was characterized by secrecy initially but the isolationistic approach 
ended in the mid-1950s with President Eisenhower's speech 'Atoms for Peace' in 1953. The second 
phase saw the disappearance of uranium monopoly, the availability of enriched uranium from 
America on the world market, and increasing international trade in research reactors and nuclear 
power plants. The joint construction and administration of nuclear power plants has been a fruitful 
area for international collaboration (Goldschmidt, 1978). Nuclear accidents used to be a matter of 
the local government (Hancher and Cameron, 1988), but the Chernobyl accident demonstrated the 
transnational impact of a nuclear accident; among the OECD members, only Australia escaped 
contamination. All governments of countries relying on or having plans to adopt nuclear power 
showed willingness to establish international safety measures (Cameron, 1988). President 
Gorbachev called for a stronger international collaboration and commitment in the area of safe 
nuclear power development (Reyners and Lellouche, 1988), and the World Association of Nuclear 
Operators came into being (Kakodkar, 2012). 
 Murata (1978) identified five types of nuclear collaboration: 1) cooperation between 
individuals and cooperation among nations or international organizations. At the interpersonal level, 
this type of collaboration depends on the personality of researchers. At the national or international 
organizational level, it depends on national characteristics; 2) bilateral cooperation and 
multinational cooperation where the former tends to involve hardware and the latter concerns 
software. Multinational collaboration is more complicated; 3) cooperation under a multinational 
agreement and cooperation through an international organization. The former tends to be exclusive 
whereas the latter kind benefits from several participants; 4) cooperation in the form of a club and 
cooperation within a system. The former is flexible with somewhat unclear objectives. The latter is 
usually efficient but inflexible. The OECD-NEA is an example of collaboration as a club; 5) 
cooperation for promotion and cooperation in establishing regulations. An example of 'promotion' is 
the promotion of nuclear technology development and the study of the plans for regional fuel cycle 
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centers. The preparation of international criteria for reactor safety, physical protection, etc. are 
examples of 'regulations'. 
 Other areas are less subject to collaboration. There has long been a high degree of 
international collaboration and joint enterprise in all aspects of nuclear fuel but concerns about the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons both inhibit and encourage it (Hill, 1978). For example, while 
collaborating with Japan, the United States made sure not to enable its former enemy to develop 
nuclear weapons. Rather, the goal was to expand the future market for nuclear technology 
developed by American corporations (Krooth et al., 2015). Similarly, the aforementioned deal on 
nuclear industry collaboration between Russia and Japan should have been concluded in 2007 but 
was delayed due to Japanese distrust and suspicion that Russia would use Japanese technology to 
advance its defense industry (Burrett, 2014).  
 
Buyer power 
Countries with nuclear power plants seek to secure supplies of uranium as well as access to a 
diversity of fuel producers. They also seek a mix of suppliers for reactors. Even if they choose only 
one or two reactor designs, they would first want to consider several designs, weighing the pros and 
cons of each and benefit from the competition among vendors to obtain a favorable price. Recently, 
several countries have expressed interest in acquiring their first nuclear power plant, including 
countries previously thought of as economically, technically and politically incapable of nuclear 
power development such as Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Belarus, Zimbabwe, 
Ghana, Namibia and Nigeria. They nonetheless face significant challenges to develop effective 
regulatory agencies, train personnel, foster a safety and security culture and secure the financial 
resources. In the UAE it may take up to ten years for the first of the reactors to begin operating due 
to these issues (Ferguson, 2011). Most of the new construction takes place in Asia (Tay and 
Paungmalit, 2012). Prior to 3/11, Asian countries considered nuclear power a mature and safe 
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technology and were less optimistic about renewables (Basrur and Collin, 2012). Though 3/11 came 
as a shock to the Asian nations they eventually reconfirmed their commitment to nuclear power 
which they see as a key option for clean energy development to sustain their socio-economic 
growth (Basrur and Collin, 2012). As Japan gains control over the nuclear crisis, sentiments are 
shifting in the rest of Asia. The 10 ASEAN members have discussed nuclear safety and agreed that 
nuclear continues to be a viable option in a future cleaner energy scenario. The region accounted for 
more than 40 per cent of the world's carbon emissions in 2009 and the trend is steadily rising 
(Basrur et al., 2012). South Korea, Japan and China have held a summit meeting to discuss a 
regional collaboration on nuclear safety (Sethi, 2012b). 
 
Supplier power 
When constructing new nuclear power plants, the vendor acts as the main contractor with the 
overall responsibility and outsources to other equipment manufacturers. One of the most dominant 
subcontractors are Japan Steel Works which occupies approximately 80 per cent of the market for 
large iron elements used for nuclear reactor pressure. The recent increase in demand has attracted 
new entrants. It is a challenge to secure enough personnel as about 2,000 workers are needed for 
construction of one reactor. Nuclear engineers, safety physicists, craft laborers, cement makers, and 
electricians are skilled professions requiring several years of training. Since the industry faces a 
wave of retirements, governments and nuclear companies invest in recruitment and training 
(Ferguson, 2011). 
 In a vertically integrated business model one company has access to all parts of the nuclear 
fuel cycle. Vendors which own capabilities in uranium mining, uranium enrichment, fuel 
manufacturing, reactor construction, radioactive waste management, and plutonium recycling may 
respond more swiftly to changes to demand for supplies. The increasing globalization of the nuclear 
industry can make matching supply and demand easier due to the circulation of information inside a 
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conglomerate (Ferguson, 2011). 
New entrants 
Some nations which are clients today may become rivals in the future, although significant entry 
barriers complicate the transition from client to rival. For instance, India began investigating 
nuclear energy already in 1945 by providing the Tata group with funds to conduct research on 
nuclear physics. In 1956 the first research reactor was complete but not until 1969 did India have its 
first nuclear power plant. The Indian nuclear industry has had difficulty acquiring fuel, supplies and 
knowledge due to an international nuclear materials embargo prompted by India's nuclear weapons 
tests since 1974 (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Since India has not committed itself to the NPT 
(Choi, 2012), the country has had to submit a declaration on non-proliferation, the setting up of a 
reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards, and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel supplied by 
the United States to verify that the country doesn't use it for its military program (Pant, 2011).  
 A number of Middle East countries have desired to acquire nuclear weapons since the 1960s 
as they experience a military threat which they cannot deter in other ways. However, many of these 
countries including Iraq, Syria and Libya have more or less given up their nuclear plans due to 
strong international pressure. The USA, the EU and the UN have enacted a severe sanction regime 
on Iran since 1979 due to the country’s nuclear aspirations. Even so, Iran insists that the country is 
entitled to have a nuclear program as long as it is peaceful. Iran perceives the economic sanctions as 
economic warfare and they have little effect on the country’s political ambitions. Rather, they push 
the country toward the East to withstand the Western tyranny. Iran’s dilemma is that an actual 
nuclear wepons program could lead to deterioration of Iran’s importance, recognition and growth 
which is the exact opposite of what the country aims for (Nielsen, 2015). 
 
Substitutes 
In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, nuclear power saw strong demand globally in spite of concerns 
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over its safety and potential damage to the environment (Murata, 1978). Opponents to nuclear 
power were few but there were quite a number of sceptics and hesitants (Huet, 1978). The global 
nuclear capacity rose from less than one GW in 1960 to 300 GW in the 1980s (Hill, 1978). 
Haunschild (1978) argued at the time that it is difficult to imagine how the industrialized countries 
can live without nuclear power. Meanwhile, the global nuclear capacity had only grown to 372 GW 
by 2010 (Peimani, 2012). What is more, many nuclear reactors will retire over the next decades 
(Diesendorf, 2012). Yet the number of nuclear reactors may still increase from the current total of 
around 436 to between 602 and 1,350 units by 2030 (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012). 
 Nuclear power expansion is vulnerable to shifting political sentiments as other energy 
sources appear more attractive. In Japan, the power sector obstructed the first efforts to introduce a 
feed-in-tariff (FIT) system in 2003 aimed to create a level playing field for renewables. Instead, a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) was introduced that only required the utilities to supply a 
limited amount of power from renewables. They were able to produce it in-house, thus avoided the 
risk of new entry into their industry. The FIT program introduced in 2009 only applied to solar and 
the utilities were able to deny independent solar producers access to their grid. However, with the 
outbreak of 3/11, the industry could no longer prevent the implementation of a generous FIT system 
(Samuels, 2013). Up until 3/11, nuclear power enjoyed full political support as it is very close to the 
heart of the LDP but recent developments clearly indicate an energy-political repositioning within 
the party (DeWitt, 2015). 
The risk of nuclear accidents, the unresolved challenge of nuclear waste and the high costs 
of decommissioning make nuclear energy less attractive. On the other hand, many view climate 
change as the game changer that is reversing a declining nuclear trend (Sovacool and Valentin, 
2012). No single energy technology is able to solve the problem of climate change. Nuclear energy 
is important because it emits low amounts of CO2 and can provide a tremendous amount of 
commercial electrical power (Ferguson, 2011) due to the high energy density of nuclear fuels (Gopi 
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Rethinaraj, 2012). Nuclear power occupies a limited area: ”for a 1,000 MW power plant, nuclear 
requires about one square mile of space, compared with 50 square miles for solar, 250 for wind and 
2,600 for biomass” (Sethi, 2012b: pp. 47). No energy source is free from environmental risks, and if 
the goal is to move away from carbon intensive energy sources renewables and nuclear energy are 
the only options (Gopi Rethinaraj, 2012). Commercial coal power with carbon capture and storage 
technology is still decades away (Diesendorf, 2012). In fairness, nuclear energy does produce 
considerable carbon emissions when viewed in terms of the full nuclear fuel cycle. Yellowcake 
mining, ore transport, uranium extraction, uranium enrichment, nuclear power plant construction, 
waste management and decommissioning are all CO2 emitting processes. Carbon estimates range 
from 1.4gCO2eq/kWh to 288gCO2eq/kWh for the complete nuclear life cycle, leading some to 
argue that nuclear power may not help to curb CO2 in the short term. Furthermore, the 
environmental effects of decommissioning are unclear because it is a relatively new practice (Tay 
and Paungmalit, 2012). While nuclear may not be as clean as renewables it is more environmentally 
friendly than fossil fuels. At the end of 2009, the world's nuclear reactors produced 15 per cent of 
the global electricity. If this should have been provided by coal about an additional 4,000 million 
metric tons of CO2 would have been emitted. If replaced by natural gas, the number would be 
around 2,000 million metric tons of CO2 (Ferguson, 2011). 
 Many countries were enthusiastic about nuclear power in the 1940s which was introduced as 
”too cheap to meter”, prompting policy-makers to conclude that nuclear power was essential to 
ensure national competitive advantage (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). However, many calculations 
of the cost of nuclear energy consider only the direct costs of building and operating reactors, plus 
mining, processing, and transporting fuel and do not take into account indirect costs to society from 
environmental and health damage, or the costs of accidents, cleanup, nuclear waste storage, and 
decommissioning (Krooth et al., 2015). Moreover, the veil of secrecy often protecting nuclear 
power development can lead to intransparency with regards to costs (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
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While the nuclear costs are driven by high up-front capital costs, the cost driver is fuel cost for 
natural gas. Coal lies in-between. The construction costs of nuclear plants frequently end up being 
much larger than projected due to delays, for example due to public controversy and new regulatory 
requirements. Improving these factors can make nuclear more competitive (Deutch et al., 2009). 
Accidents are another cost factor which can be quite significant. The Japanese government expected 
after 3/11 that the costs of the damages from the nuclear accident will exceed 20 trillion yen over 
the next 20 years (Uchida, 2013).  
Diesendorf (2012) cautions that it is easy to manipulate the costs of nuclear energy due to 
the discrepancy between high capital cost and low operating costs by choosing an unrealistically 
low interest or discount rate. Often, the data is supplied by the nuclear industry itself, e.g., the 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Similarly, wind power can appear unrealistically expensive by 
using data from areas where the conditions for wind power are poor. In many cases, nuclear reactors 
are more expensive than other types of power reactors. Even so, nuclear power is economical for 
certain countries (Peimani, 2012) and it can ensure energy security as we decrease our use of fossil 
fuels (Ferguson, 2011). Scientists have pointed out that Chernobyl could cost up to 30,000 excess 
cancer deaths over 70 years but if the Soviet were to generate the same amount of electricity from 
fossil fuels there might be about a million excess deaths (Wober, 1992d). 
 
4.2 firm-level factors 
Technology 
After Chernobyl, which demonstrated that accidents can be man-made as well as caused by 
technical and systemic flaws, it was clear that nuclear accidents are unavoidable. No amount of 
legislation can totally eliminate the risk (Hancher and Cameron, 1988; Reyners and Lellouche, 
1988). Hence, nuclear power can never be completely safe due to technical issues and workforce 
and management issues, From 1947 to 2008, about 76 nuclear reactor accidents occurred worldwide 
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(Tay and Paungmalit, 2012). Declining political and social support for nuclear power relates to past 
accidents (Brown, 1992), and attempts by the nuclear industry to cover them up (Sovacool and 
Valentin, 2012). Whenever a nuclear accident or incident occurs, the industry is clearly affected by 
changing attitudes toward nuclear power which potentially can lead to policy changes (Cameron, 
1988; Tay and Paungmalit, 2012). Whereas there had been little opposition globally to nuclear 
power expansion up until then, the technical and economic feasibility of nuclear power began to be 
questioned worldwide after TMI (Dauvergne, 1993). TMI implied that the utilities needed to 
operate their plants more efficiently. Furthermore, that nuclear regulation ought to be more 
comprehensive and independent, and investors started to demand higher premiums for financing 
nuclear power generation (Jasper, 1990). The utilities pushed the NRC for early restart of the TMI 
plant but, it took longer time than expected due to opposition and complex regulation (Walker, 
2004). Basically, TMI challenged the nuclear optimism having prevailed since the early days of the 
civil use of nuclear power (Cameron, 1988). Similarly, the Chernobyl accident impacted negatively 
on many countries’ approach to nuclear power (Wober, 1992a), and 3/11 caused the Japanese public 
to lose faith in their government's ability to handle nuclear power safely (Kingston, 2014). It is 
important to continuously improve the safety of nuclear plants to preserve the legitimacy of atomic 
power. The industry therefore seeks to decrease the risk of accidents to preserve a favorable 
business environment (Ferguson, 2011). 
 On the positive side, accidents generate generic lessons leading to adaptation of nuclear 
power programmes (Kakodkar, 2012). The clean-up of TMI which amounted to USD one billion, 
continued to bring new and surprising information to light. The Japanese government and nuclear 
industry paid USD 18 million of the amount to acquire information and provide training for their 
nuclear engineers (Walker, 2004). TMI hurt the nuclear industry in the sense that it exposed the 
problems of nuclear power generation. However, the accident also “opened a small chance to solve 
some of them” (Jasper, 1990: pp. 214). The nuclear industry stressed that it had learned from its 
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mistakes (Walker, 2004). After Chernobyl, some countries implemented measures on existing 
reactor containments to prevent the release of radioactivity (Hancher and Cameron, 1988).  
 After TMI, 40 per cent of the American population were in favor of nuclear power while 44 
per cent opposed it. However, when public opinion is viewed over a 15 year period beginning in the 
early 1970s, TMI merely accelerated an already existing trend against nuclear power (McCaffrey, 
1991). The Chernobyl accident also did nothing more than accelerate ongoing developments 
(Hancher and Cameron, 1988). Similarly, the countries pursuing nuclear power expansion prior to 
3/11 reconfirmed their commitment after the accident (Basrur and Collins, 2012). 3/11 can indeed 
be interpreted in two ways (Peimani, 2012); on one hand, it proved that nuclear reactors will shut 
down without human intervention just as they are designed to. On the other hand, 3/11 showed the 
vulnerability of nuclear reactors to risks that may not have been taken into account when they were 
designed (Sethi, 2012b). Plants vary in safety due to design, maintenance, training of operators, and 
commitment to safety culture (Ferguson, 2011). A total of 13 reactors at the Onagawa Nuclear 
Power Plant, the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant and the Fukushima Dai-Ni Nuclear 
Power Plant were affected by 3/11. Four reactors at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi were affected severely 
(Bhadwaj, 2012). It is argued that if the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant had had 
generation III reactors instead of its generation II reactors, 3/11 could not have occurred (Sovacool 
and Valentin, 2012). A new generation of advanced nuclear reactors, known as generation-IV 
reactors, is currently under development. They are capable of providing effective fuel utilization, 




Nuclear export is part of American foreign policy (Krooth et al., 2015). In general, political 
commitment is crucial for nuclear power development as the industry depends on governments for 
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financing given the considerable risk-taking and large investments required (Sovacool and Valentin, 
2012). For instance, the United States government offered about USD eight billion of loan 
guarantees in 2010 to the Vogtle power plant in Georgia (Ferguson, 2011). The Americans who 
usually subscribe to free-market principles have always supported nuclear power with subsidies 
because atomic energy was neither technically nor economically feasible when their leaders 
embraced it in the 1940s. With no private investments available, the government realized that it had 
to create the market for nuclear power. More than USD seven billion were allocated to nuclear 
power in research spending from 1951 to 1974. In comparison, the amount allocated to fossil fuels 
and renewables was only a couple of million dollars. From 1947 to 1999 federal subsidies for 
nuclear power in the United States totaled about USD 200 billion (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012). 
To this end, nuclear power is argued to be a text book example of regulatory capture in the United 
States (Kingston, 2014). In 1987, the NRC Commissioner was accused of having improper ties with 
the nuclear industry and encouraged to resign by members of Congress and NRC employees 
(Jasper, 1990). Similarly, in Japan, court ruling usually benefits the utilities (Yūko et al., 2012; 
Kingston, 2014), and the 'nuclear village' is influential. It consists of pro-nuclear Japanese corporate 
and political actors, business federations, media, and academia who are united through reciprocal 
exchanges and collaboration. They are rewarded with access to resources as well as decision-
making, and punished with ostracism. The network nurtures solidarity and a group-think that 
marginalizes dissenting opinions (Kingston, 2012). 
 
4.3 Institution-level factors 
Public opinion 
The enthusiasm for atomic energy was great in its early days (McCaffrey, 1991; Andrén, 2012). 
Decision-makers nonetheless realized over time that social acceptability may not go hand-in-hand 
with economic acceptability. In the 1970s, public demonstrations against nuclear proliferation 
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“disrupted what was once an orderly nuclear market place” (Myers, 1978, pp. 71). As citizens both 
participate in and comply with public policy (Andrén, 2012), social acceptance of the technology is 
a key concern for nuclear proponents who therefore make continuous and considerable efforts to 
shape the public mind to their advantage (Krooth et al., 2015). Campaigns in favor of nuclear 
energy began in Japan in 1955 in collaboration with the United States (Sovacool and Valentin, 
2012). The United States considered Japan ideal to promote a nuclear energy campaign due to the 
country's sufferings from the deployment of nuclear weapons. If Japanese citizens could be 
persuaded to adopt nuclear energy, other countries might also accept the technology and generate 
electricity from their own nuclear power plants (Krooth et al., 2015). By the end of 1956, 70 per 
cent of the Japanese population still thought that nuclear technology was harmful. Even so, the 
Japanese government had ensured the funding, a R&D network and a law to advance the 
development of nuclear power. The first experimental research reactor had been underway for two 
years and the country was about to purchase its first reactor. Increasing not-in-my-backyard 
(NIMBY) activism over the years has prompted METI to negotiate with various civil-society actors, 
leading to cost overruns and delays (Scalise, 2014). Therefore, depopulating, poor communities in 
which civil society was weak have been selected as potential sites for nuclear power plants 
(Aldrich, 2012). After 3/11, the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (hangenren) organized 
demonstrations that took place in front of the prime minister's residence every Friday to prevent 
restart of two nuclear reactors in the Fukui prefecture. In many cases, the police reported a 
markedly lower number of demonstrators (Ogawa, 2014). In addition to demonstrations, civil 
society organizations in communities hosting nuclear power plants have sent protest letters to the 
power companies and prefectural governors with demands to stop the reactors, cancel plans for new 
construction and switch to renewables (Yūko et al., 2012). Also the Japan Buddhist Federation and 
the monks at the Eiheiji Temple in the Fukui Prefecture called for the abandonment of nuclear 
power. Nevertheless, the reactors in Fukui came back online in July, 2012 (Uchida, 2013). The large 
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protests in Japan fell silent over time (Samuels, 2013). Power companies allegedly buy advertising 
space in major media to limit negative press coverage. The Asahi Shimbun, for example, reduced its 
coverage of nuclear-related issues by 30 per cent in 2012 and continued limiting its coverage in 
2013. The 2012 lower house election and the 2013 upper house election were more about economic 
growth and social security reform than energy policy (Scalise, 2014). Japan never had a broad 
dialogue with civil society on nuclear policy (Aldrich, 2012); at public forums designed to solicit 
community input prior to nuclear power siting decisions, preselected individuals presented 
prescreened questions (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Japanese decision-makers believe the public 
opinion on nuclear power is malleable (Aldrich, 2012). The picture is the same in many countries. 
In China, policies of land acquisition, lack of judicial independence, low levels of public 
environmental awareness, disregard of complaints and arrest of protesters help to fast-track siting 
issues, albeit increasing public criticism has prompted the government to engage the public and 
enhance the transparency of nuclear power development. In South Korea, the nuclear power 
program was initially controlled by a military dictatorship. Moreover, Confucian values discourage 
public engagement as politicians are seen as teachers who deserve to be trusted. The general low 
rate of political participation among South Koreans reflects this mindset. Environmental advocacy 
is nonetheless increasing and the government has had to respond with educational campaigns 
designed to convince the public to support nuclear power. Canada used to insulate its nuclear power 
program from social pressure. Nowadays, however, applications for licensing new nuclear power 
plants must undergo a public review process which can delay approval for more than a decade. The 
Soviet public was too uninformed and powerless to oppose to the nuclear power program, and after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, hyperinflation as well as food and electricity crises drew the public's 
attention away from nuclear protests. One method to put the technology in a positive light in Russia 
is the industry's annual beauty contest open to women working with or studying nuclear power. 
Meanwhile, a 2007 poll indicated that only 27 per cent of Russians support the construction of new 
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nuclear power plants. Protests in Russia also occurred after 3/11. In the United States, decisions 
regarding nuclear were left to experts since the decision-makers believed that the public was 
incapable of understanding the complexities of nuclear power (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
However, demonstrations after TMI drawing hundreds of thousands of participants made an impact 
on American politicians. Consequently, several nuclear power projects were abandoned in the 1980s 
regardless of the sunk costs involved (Jasper, 1990). The French have suppressed public 
involvement by controlling the information flow and access points, expropriating land, ignoring 
appeals, and deploying the special riot police in the event of demonstrations. Scholars have 
compared the French nuclear program with the Greek mythology where the government plays the 
roles of the mighty gods, industries and utilities are closely aligned with the gods as their titans, and 
the public are the mortals with little or no control over the nuclear future of their nation. 
Meanwhile, polls since 2005 indicate that the French population no longer wants nuclear power, 
and political opposition is strengthening. Pressure from the EU to restructure and privatize 
electricity markets along with calls for greater transparency and participation in energy decision-
making have weakened the capacity of nuclear advocates. In 1997, the Green Party successfully led 
a campaign to abandon the French FBR program, and an anti-nuclear French NGO was established 
in 1998 (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
 In order to shape the public opinion, television is an excellent “agent of great intrusive and 
persuasive power” (Wober, 1992a: pp. xiv). One example is the movie 'Our Friend the Atom' 
created in 1957 by the Walt Disney Company with funding from General Dynamics and the United 
States Navy, featuring a scientist who compares atomic energy to a genie in a bottle that is capable 
of doing both good and evil. He explains the history of the discovery of the atom and nuclear 
energy, shows an atomic chain reaction, and talks about the potential applications of nuclear power. 
Millions of children worldwide watched the movie in public schools and public theaters (Krooth et 
al., 2009). Another promotion strategy is the introduction of popular culture characters by the 
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Japanese nuclear industry (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012; Samuels, 2013). In England, the nuclear 
firm BNFL realized in the 1980s that it was perceived as a secretive and dishonest environmental 
polluter. The company responded by inviting the public to visit its Sellafield plant as a tourist 
destination and managed to attract hundreds of thousands of visitors. A questionnaire among the 
visitors showed that 57 per cent were very or fairly pro-nuclear before entering the facility. Upon 
leaving, the figure rose to 79 per cent. Representative public surveys indicated that the company's 
image had improved in a number of ways (Brown, 1992). Other attempts to cultivate a favorable 
public opinion toward atomic energy include 'cooperation funds' offered by the Japanese central 
government to the local governments agreeing to host nuclear power plants. In addition to civic 
centers, museums, schools, hospitals and infrastructure, these subsidies provided trips abroad for 
'habituation visits' with residents of foreign communities who explained how they live peacefully 
near nuclear facilities. Utilities and related organizations also gave host governments separate 
funding. When a Japanese town called Futaba at some point reached the brink of bankruptcy it 
turned to TEPCO for financial help and approved a plan to build two new nuclear reactors (Hirano, 
2015). Japanese politicians have frequently traveled to targeted sites to promote nuclear, while local 
government officials were flown to Tokyo to learn about nuclear and how to sell it to their  
residents. Under the Three Power Source Development Laws, up to USD 20 million per year (raised 
through electricity taxes) can be used to support programs and infrastructure development in 
Japanese communities having agreed to host nuclear power plants (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
The significant compensation offered to these communities hampers local advocacy and protest 
mobilization (Yūko et al., 2012). Aldrich (2012) found that residents of towns where nuclear power 
plants are being planned or constructed remain pro-nuclear in spite of 3/11. 
 
Energy policy 
Energy policymaking is about ensuring sufficient energy supply as economically and 
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environmentally friendly as possible. The essential concepts of energy security are availability, 
reliability, and affordability (Ferguson, 2011). Energy security was without doubt the strongest 
driver of nuclear power promotion in Japan which suffered energy supply disruptions during the 
WW II as the United States cut off their access to oil supplies, mainly from Indonesia (Sovacool 
and Valentin, 2012). In 2010, METI put forward the Basic Energy Plan which emphasized energy 
security and energy efficiency to reduce electric power prices; environmental protection to reduce 
the emission of CO2; and economic growth. Nuclear power was considered the solution to the 
realization of all these goals (Samuels, 2013). The Nixon Administration's 1974 'project 
independence' called for nuclear power to provide 40 per cent of the nation's power by 1990 and 50 
per cent by 2000 (McCaffrey, 1991). Nuclear energy became central to France's national energy 
strategy after the 1973 oil crisis. Similarly, Russia considers nuclear power a necessity to avoid 
electricity shortages (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). When China suffered for serious blackouts and 
shortages of oil, coal and electricity in the 2000s, support for nuclear power increased among the 
elite. Today, Chinese leaders also link reduction of CO2 to nuclear power expansion. Nuclear power 
is also seen as the most realistic option for South Korea to reduce CO2. France achieved a reduction 
in pollution from fossil fuels by more than 80 percent and in CO2 by 25 per cent from 1980 to 1990 
due to nuclear energy (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). In comparison, Germany is able to abandon 
nuclear power because the country has a stable population, a mature electricity market and 
sufficient energy availability. It can also easily import energy from France (Sethi, 2012b). 
 
Industrial policy 
Eisenhower's ‘Atoms for Peace’ program earmarked USD 475 million in funds to promote nuclear 
power abroad to transform the world, fight the communists and create a market for American 
nuclear technology. The Soviet Union responded to this American psychological warfare with their  
'Peaceful Atom' project that was much larger in terms of funding. It focused on non-military uses of 
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nuclear energy and disseminated nuclear materials and knowledge to the communist states. In 
France, the nuclear industry was targeted for public support as the government saw nuclear power 
promotion as a way to advance the nation both economically and scientifically to ultimately revive 
the French identity after WW II. For China, nuclear was a regional declaration of national progress 
and instrumental for improving economic competitiveness. Similarly, India's nuclear dreams were 
driven by the desire to demonstrate Indian technical skill, overcome the discrimination inherent in 
the NPT and boost India's image as the leader of the underprivileged world (Sovacool and Valentin, 
2012). Although Canada became involved with nuclear through the Manhattan project, they 
believed that atomic energy would have applications of social and economic importance that were 
far greater than its military applications. The country established a national competitive advantage 
in the manufacturing of isotopes in reactors. The prospects of uranium export also made nuclear 
power a promising industry for Canada. Between 1975 and 2001, the Japanese government 
committed more than USD two billion annually to nuclear power research, allowing the nation to 
nurture the largest per capita number of researchers, scientists, engineers, and technicians in the 
nuclear power field (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). In the aftermath of 3/11, pro-nuclear politicians 
highlighted the significance of Japanese nuclear technology by referring to the Onagawa Nuclear 
Power Plant which shut down according to plans when the tsunami struck. They advocated to 
maintain and develop the nation's high expertise in nuclear technology to protect Japan's position as 
one of the world's frontrunners in this field. Some argue that the less-experienced nations 
committed to nuclear power need Japan's continued guidance. Thus, abandonment of nuclear power 
in Japan could threaten the safety of other countries (Samuels, 2013). Japan indeed plans to boost 
nuclear exports regardless of 3/11 (Krooth et al., 2015). Nuclear power has played a key role in the 
economic development of South Korea since the 1980s and is expected to continue to do so. In aa 
similar manner, the ideological foundation of the Russian atomic energy program rests on Joseph 
Stalin's view of nuclear power as key to modernization. The direct interventionist approach 
58/220 
catalyzed the creation of entire cities and towns for nuclear research (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). 
 
Security policy 
Nuclear power has received more public research funding than any other energy source due to its 
potential military applications. Fuel reprocessing for civilian nuclear power programs has strongly 
influenced the effectiveness of weapons programs, and vice versa. The Manhattan project aimed at 
building nuclear weapons began in 1942 and the first nuclear weapons tests occurred in New 
Mexico a few months before the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan 
in 1945 (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). States with ambitions for power feel tempted to adopt a 
nuclear weapons program because the international community usually listens to nuclear weapon 
states in security discussions. The possession of atomic bombs can also compensate for a country’s 
insufficient conventional forces at low cost and boost its national pride (Nielsen, 2015).  
The security aspect is certainly a key driver of many countries' nuclear power programs. 
When China adopted nuclear, the peaceful uses of atomic energy were secondary to the military 
ones. In South Korea, the military aggressions by North Korea helped nuclear proponents to frame 
nuclear power as essential (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Highly enriched uranium has been 
produced for military purposes in Pakistan under the guidance of Abdul Quadeer Khan (Pomper and 
Harvey, 2012). The country has conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and still has not committed itself to 
the NPT (Choi, 2012). The Indian nuclear power program began with the purpose of creating 
nuclear weapons, as the country felt threatened by China and to a lesser extent Pakistan. After the 
WW II, the Soviet Union channeled substantial resources into the development of atomic bombs. In 
1945, the union imported uranium fuel from Germany and Czechoslovakia, and used German 
scientists to start research on isotope separation. The uranium enrichment techniques that Russia 
still relies on today are based on this work (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Britain also initiated its 
nuclear power program for security reasons (Hill, 2013). During the emergent Cold War, the United 
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States sought a strategic nuclear alliance with Japan and Western European countries to protect 
against the communists' expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, China and India (Krooth et al. 
2015). The Suez Crisis as well as the Cold War prompted France to build a nuclear weapons testing 
facility in the French Sahara in 1957 (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). Although Japan has foresworn 
equipping itself with nuclear weapons (Iwao, 1992), the country's first nuclear research was driven 
by military interest. The United States dismantled Japan's nuclear research capabilities after WW II, 
partly by symbolically dumping it into Tokyo Bay (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). In the post-3/11 
nuclear debate, the LDP Secretary General stated that Japan needs to maintain nuclear energy to 
show other nations that it retains the nuclear bomb option (Kingston, 2014). Some Japanese 
politicians have indicated that it is worthwhile to develop nuclear weapons because Japan's 
enemies, China, North Korea and Russia, all have them. Furthermore, diplomatic bargaining power 
means nuclear weapons, evidenced by the fact that all the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council have them. Neo-conservative politicians in Japan tend to see nuclear armament as an 
indispensable strategy to restore Japan's world status (Krooth et al., 2015). The current development 
of an atomic program in Iran is controversial due to indications that the country aims to achieve 
nuclear weapons to strengthen its military capacity and gain international recognition and self-
confidence (Nielsen, 2015).  
 It goes without saying that the generation of electricity from nuclear power involves the risk 
of proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism. While many countries recycle their Plutonium as 
MOX fuel in existing nuclear reactors, the majority of the separated plutonium stock is indefinitely 
stored, raising latent proliferation concern. Some claim that stopping nuclear power is the most 
effective way to minimize proliferation and security threats but the fact is that spent nuclear fuel, 
separated special nuclear materials and plutonium and highly enriched uranium already exist (Choi, 
2012). Several attempts have been made to smuggle nuclear material and radioactive substances out 
of former Soviet Union countries where control was lax. Therefore, the IAEA and its member states 
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work to develop measures against nuclear terrorism which it considers a real threat, especially after 
the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States (Walker, 2004). Proliferation partly refers to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries that do not have them, and partly to the increase of 
nuclear arsenals in countries that already have nuclear weapons. The former is known as 'horizontal 
proliferation' and the latter is known as 'vertical proliferation'. While the United States and Russia 
decrease their arsenals, India and Pakistan increase theirs. The eight known possessors of nuclear 
weapons are China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, England and the United States. 
The ninth undeclared nuclear arms possessor is Israel. South Africa is the only country having 
completely dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to 
additional countries, the non-proliferation regime consists of the NPT, international institutions such 
as the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements in 
which client states agree to accept safeguards and monitoring of their peaceful nuclear programmes 
in order to receive technologies and assistance for these programs. The United Nations Security 
Council is responsible for enforcing the system (Ferguson, 2011). 
 
4.4 Conceptual model 
Having shown that the market for nuclear power is driven by many factors that interact with each 
other, the tripod perspective advocated by (Peng et al., 2009) is clearly relevant for my PhD project. 
Similar to the strategy tripod, my conceptual model shown in figure 4.1 below combines the MBV, 
RBV and IBV in a three-level analysis. For each level I have defined variables to operationalize the 
model based on my empirical literature review above.  
At the industry-level, it is clear that Porter's five forces are important when analyzing this 
industry. Yet, Barney's suggestion to add collaboration as a sixth force is also relevant. 
Collaboration at the firm level, industry level, country level and supranational level was common in 
the nuclear industry long before the term ‘globalization’ proliferated.  
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At the firm level, technology is one of the most important factors since continuous 
technological upgrading to minimize the risk of accidents is crucial to ensure the legitimacy of 
nuclear power. Furthermore, as nuclear power is a highly politicized commodity the theory of 
market-political ambidexterity is especially relevant. 
At the institution-level, the public opinion is a great concern for the nuclear industry and 
decision-makers. However, it is a factor they influence rather than allow themselves to be 
influenced by. It is therefore a weaker and more indirect factor relative to the other important 
institution-level factors, namely energy policy, industrial policy and security policy. 
  
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model 
 
 In chapter five (sections 5.8-10), I apply this model to Toshiba's main markets, Japan, China 
and the United States, by investigating the sub-research questions in table 4.1 below. The strategy 
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tripod is usually applied in a national context. However, as the empirical literature clearly indicates, 
the nuclear industry is a global industry where the national context to a large extent is determined 
by international regulation and collaboration. At the same time, political leadership in the national 
context is crucial to promote the industry. This compels me to apply the model to several markets to 
avoid presenting a distorted picture 
 
Table 4.1: Operationalization of the conceptual model 
 Research question Measure Market (Japan/ China/ USA) 
MBV 1) What is the threat of 
competition? 
2) What is the extent of 
collaboration? 
3) What is the threat of buyer 
power? 
4) What is threat of supplier 
power? 
5) What is the threat of new 
entrants? 
6) What is the threat of 
substitutes? 
1) The sellers 
2) Agreements of 
collaboration 
3) The buyers 
4) The suppliers 
5) Barriers to entry 







RBV 7) Does Toshiba offer the 
technology demanded in this 
market? 
8) Does Toshiba have positive 
relations with the local 
government? 
7) The fit between the 
demand in this market 
and Toshiba's offer 
8) Evidence of 




IBV 9) Does the local public opinion 
support nuclear power 
development? 
10) Does the local energy policy 
support nuclear power 
development? 
11) Does the local industrial 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
12) Does the local security policy 
support nuclear power 
development? 
9) The public opinion 
10) The energy policy 
11) Political measures 
to cultivate a national 
nuclear industry 
12) Evidence that the 
nation is being 






Strategy 13) Does Toshiba target this 
market? 
13) Evidence of bids for 
contracts in this market 
13) <finding> 
Performance 14) Has Toshiba achieved 
contracts in this market? 
14) Evidence of 






Chapter 5 Case study 
5.1 Rivalry 
The main competitors in the global nucleaer industry are Toshiba, Hitachi, and the Areva-Mitsubishi 
Heavy industries (MHI) alliance. In 2010, Toshiba occupied the largest global market share in terms 
of output capacity, namely 28 per cent, followed by Areva with 26 per cent, Hitachi with 15 per cent 
and MHI with four per cent. Other important industry players are Korean Doosan Heavy Industries 
& Construction and Russian Rosatom. Over time, the industry has concentrated into fewer and 
larger market players. The current post-Fukushima situation is that divestment as well as mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) are likely to occur (SPEEDA, 2015a). When the German government 
announced the phasing out of nuclear power after 3/11 Siemens ceased its nuclear activities but 
continues to offer components. The lack of a domestic market for nuclear power makes the future 
uncertain for the German nuclear industry (EY, 2012). In the energy sector, it is widely believed that 
the success of a country’s exports depends on its willingness to use its own products (Canada’s 
public policy forum, 2013). 
 Westinghouse Electric in the United States first developed and commercialized the PWR. 
Later, General Electrics (GE) in the United States developed and commercialized the BWR. The 
PWR is said to be safer than the BWR because it uses a steam generator so that radioactive material 
is not released from the reactor vessel. In contrast, at the BWR, steam containing radioactive 
material is released from the nuclear reactor building. The PWR is the most popular kind because it 
was proliferated early and the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan has BWR reactors 
(SPEEDA, 2015a). The PWR is easier to secure against seismic events compared to the BWR 
(Schneider and Froggatt, 2015). The most dominant reactor types worldwide are the PWR and 
BWR. In 2013, these two types accounted for more than 90 per cent of all reactors (SPEEDA, 
2015a). Other reactor types include the Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) (six per cent), 
the Light Water Graphite Reactor (LWGR) (three per cent), the Gas Cooled Reactor (GCR) (two per 
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cent) and the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) (less than two per cent) (SPEEDA, 2015a). Among the 
nuclear reactors under construction globally in 2013, 87.6 per cent were PWRs, 5.6 per cent were 
BWRs, 4.6 per cent were PHWRs and 1.8 per cent was FBRs (SPEEDA, 2015a). In this section I, I 
explain what the vendors offer and how their home country has responded to 3/11. 
 
France 
Areva has a number of affiliated companies and focuses on the PWR. Areva originally acquired the 
PWR technology from Westinghouse and refined it. In 2001, Areva acquired Siemens' nuclear 
power business (SPEEDA, 2015a). Areva entered into a strategic alliance with MHI in 2007 
concerning the medium-sized reactor, and they established the joint venture Atmea. In 2008, the two 
companies agreed to collaborate in fuels as well. MHI and Areva still compete in the market for 
large-size reactors but apart from this they can be regarded as a group (SPEEDA, 2015a). On the 
global market, France's advantages are that they cover the whole value chain, including waste 
management and has a strong track record of nuclear projects and safe operation. The CEA is 
responsible for coordinating international partnerships. France does not engage in 'build-own-
operate' (BOO) projects where the client does not pay for construction. Rather, the country requires 
the client to be able to have some nuclear capacity and passes on its knowledge and capabilities in 
strategic partnerships with other countries. France's abundant and skilled labor force makes it able 
to handle projects at home as well as abroad. It is quick to absorb learnings from construction 
projects and apply them in other projects. The French offer is known to be among the safest on the 
market (EY, 2012). Areva told its shareholders in 2010 that safety has a cost; the company presented 
an annual loss of EUR five billion in 2014. In mid-2015 the French government discussed with 
EDF and Areva how they can save Areva (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015). Areva's EPR may be too 
large for some countries. French foreign policy could also help promote nuclear exports more 
actively. As France does not have consulting capacity unlike many other vendors, they cannot take 
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part in potential clients' decision-making process. Neither does France offer financing (EY, 2012).  
After 3/11, the French Prime Minister François Fillon asserted that we should not condemn 
nuclear power because of this accident, while President Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized the 
significance of nuclear energy. The government announced a safety review based on the assumption 
of an accident similar to the Fukushima. At the same time, the EDF announced its plans to electrify 
French vehicles with the help from nuclear power. President Sarkozy restated France's choice of 
nuclear energy to help curb greenhouse gasses and ensure energy independence. However, 77 
percent of the 1,005 respondents in a public opinion survey in France favored a phasing out of 
nuclear power. Subsequently, the winner of the election in 2012, President François Hollande, 
announced his commitment to reduce France's reliance on nuclear energy (The Sasakwa Peace 
Foundation, 2012). Yet the French nuclear industry still benefits from strong political and public 
support (EY, 2012). Internationally, France continues to promote nuclear power as a way to fight 
global warming as well as poverty and to meet the escalating global electricity demand. The 
government continues to consider the support of its nuclear industry of strategic national 
importance. France envisions an international market for nuclear power plants to be worth USD 3.9 
trillion by 2030, and believes it can capture about one-third of the global market for future reactors 
(Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). In the aftermath of 3/11, five French nuclear experts rushed to 
Fukushima followed by President Sarkozy and Areva CEO Anne Lauvergeon. It is argued that the 
French assistance was motivated by the fact that a severe nuclear crisis might threaten their 
government's nuclear policy in the future (Krooth et al., 2015). Areva provided technology for the 
absorption of radioactive materials (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012). 
 
Canada 
Canada has capabilities along the whole nuclear supply chain, and has large reserves of uranium. 
The Canadian government supports the nuclear export business with trade missions to target 
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countries (EY, 2012). The CANDU technology enables the production of smaller, modular nuclear 
reactors that do not require large forged pressure vessels, but use pressure tubes. It also has lower 
staffing and security needs. It is inherently suited for using alternative fuels, thus can burn recycled 
recovered uranium from LWRs, and possibly also thorium. Investment is needed to enhance the 
CANDU reactor such as its IT functionalities (EY, 2012). 
3/11 had little impact on Canada’s nuclear program compared to some other countries, 
mostly because of relatively minimal public reaction. A safety review yielded no major findings and 
the technology continues to be perceived as safe. Some minor technological upgrades are expected 
on operating plants to increase their resistance to natural disasters. Some administrations have 
stalled decisions regarding prolonging the life of reactors. In 2011, Canada seized the contract to 
refurbish a nuclear reactor in Argentina. In addition, Candu Energy acquired certain assets of 
AECL. The sale of AECL helps the government to reduce the amount of subsidies it pays to AECL 
and to strengthen the sales and marketing of CANDU reactors (EY, 2012). Canada currently seeks 
to become more competitive by looking at further using enhanced fuel and used uranium (Canada 
public policy forum, 2013). 
 
China 
China has significant international ambitions, albeit focusing on its domestic market for now (EY, 
2012). Their Hualong One design is a direct competitor to the EPR and AP1000. The construction 
of a Hualong reactor abroad is scheduled to begin in 2017 (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015).  
In the aftermath of 3/11, China suspended the approval process for the construction of new 
nuclear reactors in order to review its safety criteria. However, in June 2012, the State Council 





South Korea began to transfer foreign nuclear technology in the 1980s and became able to export 
nuclear components (EY, 2012). Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction is part of the Doosan 
Heavy Manufacturing Group in South Korea which owns several companies, including Doosan 
Infracore and Doosan Engine. In accordance with the South Korean domestic nuclear policy, 
Doosan is engaged in the majority of the domestic nuclear power plants, and has collaborated with 
GE since 1976. Doosan exported its own APR-1400 which is a refined version of ABB-CE's (now 
part of Westinghouse) PWR System 80, for the first time in 2009 to China (SPEEDA, 2015a). South 
Korea has a highly structured approach to marketing but has little geopolitical power and is unable 
to secure contract financing through an international bank (EY, 2012).  
The country made no changes in its nuclear energy policy, although there were protests (The 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012). The capacity of the industry needs to expand to meet its export 
goals as South Korea seems to lack a sufficient number of human resources and a sufficiently large 
network of subcontractors. It may not be able to undertake several international projects at the same 
time (EY, 2012). Regardless of 3/11, South Korea plans to build more nuclear reactors (Peimani, 
2012). President Lee Myung-Bak stressed in 2011 that nuclear reactor export will upgrade the 
country's standing in the world. South Korea is bidding to construct reactors in Brazil, China, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the 
Ukraine, various South East Asian countries, and the United States. South Korea will also enter the 




Rosatom is a government run umbrella body uniting all the private nuclear companies in Russia. Its 
predecessor is the Ministry for Atomic Energy which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union in 
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1992. Rosatom was founded in 2007 under the Putin administration. Among its affiliated companies 
are the Atomenergoprom, a newly established public nuclear holding company. It focuses on the 
PWR. In accordance with the Putin administration's energy policy, Rosatom pursues projects in 
Russia, the Middle East and Asia. Iran set up its first nuclear power plant, the Bushehr Nuclear 
Power Plant, with assistance from Rosatom and the plant started to supply energy in 2012 
(SPEEDA, 2015a). Rosatom recently implemented a program to manage nuclear innovations (EY, 
2012). The Soviet Union developed the RBMK reactor which may refuel while online and costs less 
because it does not require a protective dome. The other Soviet reactor type is the VVER developed 
based on the design used by the Soviet navy for nuclear submarine and surface warship propulsion. 
Both reactors have been exported to a number of Eastern European countries. The VVER was also 
used as a model for research reactors in Finland, Vietnam, and Mongolia. Russia has one of the 
largest pools of nuclear scientists and universities engaged with nuclear research. In the near future, 
Rosatom expects to receive orders for 80 reactors mainly from developing countries, and will train 
around 60,000 foreign specialists by 2030 to operate these. Russia offers the BOO model. However, 
its international reputation could be better due to corruption and intransparency. Russia's 
competitive advantages involve high safety standards and reliable technology, waste management 
expertise, and full government involvement. On the downside, their manufacturing is less efficient, 
and there is a shortage of human resources domestically. Russia offers the whole range of products 
and services related to the nuclear industry, and its ability to offer financial solutions is unmatched 
by competitors. As the Russian vendors increased the safety measures considerably following the 
Chernobyl accident they planned to make no changes to their equipment and designs in the 
aftermath of 3/11 (EY, 2012). Russia utilizes the floating nuclear power plant technology in its 
Northern region and plans to offer it internationally (Dowdall and Standring, 2008).  
Russia had 11 ongoing projects when the Fukushima accident struck (Peimani, 2012). The Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin ordered checks of the domestic nuclear power plants and President 
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Dmitry Medvedev stressed that nuclear power is economical (The Sasakwa Peace Foundation, 
2012). Russia assured Prime Minister Erdogan that Turkey's nuclear power plant will be built as an 
example for the whole world. On the same day, the country signed a USD six billion deal with 
Belarus to cooperate on a new nuclear power plant. In April, 2011, Russia signed a deal to build a 
new nuclear power plant in Bangladesh worth USD two billion. Moreover, Hungary and Russia 
started discussions on the modernization of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant in mid-2011 (Sovacool 
and Valentin, 2012). Rosatom announced in 2012 that it aims to invest 100 billion dollars in 38 new 
nuclear reactors in Russia and 28 new nuclear reactors abroad up until 2030 (SPEEDA, 2015a). 
 
Japan & the United States 
The Japanese and American nuclear industries are interdependent (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 
2012). Their collaboration was formalized in 1968 with the Agreement for Cooperation between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy. In 1988, the Japan-US Nuclear Energy Agreement enabled Japan to 
conduct R&D on the nuclear fuel cycle (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012). The United States 
has unmatched nuclear experience and expertise in consulting and American embassies help to 
promote nuclear export (EY, 2012). The Japanese offers a complete solution including financing, 
e.g., low interest loans. The government engages in nuclear export promotion. Japan refrains from 
selling to countries which may use it for military purposes. Their competitive advantages are their 
extensive experience and good technology, international partnerships with strong companies, 
government support, a reputation for industrial excellence, 3/11 experiences and growing expertise 
in waste management. Disadvantages include a damaged public opinion on nuclear power and three 
domestic vendors competing among each other (EY, 2012). MHI focuses on the PWR. In 2009, 
MHI established a unified nuclear fuel company that handles the design, development, 
manufacturing and sale under one roof. The company intends to supply uranium for both PWRs and 
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BWRs on the Japanese market and will expand MHI's distribution channels for PWR fuel in foreign 
markets. Hitachi-GE offers the BWR. In 2007, the joint venture Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy was set 
up in Japan. At the same time, an American equivalent was established in the United States by the 
name GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy (SPEEDA, 2015a). The company has been working with India 
since before 3/11 to identify a suitable site for a nuclear power plant (EY, 2009). Hitachi was 
selected by the Lithuanian government together with its Estonian and Latvian partners in 2012 to 
construct a nuclear power plant by 2020. The Lithuanian plans for nuclear expansion were 
challenged when a referendum in 2012 determined that 63 per cent of the population opposed 
nucleaer power. The prime minister stated that he would follow the people’s will, yet established a 
working group on the energy development in the country which concluded in 2013 that the nuclear 
project could continue under the condition of the involvement of regional partners, the availability 
of a strategic investor and the use of the most modern and practically tested nuclear technology 
(Schneider and Froggatt, 2015). Toshiba used to offer only the BWR but acquired Westinghouse in 
2006 to obtain the PWR technology (SPEEDA, 2015a). I provide a thorough description of Toshiba 
in section 5.7. 
In spite of 3/11, Japan's competitors acknowledge that the country still has an excellent 
reputation and unique competences. Furthermore, Japanese nuclear firms are able to share the 
experiences from 3/11 with clients (EY, 2012). In the United States, the government expressed its 
continuing support for nuclear power after 3/11 and foresaw no changes to its nuclear power policy. 
It tasked the NRC to review the safety of the domestic nuclear power plants, resulting in a report 
with 12 recommendations. President Obama emphasized that nuclear power will continue to be an 
important energy source, and the American-Japanese collaboration now integrates the lessons 
learned from 3/11 (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012). The American-Japanese vendors have 
consolidated their position in the global nuclear industry since 3/11. For instance, Hitachi acquired 
the British Horizon Nuclear Power in 2012 for the amount of GBP 700 million (Schneider and 
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Froggatt, 2015) and obtained orders in England through this company. Hitachi also takes part in the 
expansion of nuclear power in the United States and expects its sales to increase from JPY 110 
billion in 2013 to JPY 280 billion in 2020. To support this growth, the preparations for Horizon 
Nuclear Power's scheduled ABWR facility will be accelerated and activities undertaken in the three 
Baltic countries. In 2013, Toshiba announced its mid-term plan toward 2015 in which the sales in 
the nuclear power business is expected to reach JPY 630 billion in 2015 and JPY 800 billion in 
2017. The company will reevaluate its activities in thermal power, hydro power, geothermal power 
and wind power and will focus more on other areas than nuclear power than previously to find the 
'best mix'. In 2014, Toshiba took a 60 percent equity position in the British nuclear power business 
development firm NuGeneration (SPEEDA, 2015a). Toshiba plans to build three AP1000 reactors at 
the Moorside site which should begin operating in 2024 (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015). In 2015, 
MHI began to develop a proposal to invest in the Areva group company called Areva NP. The 
purpose is to strengthen the collaboration between MHI and Areva which has existed since 1991.   
AREVA NP invested in Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. In 2009 which led to the formation of a 
business structure covering all areas of the nuclear fuel business (MHI, 2015). 
 
5.2 Collaboration  
There are many cases of supranational, international, inter-firm and public-private collaboration in 
the nucleaer industry. The IAEA, for instance, was established in 1957 to serve as a supranational 
forum for scientific and technological collaboration in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. States 
that do not accept IAEA surveillance and inspection are excluded from international nuclear 
collaboration and trade (WNA, 2015). An example of inter-firm and public-private collaboration is 
JINED, a consortium consisting of the Japanese utilities and vendors and METI. It aims to 
orchestrate complex proposals for overseas nuclear power projects (Hitachi, 2010). Canada recently 
concluded collaboration agreements with India and China to facilitate the flow of nuclear products 
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and services to new markets (Canada public policy forum, 2013). There clearly exist many kinds of 
nuclear collaboration. 
 
5.3 Buyer power 
Currently, there are five reactors under construction and seven reactors planned for construction in 
North America. In 2010, the government of the United States approved an USD eight billion loan 
guarantee for the construction of two nuclear reactors in the state of Georgia. It will be the first 
American plant to begin construction in three decades. The necessity to switch to non-fossil fuel 
energy motivated the congress to offer significant subsidies to companies willing to launch nuclear 
power plant projects. Subsequently, American companies announced the construction of 34 nuclear 
reactors over the coming decades (Peimani, 2012). In Europe, four reactors are under construction 
and 20 reactors are planned for construction (WNA, 2014). The Western nuclear states focus on 
maintenance, upgrades and decommissioning (EY, 2012).  
 In the former Soviet Union, 11 reactors are under construction and 31 reactors are planned. 
In Asia, 45 reactors are under construction and 196 reactors are planned for construction (WNA, 
2014). Chinese nuclear policymaking can potentially set the future direction for the whole industry 
(SPEEDA, 2015a). Nuclear is booming in India after reaching a deal with the United States in 2008 
to supply it with the LWR technology (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). India utilizes fast breeder 
reactors to compensate for its scarce uranium reserves (Pomper and Harvey, 2012). Since the 
country has abundance of thorium it aims to completely rely on thorium-powered nuclear reactors 
by 2050 (Sovacool and Valentin, 2012). The goal is to build 20 to 26 nuclear reactors (Peimani, 
2012). Russia was the first vendor to supply India with nuclear technology, and the country has 
since negotiated with France, Japan, Argentina and Mongolia (SPEEDA, 2015). Nuclear energy is 
expected to account for 25 per cent in India's energy mix by 2025. India was constructing four new 
nuclear power plants at the time of 3/11 and collaborated internationally (Basrur et al., 2012). Those 
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working with nuclear energy in India tried to calm down the Indian population through the media 
(Kumar, 2012). Conservative siting regulations have now been established, although earthquakes 
and tsunamis in India historically have been less severe than those in Japan (Bhardwaj, 2012). To 
guard against nuclear terrorism, one battalion including 1,000 police men are trained to nuclear and 
biological emergency issues (Kumar, 2012). India enhanced the safety measures and upgraded its 
reactors to better withstand natural disasters (SPEEDA, 2015a). Vietnam continues with its plan to 
build 13 reactors by 2030 (Peimani, 2012), yet gives high priority to safety measures (The 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012), and 3/11 may cause some delay (Tay and Paungmalit, 2012). 
The first two plants with a total of four reactors will be built by Russia and Japan, respectively. The 
Japanese-built Ninh Thuan No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant will have two nuclear reactors of one million 
kilowatts. The contract amounts to around 100 million yen and the plant is scheduled to begin 
operation in 2021. It was the Japanese government that reached this agreement which includes 
support for financing of the nuclear power plant, training of about 1,000 Vietnamese technicians in 
Japan annually, and infrastructure maintenance through the Overseas Development Agency. The 
plant will be built in Tay Anh where 1,500 villagers are to be relocated. In 2010, some of these 
villagers accepted an invitation from a Japanese power company to visit nuclear power plants in 
Japan, learn about their safety and spread the word back home (Satoru, 2012). 
 In Africa, no reactors are under construction but four are planned for construction (WNA, 
2014). Nuclear energy in South Africa will double toward 2030 from the current five per cent, albeit 
the lack of full political support may delay the process. In addition to the two reactors already in 
operation, South Africa's first new nuclear plant is expected online by 2023. The country evaluated 
its safety measures and the resistance to natural disasters in the aftermath of 3/11, and formulated a 
strategy to absorb the lessons learned from the accident. South Africa seeks a longterm partnership 
with high potential for knowledge transfer so that the country can develop its own industry. It is 
likely to select the most modern reactor technology available. Meanwhile, South Africa faces 
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challenges because influential politicians have historically favored coal due to their strong link with 
labor unions (EY, 2012). 
 In Latin America, one reactor is under construction and two reactors are planned for 
construction (WNA, 2014).  
 Nuclear energy is an issue of regional prestige in the Middle East (EY, 2012). The UAE 
enacted safety tests soon after 3/11 and found a need to strengthen the safety measures. The ability 
of vendors to provide fuel and handle nuclear waste is critical to win contracts because international 
agreements prevent the UAE from performing domestic fuel enrichment and waste disposal. The 
country plans to lease fuel to overcome this constraint. The government has enacted an education 
campaign to reach a target of 70 per cent of its own nuclear workforce by 2020 (EY, 2012). Saudi 
Arabia announced its intention to start a civilian nuclear power program in 2009 amid an annually 
increasing electricity demand of around eight per cent. The country maintains its target to achieve 
more than 40 GW of nuclear power in spite of 3/11. The Saudi government declared that it would 
invest more than 100 billion USD in the construction of 16 nuclear power plants, and the country 
concluded a number of bilateral agreements on nuclear collaboration with France, South Korea, 
China, the United States, Russia, Japan, Argentina and Czech Republic. The first nuclear power 
plant is expected to come online within 10 years with two additional plants coming into operation 
every subsequent year until 2030. The King Abdullah Center for Atomic and Renewable Energy 
(KA-CARE), established in 2010, is in charge of the implementation of the regulatory framework. 
Unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia has not agreed to divert technology and fuel to military use (EY, 
2012). Turkey's energy demand rises about eight per cent per year. The country aims to achieve 10 
per cent nuclear power by 2020 and its first unit is currently being constructed by Russia. The 
Russian consortium will also take charge of its operation, train Turkish engineers and provide 
technology transfer. Russia incurs all the costs of construction and operation with the investment 
recovered through selling a predetermined portion of the electricity produced back to Turkey at an 
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agreed price. Due to the high risks of earthquakes in Turkey, the Turkish operators' main priority is 
safety when selecting reactor design (EY, 2012). The Turkish government has decided to adopt at 
least two different reactor designs and at least two different contracts (Schneider and Froggatt, 
2015). Diversification of the main technologies is a sensible choice in the nucleaer business (EY, 
2012). The project at Akkuyu consists of four VVER1200 constructed by Rosatom while the other 
project at Sinop is constructed by a consortium of MHI, Itochu, GDF-SUEZ and Areva and will 
consist of four ATMEA 1 reactors (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 
2016). In spite of their oil and natural gas reserves, the leaders of a number of Middle East countries 
pursue energy diversification to free more for export. The interest in nuclear power plants by many 
countries with large Arab populations seems correlated with the growth of Iran's nuclear program. 
Even if the Arab states do not develop nuclear weapons at the moment, they may try to leave the 
option open as a future deterrent against nuclear attack (Ferguson, 2011). Iran completed its Busher 
Nuclear Reactor with assistance from Russia in 2010. The goal is to achieve the capacity of 20,000 
MW over the next two decades (Peimani, 2012). Iran developed enrichment capabilities and 
facilities with assistance from the A.Q. Khan network and insists on its right under the NPT to 
develop fuel cycle technologies (Choi, 2012). Concerns about Iran's enrichment program have led 
the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran five times since 2006. Iran signed up for the 
NPT in 2003, but has not brought the agreement into force (Pomper and Harvey, 2012).  
The most significant hurdle to nuclear power expansion is the inability of clients to gain 
access to capital (EY, 2009). The vendors and institutions in their home country therefore often help 
to finance the construction. For instance, Korean Electrical Power Corporation (KEPCO) constructs 
four units at the Barakah nuclear project near Abu Dhabi for approximately USD 20 billion and the 
Export-Import Bank of Korea provides USD 10 billion for the project. Similarly, the Belarussian 
and Russian government agreed in 2011 that Russia would lend USD 10 billion for 25 years to 
finance 90 per cent of the contract for construction of two reactors in Belarus. Turkey opted for the 
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BOO model offered by Rosastom which builds four reactors in Akkuyu (Schneider and Froggatt, 
2015). Under this agreement, Rosatom has established a project company in Turkey which owns the 
nuclear power plant. Rosastom brings technology, financing and operation experience to the 
company while the Turkish government provides the site for the nuclear power plant, project 
support and a power purchase agreement under which the Turkish government is obliged to 
purchase the electricity generated at the plant at a fixed price over 15 years (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2014). On one hand, the BOO model helps to 
circumvent the problem of scarce capital. On the other hand, countries that desire to build their own 
nuclear industry are advised to ensure a greater degree of local participation than the BOO model 
allows for (Akkuyu NPP JSC, 2014). Vietnam closed a deal with Japan which includes low-interest 
and preferential loans besides assistance in conducting feasibility studies for the project, technology 
transfer and training of human resources, and cooperation in the waste treatment and stable supply 
of materials for the whole life of the project (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015).  
Clearly, the current buyers are from many different countries. They are particularly 
concerned about financing costs, knowledge transfer and diversification. 
  
5.4 Supplier power 
New construction projects in China have shown that nuclear plants can be built on time and on 
budget (EY, 2009). However, nuclear construction is frequently subject to delay and cost overrun. 
The most common reasons are design issues, shortage of skilled labor, quality control issues, supply 
chain issues, poor planning, shortage of finance and public opposition, although the impact of 
public opposition is often overstated. The problem with design is that detailed design is being 




5.5 New entrants  
The most recent new entrant into the nuclear industry is India. Before 1988, India had only access 
to the international nuclear market through Canada's AECL. The 2008 agreement with the United 
States gave the country full access to technology and fuel (EY, 2012). The Indian NPCIL engages in 
joint ventures with public utilities to set up a series of nuclear power projects using domestic 
technology (EY, 2012). India markets an AHWR that may use thorium on a large scale (Schneider 
and Froggatt, 2015). Indian engineers and construction firms have a history of fruitful collaboration, 
and collaboration with foreign suppliers has also been smooth (EY, 2012). Since India has had to 
develop its reactor independently, many of them do not meet international safeguards (Sovacool and 
Valentin, 2012). India refrains from importing turnkey projects. Instead they country ensures local 
participation in import agreements in order to upgrade its own nuclear industry (Sethi, 2012b). This 
approach contrasts with Turkey's commitment to the BOO model (cf. section 5.3). 
 
5.6 Substitutes 
Nuclear power is a base-load power source that offers a more stable energy supply compared to 
wind power and solar power (SPEEDA, 2015a). More recently, fossil fuel price instability in 2008 
has helped to highlight that nuclear power is much less prone to fuel price volatility (EY, 2009). On 
the other hand, the risk of a severe accident is worrisome. The estimated transient damage to 
TEPCO, the operator of the Fukushima Dai Ichi Nuclear Power Plant, such as loss of property value 
and damage caused by rumors or misinformation, amount to at least 2.6 trillion yen. Furthermore, 
the required amount of compensation in terms of evacuation expenses, emotional damages, business 
losses, etc. exceeded one trillion yen within the first fiscal year (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 
2012). As shown in table 5.1 below, it is impossible to determine a maximum price considering the 
costs for disposal of nuclear waste, reactor decommissioning, accidents and other incalculable costs. 
Still, the IAEA forecasts that the use of nuclear power will increase from 373.1 GW in 2012 to 407-
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503 GW in 2020, and further, to 435-722 GW in 2030. This expansion will primarily be in Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and the Middle East (SPEEDA, 2015a). 
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of energy sources (SPEEDA, 2015a)
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Energy source Years of 
operation 














Nuclear power 40 8.9 –  0 20 20 
Coal-fired thermal 
power 
40 10.3 – 10.6 864 79 943 
Liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) 
40 10.0 – 11.4 476 123 599 
Oil-fired thermal 
power 
40 25.1 – 28.0 695 43 738 
Solar power 
(residential use) 
20 9.9 – 20.0 0 38 38 
Wind power  
(on-shore) 
20 8.8 – 17.3 0 25 25 
Wind power  
(off-shore) 
20 8.6 – 23.1 0 25 25 
Geothermal heat 40 9.2 – 11.6 0 13 13 
Hydro electric 
power 
40 19.1 – 22.0 - 11 11 
Biomass 40 17.4 – 32.2 N/A N/A N/A 
 
5.7 Toshiba's nuclear power business 
Toshiba is an established nuclear manufacturer which entered the market for nuclear power in the 
1950s through an alliance with GE that was facilitated by MITI (Samuels, 2013). In my brand recall 
study among Japanese citizens Toshiba was recalled the most times after TEPCO (cf. appendix b). 
The Mitsui business group (keiretsu) of which Toshiba is a member (interview 14.04.2015), 
established Japan Atomic Power Projects in 1958 (Hoshi, 1994). The keiretsu system is a unique 
feature of Japanese corporate life. A main bank system developed in Japan in the aftermath of WW 




 The Cost Verification Committee of the Ministerial Energy and Environmental Council reported somewhat 
different figures through the Institute of Energy Economics (IEE) in 2010: nuclear 8.9; coal 9.5; LNG 10.7; oil 22.1; 
wind 9.4-23.1; Geothermal 9.2-11.6; Solar 33.4-38.3 (Samuels, 2013). 
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II to circumvent the problem of scarce capital and offer firms the opportunity to raise funds at a low 
cost. Aoki and Patrick (1994: pp. xxi) describe the main bank system as “a more or less informal set 
of regular practices, institutional arrangements and behavior that constitute a system of corporate 
finance and governance”. Under the main bank system, firms obtain their largest share of 
borrowings from one bank. The main bank is the largest but not sole lender to the firm. It is also the 
firm's largest stockholder and acts as a monitor. The main bank is in a unique position to do so as it 
operates the firm’s major payment settlement accounts. The main bank furthermore has the right to 
intervene in the management of the firm when things go wrong (Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard, 1994). 
The main bank system allows the firm to enact strategic decision with no regard for the interests of 
individual stockholders (Aoki, 1988). It also allows coordinated refinancing (Hoshi, 1994), and thus 
can reduce the costs of financial distress (Sheard, 1994; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991). 
Finally, the system helps to reduce the information and incentive problems inherent in arms-length 
financial contracts (Hoshi, 1994). The main bank system gave rise to two sorts of corporate 
grouping in Japan (Aoki 1988). One kind is the horizontal keiretsu, where unrelated firms are united 
through a group of financial institutions, including their main bank. The other type is the vertical 
keiretsu, where related firms are organized under a principal manufacturer, which often is a member 
of a horizontal keiretsu as well. Cross-shareholding (kabushiki mochiai) is also closely related to 
corporate grouping (Hoshi, 1994). Most Japanese firms have extensive cross-shareholding with 
partners somewhat related in their value chain, i.e., banks, insurance companies, suppliers, 
customers, trading companies, and affiliated firms (Sheard, 1994). These corporate shareholders 
hold each other's shares as 'stable shareholders' (antei kabunushi), who refrain from selling the 
shares to speculators and third parties that oppose to incumbent management. In case selling is 
necessary they agree to notify the firm of their intention to sell. Hence, they cannot claim the 
property rights that usually are associated with shareholding and they are excluded from exercising 
corporate control. Trust is crucial to sustain cross-shareholding because the compensation is a 
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reciprocal exchange of property rights (Sheard, 1994). This practice intends to insure against 
financial failure and external take-over (Aoki 1994). It is considered a competitive advantage of the 
firm “enabling management to take a long-term view of investment and decision making without 
being subject to short-term stock market pressures” (Sheard, 1994: pp. 311). 
The members of a horizontal keiretsu are the large firms belonging to Japan's economic, 
political and social elite (Gerlach, 1992). They are united through six kinds of linkages where one is 
cross-shareholding. Another is the monthly presidents’ council meeting (shachōkai), typically 
including four financial institutions, which are the major debt holders of the member firms. Thirdly, 
their main bank often sends an employee to each firm who becomes a permanent employee of the 
firm and serves as a board member for at least 10 years. This employee is an important source of 
information for the main bank enabling efficient monitoring of the firm. Fourthly, the main bank 
may, if necessary, send its own employees to act as directors of the firm. Transactions in 
intermediate product markets are the fifth linkage. Lastly, the firms in a horizontal keiretsu may 
undertake joint projects, e.g., collaborate to set up a company in order to start a new line of business 
(Hoshi, 1994), in the same way as the Mitsui keiretsu established Japan Atomic Power Projects (cf. 
p. 78). Due to the main bank's central position in the presidential council and the horizontal keiretsu 
it can “act as de facto owners of keiretsu member firms” (Oh, 2004: pp. 66). 
The members of a vertical keiretsu are smaller and less prestigious firms compared to those 
in a horizontal keiretsu. These firms operate within the same industry and under the control of a 
large manufacturing company (the principal manufacturer). There are three categories of vertical 
keiretsu: the production keiretsu comprising hierarchies of primary, secondary and tertiary-level 
subcontractors supplying the manufacturer; the distribution keiretsu which constitutes the vertical 
marketing system of the manufacturer; and the capital keiretsu consisting of affiliated companies 
depending on capital from the manufacturer (Gerlach, 1992). The manufacturer tends to dominate 
the subcontractors because the former utilize a large amount of resources in selecting the latter, and 
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technological know-how is transferred from the manufacturer to the subcontractors. The ability to 
dominate depends on the amount of capital, not the supply of material (Oh, 2004). Whittaker 
(1994), however, emphasizes strong interdependence within the vertical keiretsu where the J-MNC 
greatly depends on its subcontractors due to their mutually beneficial relation. In fact, 
subcontractors may at some point become independent companies. Not least since pressure from the 
manufacturer to reduce costs, raise their technical level, rationalize production, and participate in 
design and development help them to enhance their capabilities and potentially launch their own 
products to a wider audience. 
 In figure 5.1 below I have illustrated the two kinds of corporate grouping. The box to the 
right shows the principle of the horizontal keiretsu with unrelated J-MNCs united with each other 
and financial institutions. The boxes to the left show how each member of the horizontal keiretsu 
controls its own vertical keiretsu including a production keiretsu (P), a distribution keiretsu (D) and 
a capital keiretsu (C). 
 
Figure 5.1: Post-WW II corporate grouping in Japan 




 The number of firms in the horizontal keiretsu is not limited to three and some vertical 
keiretsu may not include all three kinds (P, D, and C) such as indicated in my figure above. The 
reality is that it is difficult to map out these webs exactly as firms may hesitate to inform about them 
and the business groups lose some and gain other members over time (Oh, 2004). They are dynamic 
and adapt to changing circumstances (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). My informants at Toshiba 
informed me that the Mitsui keiretsu is weakening because Toshiba cannot be globally competitive 
if it only collaborates with the other keiretsu members. They also let me know that the Mitsubishi 
keiretsu currently is the most well-preserved keiretsu. In terms of international collaboration, my 
informants find that collaborating with Asian nationals is more smooth compared with westerners. 
They believe the reason is that many Asians speak good Japanese and those having experienced 
studying or working in Japan are accustomed to the Japanese working environment. Especially 
Japanese technicians have difficulty speaking a foreign language and it is difficult to communicate 
through an interpreter: “If there was no communication issue international collaboration could be 
more cost-efficient”, said one of the informants. He further explained that, in his view, a different 
cultural DNA prohibits mutual understanding: “we Japanese are farmers (nomin) who stay at our 
farm. The Americans are a hunting people (syuryo minzoku)”.  He said the implication in business is 
that Americans chase high growth rates and soon withdraw from a market when growth starts to 
decline. In contrast, the Japanese hold on to their investments in good times and in bad. Lastly, they 
mentioned the shorter distance from Japan as an advantage of Asian countries compared to western 
countries (interview 14.04.2015). 
 
5.7.1 Technology 
In the beginning Toshiba focused on the BWR technology and built many of the nuclear reactors in 
Japan, including at the Fukushima Dai Ichi Nuclear Power Plant and the Onagawa Nuclear Power 
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Plant (Toshiba annual reports, 1995 through 2014). Toshiba's share of the Japanese market was 
roughly 30 per cent in 1998. At this point, 90 per cent of Toshiba's orders were from Japanese 
customers. As the utilities in Japan demanded cheaper equipment Toshiba cut costs to be able to 
supply products at competitive prices (Toshiba annual report, 1998). The Japanese utilities limited 
their capital spending throughout the 1990s, leading Toshiba to expand into Asia, albeit fierce 
competition in Asian markets from European and American competitors held down prices. Growth 
through alliances underpinned Toshiba's globalization strategy. To improve its competitive position, 
the company formed the Asia ABWR Promotion Organization with Hitachi and GE which obtained 
a contract for the construction of an ABWR facility in Taiwan (Toshiba annual report, 1997). 
Toshiba formed Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) with GE and Hitachi in 2000 which develops, designs, 
manufactures and sells nuclear fuel (Toshiba annual report, 2000). The company built a more global 
business structure with manufacturing and service bases in foreign growth markets (Toshiba annual 
report, 2004), primarily China (Toshiba annual report, 2005). 
Toshiba attracted a lot of attention with the acquisition of Westinghouse in 2006 from British 
Nuclear Fuel for the amount of USD 5.4 billion (Toshiba annual report, 2006). The company had 
long been preparing itself for a sharp increase in demand for nuclear power beginning in 2000 
(Toshiba annual report, 1998). The acquisition was as a reaction to this emerging nuclear 
renaissance. It made Toshiba the leader of the global nuclear industry and the only company 
offering both the BWR and PWR technologies. Given the solid global presence of Westinghouse 
which pioneered the nuclear industry, Toshiba aimed to expand sales mainly in the United States 
and China to grow the nuclear power business by 3.5 times to 700 billion yen in sales in 2015 
(Toshiba annual report, 2006).  
Up until then, Toshiba had classified its nuclear power business as a stable performer but 
now considered it a growth area, and promoted nuclear power as a solution to the growing concern 
about global warming (Toshiba annual report, 2007). The company continued to strengthen its 
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leading market position with the entrance into a share transfer agreement with the state-owned 
Kazakh uranium supplier Kazatomprom. Westinghouse was now owned 67 per cent by Toshiba, 10 
per cent by Kazatomprom, 20 per cent by the Shaw Group and 3 per cent by the IHI Corporation. 
Toshiba provided the other owners with the option to sell all or part of their shares to Toshiba within 
a certain period, and Toshiba had the option to purchase their ownership under certain conditions 
(Toshiba annual report, 2008). The company invested in the American company USEC engaged in 
uranium enrichment for commercial nuclear power plants (Toshiba annual report, 2010). 
The United States approved Toshiba's new nuclear power plant engineering center as a 
manufacturer of nuclear reactors, and Toshiba established a BWR training center in the United 
States. It also established a zirconium sponge producing joint venture in China as well as it began 
the construction of two BWRs in the country, entered into a Memorandum of understanding with 
Russian TENEX on cooperation in the nuclear fuel business, and assumed long-term management 
of a fuel manufacturing operation from Britain's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (Toshiba 
annual report, 2010). 
 Toshiba set more ambitious targets for nuclear power: sales of one trillion yen and orders for 
39 new plants by 2015. At this point, Toshiba possessed the following track record as a nuclear 
power plant builder: 62 plants in the United States, 21 plants in Japan, 10 plants in Sweden, six 
plants in South Korea, five plants in Spain, two plants in Taiwan, two plants in Switzerland, two 
plants in Finland, one plant in Slovenia and one plant in Brazil. The strategy for the nuclear power 
business was to win more new plant orders and carry out construction; expand the services 
business; enhance the fuel business; and develop next generation reactors (Toshiba annual report, 
2010).  
 
5.7.2 Market-political ambidexterity 
Toshiba is part of the nuclear village (Dewit et al., 2012), which is well-connected with the local 
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government. Amakudari, referring to the practice of private companies to hire former bureaucrats, is 
an established, well-documented, system-wide practice in the Japanese nuclear industry. The 
industry managed to fence off calls to end the Amakudari practice by JDP politicians. In fact, the 
occurrence of Amakudari placements has increased over the years (Samuels, 2013). In the past, the 
Federation of Electric Power Companies in Japan has approached the LDP behind the scenes and 
succeeded in blocking a proposed renewable energy bill (Scalise, 2014). The Federation of Electric 
Power Related Industry Workers Unions of Japan systematically lobbied the DPJ in the aftermath of 
3/11 with a budget of around 750 million yen (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012). Utility 
executives have also been elected to the Diet helped by support from the Japanese nuclear vendors. 
By 2011, a total of 80 employees from the utilities and nuclear vendors had worked for their 
regulator NISA (Samuels, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the independent investigation of 3/11 indeed 
identified regulatory capture (NAIIC, 2012).  
Toshiba and the Japanese nuclear industry continue to enjoy political support. When Prime 
Minister Noda took office in August 2011, he declared that the Japanese government will firmly 
respond to the interests of countries pursuing nuclear power. Six months after 3/11, the Japan 
Atomic Power Company signed an agreement with Vietnam to conduct a feasibility study for two 
nuclear reactors (Samuels, 2013). 
Prime Minister Abe advances the agenda of the nuclear village when he and his colleagues actively 
promote nuclear plant exports during high level meetings (Kingston, 2014), such as in Poland in 
2015 where the deputy METI minister assured his Polish counterparts that Japanese companies are 
eager to participate in Poland’s first nuclear power plant project (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015). 
Prime Minister Abe’s policy dubbed 'Abenomics' leads to depreciation of the yen which makes the 
fossil fuel import more expensive and this highlights the need for generating electricity in Japan 
from nuclear power (Kingston, 2012). 
 The increasing globalization of Toshiba’s nuclear power business means that the company 
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needs to excel in market-political ambidexterity in several countries. For instance, Toshiba assisted 
China with their plans for nuclear power construction. In collaboration with Japan Consulting 
Institute, Toshiba participated in a nuclear feasibility study project for the Vietnamese government 
covering energy demand estimation, nuclear economics, training of operating technicians, among 
other activities (Toshiba annual report, 1998). Toshiba also makes efforts to strengthen brand 
awareness abroad. In China, the company enacted a marketing campaign featuring the slogan 'New 
Current, New Arrival, New Toshiba' (Toshiba annual report, 2004). It supports the 'Hope 
Elementary Schools' providing educational opportunities for underprivileged children (Toshiba 
annual report, 2006), and initiated a science and math contest at Chinese universities in 2008. In 
North America, Toshiba has held a science and technology contest every year since 1990 (Toshiba 
annual report, 2010). 
 
5.7.3 3/11 and beyond 
In the aftermath of 3/11, Toshiba maintained that the company had not changed its strategy as the 
factors driving the business environment, such as the growing energy need and concern about 
global warming, had not changed. However, in May, 2011, the company concluded a partnership 
with the Korean windmill manufacturer Unison, and thus entered the global industry for wind 
power (Toshiba annual report, 2011). Given the short time from the outbreak of 3/11 until 
conclusion of the agreement with Unison, the companies had been negotiating before the accident. 
However, representatives from Toshiba's wind power business informed me that 3/11 was a major 
motivation for the company to form the alliance with Unison this early (interview, 14.04.2015). The 
new focus on renewables continued into 2012, where Toshiba introduced its Total Energy 
Innovation initiative with renewables playing an important role. The company also acquired a larger 
stake in Unison (Toshiba annual report, 2012). Regarding nuclear, Toshiba purchased Shaw Group's 
20 per cent stake in Westinghouse in fiscal 2012 (Toshiba annual report, 2013). At the same time, 
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Toshiba reduced the sales target for nuclear power from JPY one trillion to JPY 630 billion (Toshiba 
annual report, 2013), and stressed in the following year that 80 per cent of its nuclear business 
relates to maintenance and fuels which generate a stable income. The company continued to 
strengthen its leading position in the global nuclear industry by acquiring a 60 per cent stake in 
NuGeneration from IBERDROLA and GDF SUEZ. This company plans to construct nuclear power 
plants in England (Toshiba annual report, 2014). Toshiba also acquired the nuclear construction and 
services firm CB&I Stone & Webster in December, 2015 (Toshiba 05.01.2016). 
 Toshiba collaborates with TEPCO and the Japanese government to remedy the disaster at the 
Fukushima Dai Ichi Nuclear Power Plant (Toshiba annual report, 2011). The company also 
develops new equipment such as robots capable of accessing contaminated areas (Toshiba 
30.06.2015), and other equipment for decontamination (Toshiba annual report, 2013; Toshiba, 
18.01.2016). Finally, the company engages in philanthropic activities in Great East Japan (Toshiba 
annual report, 2011). 
During fiscal 2015, it came to light that Toshiba had manipulated its balance sheets over the 
past seven years across all business units. The independent investigation determined that the main 
cause was a corporate culture where employees cannot act contrary to the intent of their superiors. 
The top management set high income targets which should be obtained in such a short time frame 
that the employees had no other option than to overstate the profits to comply with the demand. In 
several cases, contract losses were either not reported in a timely manner or deliberately not 
reported at all. A sense of camaraderie helped to hide the fraud in an institutional manner, making it 
difficult for external stakeholders to detect the inappropriate accounting (Toshiba, 21.07.2015). The 
liquidity crisis that Toshiba subsequently encountered prompted the company to sell some of its 
assets to improve its balance sheets, e.g., the shares held in Topcon Corporation worth JPY 79 
billion (Toshiba 28.09.2015), NREG Toshiba Building worth JPY 62 billion (Toshiba 17.09.2015), 
KONE Corporation worth JPY 118 billion (Toshiba 22.07.2015), and a majority stake in its 
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semiconductor business (Toshiba, 25.01.2016). Toshiba admitted to pay the penalty imposed by the 
Financial Services Agency of nearly JPY 7.4 billion in December, 2015 (Toshiba 17.12.2015). In 
addition, given the changed business environment for nuclear power after 3/11, impairment of 
Westinghouse seemed inevitable. However, Toshiba explained that, on a consolidated basis, the 
market value of Westinghouse is still higher than the book value (Toshiba, 13.11.2015). The media 
reported that Toshiba considers spinning off its Japanese nuclear business to rebuild it as a separate 
company. However, Toshiba rejected this and emphasized that the company still promotes the 
nuclear business in Japan and abroad (Toshiba 27.01.2016).  
 The company disclosed the financial data for its nuclear power business going back to fiscal 
2006 in November, 2015 upon request from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. According to this data, the 
nuclear power business has continued to be profitable. In spite of fewer orders for new construction 
than expected, the fuels and services businesses generate a stabile profit (Toshiba, 27.11.2015). 
According to figure 5.2 below, Toshiba's nuclear power business seemed to be recovering from 














Figure 5.2: The EBITDA of Toshiba's nuclear power business 
Source: data from Toshiba (27.11.2015, 04.02.2016) 
 
Meanwhile, due to the financial turmoil at Toshiba the company recently incurred higher 
financing costs. A change in the discount rate from 9.5 per cent to 11 per cent resulted in a write 
down of the value of the nuclear power business by JPY 220 billion which, however, will not 
impact on Toshiba’s consolidated financial statements (Toshiba, 26.04.2016). 
 
Current strategy 
The goal for Toshiba's nuclear power business as announced in May, 2014, is to achieve stabile 
profitability through maintenance services, the fuels business and to a lesser extent new 
construction. To support the maintenance business, the company has established a service center in 
France, and seeks to gain maintenance contracts for reactors of other manufacturers. Toshiba also 
supports the resumption of nuclear power plants in Japan. In the fuels business, the company targets 
new customers, for example in France and Eastern Europe. To achieve contracts for new 
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construction, Toshiba submits proposals in Europe, the United States, Asia, and the Middle East 
(Toshiba, 22.05.2014). The company assumes that new construction opportunities will emerge in 
the future and expects to construct 45 new units during the next 15 years. Decommissioning is a 
new growth area where Westinghouse already has received orders in Europe. Toshiba is integrating 
its Nuclear Energy Systems division with the Westinghouse division to maximize synergy, 
particularly with regards to sharing of knowledge relating to construction and cooperation in 
manufacturing. The business of Westinghouse covers the whole nuclear life cycle. In parallel, it 
engages in the fuels business by offering to conduct the initial fuel load, refuel, preservation of 
spent fuel and disposal. Westinghouse has a 30 per cent global market share in the fuel business. In 
the construction business, Westinghouse offers its AP1000 reactor. Of the 400 reactors currently 
being planned for construction worldwide, Westinghouse targets 64 reactors in England, Poland, 
Bulgaria, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, India, China, 
Vietnam, Canada, the United States, Mexico and Brazil (Toshiba, 27.11.2015). Clearly, Toshiba has 
increased its commitment to nuclear power over time, also after 3/11. I will now analyze the current 
business environment for nuclear power in Toshiba's core markets, namely Japan, China and the 
United States. 
 
5.8 The Japanese market 
Japan is a mature market with currently 43 operable reactors (WNA 12.2015a). 
 
5.8.1 The competitive environment 
Rivalry 
The domestic vendors MHI, Hitachi and Toshiba have each had a fair market share since the 




As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Japanese nuclear firms and the government collaborate 
domestically as well as internationally, and they obey the rules of supranational nuclear 
organizations.   
 
Buyer power 
The nine electric power companies in Japan operating LWRs make contracts with MHI, Hitachi and 
Toshiba for repair and maintenance of their nuclear power plants (IAEA, 2015a). Those reactors 
that are able to pass the NRA’s new and stricter safety requirements are now gradually coming back 




Numerous companies in Japan are capable of supplying the nuclear power industry with equipment 
and machinery, as well as engineering advice (IAEA, 2015a). 
 
New entrants  
The data shows no evidence of new entry.  
 
Substitutes 
As 3/11 caused the termination of electricity generation from nuclear, the share of other energy 
sources increased, mainly fossil fuels. In 2014, Japan relied primarily on LNG followed by coal, oil, 
hydro, biomass and waste, solar, wind and geothermal energy. The government estimates that the 
generation costs per kWh is roughly 10.1 yen for nuclear, 10 yen for wind, 12.3 yen for coal, 13.7 
yen for LNG, and 24.3 yen for solar. Hence, nuclear is considered cost-competitive in Japan. METI 
assumes that the power generation costs would rise three trillion yen per year if the utilities replace 
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nuclear with thermal power generation (WNA 12.2015a). The current political goal is to decrease 
the dependence on nuclear power to the extent possible by increasing energy savings and 
introduction of renewables, and improve the efficiency of thermal power generation. Nuclear power 
is regarded as essential to ensure a flexible energy system in Japan as a low carbon, quasi-domestic 
energy source with low and stable operational costs (IAEA, 2015a). At the same time, generous 
feed-in-tariffs were introduced in 2012 for solar and wind to accelerate their deployment (WNA 
12.2015a). 
 
5.8.2 Resources and capabilities specific to Toshiba 
Technology 
Toshiba has extensive experience in this market where it has been operating since the country 
decided to adopt nuclear power. The company possesses the technology that the Japanese utilities 
demand, namely BWRs and PWRs. It is able to maintain and upgrade nuclear power plants as well 
as undertake waste management and decommissioning projects (WNA 12.2015a). Japan also 
utilizes the FBR technology at the Monju nuclear power plant that was connected to the grid in 
1995 (IAEA, 2015a). 
 
Market-political ambidexterity 
Toshiba collaborates with the government. For instance, since 2008, the company has collaborated 
with METI, the domestic nuclear manufacturers, and the Japanese utilities to develop next-
generation LWRs (WNA 12.2015a). Japan's energy policy develops in close collaboration with the 
energy industry; METI regularly receives advice regarding the national energy policy from the 
Electricity and Gas Industry Committee, comprising non-governmental professionals and experts. 
On this basis, METI and related Ministries and Agencies confer with individual power companies 




5.8.3 Institutional conditions and transitions 
Public opinion 
Since 3/11 broke out the media has reported very critically about nuclear power leading to public 
protests and demonstrations. Many people were shocked by the Fukushima disaster and came to 
look very negatively upon nuclear power. However, the opposition fell silent as electricity prices 
began to rise due to the increasing energy import that compensates for the lack of nuclear power 
(interview, 15.02.2016). My public opinion survey shows ambiguity among the Japanese 
population. Many reply that nucleaer power is ‘a double-edged sword’ or in other ways express that 
they are aware of the pros and cons of nuclear power (cf. appendix b). The Japanese government is 
confident that the public opinion will bounce back over the coming years (interview, 27.01.2013). It 
is determined to enhance public relations activities, e.g., public hearings, dialogues with various 
stakeholders, and education on nuclear power. These activities are based on scientific evidence and 
objective facts regarding the risks of nuclear energy, the impact of accidents, the waste management 
challenge, nuclear economics and international trends and experiences (IAEA, 2015a). 
 
Energy policy 
Nuclear power became a strategic national priority for Japan in 1973. Atomic energy accounted for 
about 30 per cent of the nation's energy mix at the time of 3/11. This share was expected to increase 
to 40 per cent toward 2017 and further to 50 per cent until 2030. Yet, 3/11 prompted the government 
to temporarily shut down all of the country's 48 nuclear reactors for a safety check and to reconsider 
its energy policy. While the public opinion on nuclear power was negatively affected by 3/11, the 
JDP government seemed to lose the 2012 election partly due to their proposal to phase out nuclear 
energy. The new LDP government declared that nuclear is a key base-load power source, and the 
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current goal for nuclear energy is 20 per cent (WNA 12.2015a). The previous goal to increase the 
share of nuclear power in Japan's energy mix to 50 per cent was scrapped after 3/11, but Keidanren 
continues to lobby in favor of nuclear power to ensure that the technology assumes a role in the 
long term (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012).  
 
Industrial policy 
Regardless of 3/11, the country has continuously promoted the export of Japanese nuclear 
technology (WNA 12.2015a). 
 
Security policy 
Nuclear energy is only used for peaceful purposes in Japan (IAEA, 2015a). However, Japan shows 
two faces on the issue of nuclear weapons politics. Domestically and internationally, Japan is an 
advocate of nuclear disarmament since the mid-1990s (Difilippo, 2006). The country hosts the 
Nuclear Security Summit (OECD, 2015). Meanwhile, Japan assures the United States that it will 
remain protected by the American nuclear shield as it fears a potential nuclear attack from North 
Korea, China or Russia. At the same time, it is important for the United States to keep Japan under 
its protection to be able to affect Japan politically. Finally, as long as Japan is protected by the 
United States, it is unlikely to leave the NPT and create its own nuclear weapons. The slow but 
steady growth of nationalist and conservative influence on Japanese politics may nonetheless lead 
Japan to look more favorably upon nuclear armament. If the United States at some point no longer 
is able or willing to protect Japan the country might also decide to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, 
on one hand, Japan opposes the existence of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it enjoys the 
protection of nuclear weapons. The fact is that Japan has not pushed very hard for international 
nuclear disarmament since doing so would not be in line with American objectives. This paradox 
reflects Japan’s security dependence on the United States (Difilippo, 2006). 
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Table 5.2: The business environment in Japan 
 Research question Measure Market: Japan 
MBV 1) What is the threat of 
competition? 
2) What is the extent of 
collaboration? 
3) What is the threat of buyer 
power? 
4) What is the threat of 
supplier power? 
5) What is the threat of new 
entrants? 
6) What is the threat of 
substitutes? 
1) The sellers  
2) Agreements of 
collaboration 
3) The buyers  
4) The suppliers 




1) Oligopolistic competition among 
Toshiba, MHI and Hitachi. 
2) The vendors collaborate with 
eachother as well as the government 
and foreign peers. They are also 
committed to supranational 
agreements.  
3) Buyer power is low. Although 
there are three vendors, Hitachi 
offers only the BWR and MHI offers 
only the PWR. Thus, utilities seeking 
either PWRs or BWRs have only two 
companies to choose from. 
4) Supplier power is low for Toshiba 
which has a vertically integrated 
business model. In addition, there 
are many suppliers to the nuclear 
industry in Japan. 
5) Entry barriers are significant in the 
nuclear industry because it requires 
a high and long-term investment. 
There is no evidence of new entry 
into the Japanese market.  
6) Nuclear power will remain part of 
Japan's energy mix although other 
energy sources are being promoted 
as well. 
RBV 7) Does Toshiba offer the 
technology demanded in this 
market? 
8) Does Toshiba have positive 
relations with the local 
government? 
7) The fit between 
the demand in this 
market and 
Toshiba's offer 




7) Toshiba offers the technology 
demanded in Japan and has 
significant experience in this market. 
8) Toshiba collaborates with the local 
government. 
IBV 9) Does the local public 
opinion support nuclear power 
development? 
10) Does the local energy 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
11) Does the local industrial 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
12) Does the local security 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
9) The public 
opinion 




cultivate a national 
nuclear industry 
12) Evidence that 
the nation is being 
protected by 
nuclear weapons 
9) There is considerable opposition 
against nuclear power in Japan. 
10) The Japanese energy policy 
supports nuclear power. 
11) The industrial policy supports the 
development of a nuclear industry 
and promotion of nuclear exports. 
12) Japan does not possess its own 
nuclear weapons but is being 
protected by American nuclear 
weapons. 
Strategy 13) Does Toshiba target this 
market? 
13) Evidence of 
bids for contracts 
13) Toshiba targets the Japanese 
market. 
Performance 14) Has Toshiba achieved 
contracts in this market? 
14) Evidence of 
contracts won 
14) Toshiba is engaged in 




5.9 The Chinese market 
China is a growth market with 30 operable reactors and 24 reactors under construction (WNA 
06.01.2016). 
 
5.9.1 The competitive environment 
Rivalry 
In 2006, Westinghouse won four contracts for new construction in China in competition with the 
French vendors Areva and the Russian vendor Atomstroyexport. The selection criteria concerned 
the degree to which the technology was proven, the price, local content, and, importantly, 




China ensures local participation in nuclear projects to benefit from knowledge transfer. So far it 
has learnt from France, Russia, Canada and Japan. The goal is to become self-reliant in reactor and 
equipment design and project management but the country will contuinue to collaborate 
internationally (WNA 25.05.2016). The country is an active participant in most of the existing 
multilateral international cooperation mechanism on nuclear power research and development and 
relevant promotion initiatives (IAEA, 2015b). 
China’s agreements with the IAEA are the People’s Republic of China and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China, an additional protocol to 
Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards in China and supplementary agreement on provision of technical 
assistance by the IAEA. Its main inetrnational treaties are the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
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Nuclear Weapons, Convention on physical protection of nuclear material, Convention on early 
notification of a nuclear accident, Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency, Convention on nuclear safety, and Safety Convention on Spent Fuel 
Management and Radioactive Waste Management. The Chinese government has bilateral 
agreements for co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy with 27 countries (IAEA, 2015b). 
 
Buyer power 
Nuclear power plants in China must be approved by the State Council. There are four state-owned 
nuclear firms: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China General Nuclear Power Group 
(CGN), China Nuclear Engineering Group Corporation (CNEC) and State Nuclear Power 
Technology Corporation (SNPTC). China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China 
General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) operate several nuclear power units. China Nuclear 
Engineering Group Corporation is mainly engaged in the construction and installation of China’s 
nuclear power units. State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation is mostly involved with the 
introduction, digest, assimilation, research and development, transfer, application and promotion of 
the 3
rd
 generation nuclear power technology. China Power Investment Corporation and China 
Huaneng Group, China Datang Corporation, China Guodian Corporation and China Huadian 
Corporation participate financially in nuclear power projects (IAEA, 2015b).  
 
Supplier power 
The main construction and installation companies in China are China Nuclear Engineering Group 
Co.: China Nuclear Industry 22
nd
 Construction Co., Ltd., China Nuclear Industry 23
rd
 Construction 
Co., Ltd., China Nuclear Industry 24
th
 Construction Co., Ltd., China Nuclear Industry 5
th
 
Construction Co., Ltd. and China Nuclear Industry Huaxing Construction Co., Ltd. The main 
Chinese suppliers of equipment are Harbin Electric Corporation, Dongfang Electric Corporation, 
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Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited, China First Heavy Industries Corporation, China 
National Erzhong Group Co., Shanghai First Machine Tool Works Ltd., Shenyang Blower Works 




The data shows no signs of new entry.  
 
Substitutes 
China is one of the countries in the world with the largest reserve of uranium (IAEA, 2015b). In 
2013, China generated electricity primarily from coal followed by renewables, nuclear and oil. In 
addition, China has some shale gas which it might use in the future. Yet, water is a constraint in 
China which complicates gas- and coal-fired power generation. Given the rising energy demand in 
China, the country expects to increase the production of practically all kinds of different energy 
sources (WNA 06.01.2016). The government has, however, committed to decreasing its use of fossil 
fuels to reduce CO2 emission by 40 per cent. The goal is to increase the ratio of non-fossil fuels to 
15 per cent by 2020 (IAEA, 2015b). 
 
5.9.2 Resources and capabilities specific to Toshiba 
Technology 
The local nuclear industry has become self-sufficient in reactor design and construction to a great 
extent but China still depends on western technology which the nuclear industry adapts and 
improves. All of the Chinese reactors in operation and under construction are PWRs, except one 
HTR. The country plans to build reprocessing plants. So far, the first pilot plant has been built 
(IAEA, 2015b). China focuses on promoting Westinghouse's AP1000 reactor, its indigenous 
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CAP1400 reactor, high temperature gas-cooled reactors and FBRs. The State Nuclear Power 
Technology has made the AP1000 the current basis of technology development and the CAP1400 is 
based on it. Quality and safety is a great concern after 3/11. Westinghouse has agreed to transfer 
technology to the State Nuclear Power Technology Corp which develops the CAP1400 reactor. In 
2014, the companies deepened their technological cooperation by establishing a partnership (WNA 
06.01.2016). Currently, four AP1000 reactors are under construction in China (IAEA, 2015b). 
These projects have incurred some delays due to issues related to design, quality, documentation 
and testing (Schneider and Froggatt, 2015). 
 
Market-political ambidexterity 
The relations between Japan and China are rather strained (interview 14.04.2015). However, 
Toshiba’s partner in China is the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (Schneider and 
Froggatt, 2015), which presumably has excellent relations with the local government.  
  
5.9.3 Institutional conditions and transitions 
Public opinion  
The law stipulates that the public should be involved in every stage of constructing and 
decommissioning nuclear power plants. The construction companies are obliged to publicize 
nuclear power related knowledge to the local public, e.g., distribution of brochures, giving lectures, 
holding exhibitions, and arranging site visits to nuclear power plants. They are furthermore obliged 
to efficiently deal with public opinions and suggestions collected from public participation and give 
timely feedback on a dedicated website or in the environment impacts assessment report (IAEA, 
2015b). He, Mol, Zhang and Lu (2012) stress that the Chinese public is hardly involved in the 
decision-making that concerns nuclear power. They found that the general level of knowledge is 
low in China due to the lack of transparency. 
100/220 
Energy policy 
China has found the peaceful use of nuclear energy essential since 1970. The Qinshan nuclear 
power plant, which China built independently, was connected to the grid in 1991. The Daya Bay 
nuclear power plant imported from France was connected into the grid in 1994. China Atomic 
Energy Authority, the National Energy Administration, the Ministry of Environment Protection and 
the Ministry of Health supervise nuclear power (IAEA, 2015b). The national nuclear power policy 
moved from 'moderate development' to 'positive development' in 2004, and shifted to 'steady 
development with safety' in 2011. China pursues nuclear power as a way to reduce the air pollution 
attributed to coal burning and to reduce CO2 emissions (WNA 06.01.2016).  
 
Industrial policy 
China aims to seize world leadership in nuclear and become a nuclear exporter. In 2015, the 
Hualong One reactor became China's main export product and the country utilizes its economic and 
diplomatic influence to promote it. According to the 2014 White Paper on Energy Policy, China will 




China is a nucleaer weapon state. The country conducted its first weapons test in 1964 (WNA 
04.2016). 
  
Table 5.3: The business environment in China 
 Research question Measure Market: China 
MBV 1) What is the threat of 
competition? 
2) What is the extent of 
collaboration? 
3) What is the threat of buyer 
power? 
1) The sellers 
2) Agreements of 
collaboration  
3) The buyers 
4) The suppliers 
5) The barriers to entry 
1) Several vendors have 
supplied reactors to China. 
However, Toshiba enjoys a 
competitive advantage over its 
rivals as it collaborates in a joint 
venture with the Chinese nuclear 
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4) What is the threat of supplier 
power? 
5) What is the threat of new 
entrants? 
6) What is the threat of 
substitutes? 
6) Viable alternatives industry which is eager to obtain 
Westinghouse technology. 
2) The Chinese vendors 
collaborate with vendors from 
several countries to learn from 
them. 
3) Buyer power is relatively high 
in China as many of the 
established vendors have a 
market share. 
4) Supplier power is low for 
Toshiba which has a vertically 
integrated business model. 
5) The threat of new entry is low 
in the nuclear industry which 
requires a high and long-term 
investment. There is no sign of 
new entry. 
6) The threat of substitutes is low 
because nuclear power is 
necessary to fill the great energy 
supply gap in China. 
RBV 7) Does Toshiba offer the 
technology demanded in this 
market? 
8) Does Toshiba have positive 
relations with the local 
government? 
7) The fit between the 
demand in this market 
and Toshiba's offer 
8) Evidence of 
collaboration with the 
local government 
7) Toshiba offers the technology 
demanded in China. In fact, the 
Chinese nuclear industry 
develops its own technology 
based on Westinghouse's 
AP1000 reactor and therefore 
depends on collaboration with 
Toshiba to benefit from 
knowledge transfer. 
8) Toshiba’s partner in China is a 
state owned corporation. 
IBV 9) Does the local public opinion 
support nuclear power 
development? 
10) Does the local energy policy 
support nuclear power 
development? 
11) Does the local industrial 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
12) Does the local security 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
9) The public opinion 
10) The energy policy 
11) Political measures 
to cultivate a national 
nuclear industry 
12) Evidence that the 
nation is being 
protected by nuclear 
weapons 
9) The general public knows litte 
about nuclear power and their 
opinion has hardly any influence. 
10) The energy policy supports 
nuclear power. 
11) The industrial policy supports 
the development of a nuclear 
industry and promotion of 
nuclear exports. 
12) China has nuclear weapons. 
Strategy 13) Does Toshiba target this 
market? 
13) Evidence of bids for 
contracts in this market 
13) Toshiba targets the Chinese 
market. A motivation for aquiring 
Westinghouse was to increase 
sales in China. 
Performance 14) Has Toshiba achieved 
contracts in this market? 
14) Evidence of 
contracts won in this 
market 
14) Toshiba is engaged in new 
construction in China. 
 
5.10 The American market 
The United States is a mature market for nuclear power with 99 operable reactors. Five are under 
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construction (IAEA, 2015c). 
 
5.10.1 The competitive environment 
Rivalry 
Westinghouse has built the majority of the PWRs in the country and is currently working on the five 
reactors that are under construction. GE has built all the BWRs in the United States. Reactors sold 
in the United States must have their design certified by the NRC or have the equivalent of design 
certification occur during the combined license application process (IAEA, 2015c). Westinghouse's 
AP600 and AP1000 reactors, Toshiba's and GE-Hitachi's ABWRs, and GE-Hitachi's Economic 
Simplified BWR have so far obtained American design certification and are being marketed in the 
United States (WNA 12.2015b). 
 
Collaboration 
The United States is an active member of a variety of supranational nuclear organizations and has 




The American reactors are operated by 30 different utilities which invest around USD 7.5 billion 
annually in maintenance and upgrading of their plants. Most of the reactors obtain life extension to 
60 years of operation, and the NRC considers extensions up to 80 years. The owners upgrade the 
reactors substantially when they have operated for about 30 years (WNA 12.2015b). 
 
Supplier power 
Many of the supplies to the nuclear industry are imported (OECD, 2015). The United States has 
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turned around the trend of declining enrollment at nuclear engineering schools over the past five 
years. The trend toward a decline in the number of university programs offering nuclear engineering 




MHI's US-APWR, the Korean APR-1400 reactor, the Russian VVER-1200 reactor and Areva's US 




In 2013, the nation's electricity was generated mostly from coal (39 per cent) followed by natural 
gas (27 per cent), nuclear (20 per cent), conventional hydroelectric (seven per cent), wind, 
geothermal, and solar energy (six per cent in total). Nuclear power is cost-competitive compared to 
alternatives. However, gas prices since 2009 and subsidized wind power with priority grid access 
threaten to erode the favorable nuclear economics. Due to the lower investment risk of gas-fired 
power plants compared with coal and nuclear, the majority of the new power plants being 
constructed in the United States are gas-fired (WNA 12.2015b). Federal and local governments 
encourage the development and use of selected energy resources through funding of research and 
development, tax allowances, service charges, regulations, and demonstration projects. Policy 
changes since the 1990s in favor of nuclear power led to a nuclear renaissance after a 30 year period 
with no new construction. The United States' reliance on nuclear power grew from 11 percent in 
1980 to almost 20 per cent in 2008 (IAEA, 2015c). 
 
5.10.2 Resources and capabilities specific to Toshiba 
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Technology 
The 99 reactors in the United States are BWRs and PWRs. 47 of them were built by Westinghouse, 
while the rest are built by GE, Babcock & Wilcox and Combustion Eng (IAEA, 2015c). By 2013, 
the NRC had approved four reactor designs, including Westinghouse's AP1000 and GEs ABWR 
(IAEA, 2015c). In Fiscal 2008, Toshiba gained orders for six PWRs and two ABWRs in the United 
States (Toshiba annual report, 2009). Currently, four AP1000s and one PWR are under construction. 
Another 16 reactors are under review of which six units are AP1000 (IAEA, 2015c). 
 
Market-political ambidexterity 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) supports the nuclear industry. It for instance intends to 
provide USD 452 million in funding to facilitate the development of SMR technology which 
potentially can obtain license from the NRC to achieve commercial operation by 2025 (IAEA, 
2015c). The government remains more involved in commercial nuclear power compared to any 
other industry in the United States (WNA 12.2015b). DOE recently provided a federal loan 
guarantee for USD 5.6 billion with Georgia Power Company and Oglethorpe Power Corporation for 
the construction of two of Westinghouse’s AP1000 reactors (IAEA, 2015c). 
 
5.10.3 Institutional conditions and transitions 
Public opinion 
The TMI in 1979 had undermined public support and many nuclear projects were replaced by fossil 
fuel projects. The U.S. Energy Information Administration collects, analyzes and disseminates 
impartial energy information to facilitate sound policy-making, efficient markets and public 
understanding regarding energy and its economic and environmental impact (IAEA, 2015c). The 
Public opinion has grown more positive. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear 




The United States adopted nuclear power in 1954. In 1957, the first nuclear power plant began 
operating in Shippingport. The number of nuclear reactors grew significantly until a recession 
began in the early 1980s which lowered electricity demand and inflation doubled or more than 
trippled the cost of capital (IAEA, 2015c). Yet in 2001, President Bush stated the intention to 
promote nuclear power to fight global warming (SPEEDA, 2015c). 
 
Industrial policy 
The Office of Advanced Reactor Technologies sponsor research, development and deployment 
activities through its Next Generation Nuclear Plant, Advanced Reactor Concepts, and Advanced 
Small Modular Reactor (SMR) programs to promote safety, technical, economical, and 
environmental advancement, and next generation nuclear energy technologies. SMRs are small 
enough to be fabricated in factories, they can be shipped to sites easily by truck, for example, and 
the construction is just three years. These factors can potentially reduce the financial risk associated 
with nuclear projects (IAEA, 2015c).  
 
Security policy 
The importance of nuclear power to the United States is geopolitical as much as economic (WNA 
12.2015b). The United States depends on nuclear weapons not only for deterrence but potential use 







Table 5.4: The business environment in the United States 
 Research question Measure Market: USA 
MBV 1) What is the threat of 
competition? 
2) What is the extent of 
collaboration? 
3) What is the threat of buyer 
power? 
4) What is the threat of supplier 
power? 
5) What is the threat of new 
entrants? 
6) What is the threat of 
substitutes? 
1) The sellers 
2) Agreements of 
collaboration 
3) The buyers 
4) The suppliers 
5) The barriers to 
entry 
6) Viable alternatives 
1) Currently, Toshiba competes 
only with Hitachi in this market. 
However, the competitive pressure 
will increase as the reactor designs 
of other vendors eventually 
become approved for use in the 
United States. 
2) The United States collaborates 
with many countries, particularly 
with Japan through the 
Westinghouse-Toshiba and GE-
Hitachi collaboration. 
3) Buyer power is currently low 
because they can only choose 
between two vendors. 
4) Supplier power is low for Toshiba 
which has a vertically integrated 
business model. 
5) The incumbents can expect 
competition from Russia, Korea 
and France in the near future. 
6) Nuclear power will likely remain 
part of the United States' energy 
mix although other energy sources 
are being promoted as well. 
RBV 7) Does Toshiba offer the 
technology demanded in this 
market?   
8) Does Toshiba have positive 
relations with the local 
government? 
7) The fit between 
the demand in this 
market and Toshiba's 
offer 
8) Evidence of 
collaboration with the 
local government 
7) Toshiba offers the technology 
demanded in the United States and 
has significant experience in this 
market through Westinghouse. 
8) Toshiba has positive relations 
with the local government through 
Westinghouse. 
IBV 9) Does the local public opinion 
support nuclear power 
development? 
10) Does the local energy policy 
support nuclear power 
development? 
11) Does the local industrial 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
12) Does the local security 
policy support nuclear power 
development? 
9) The public opinion 
10) The energy 
policy 
11) Political 
measures to cultivate 
a national nuclear 
industry 
12) Evidence that the 
nation is being 
protected by nuclear 
weapons 
9) There is little opposition to 
nuclear power in the United States. 
10) The energy policy supports 
nuclear power. 
11) The industrial policy supports 
the development of a nuclear 
industry and promotion of nuclear 
exports. 
12) The United States has nuclear 
weapons. 
Strategy 13) Does Toshiba target this 
market? 
13) Evidence of bids 
for contracts in this 
market 
13) Toshiba targets the American 
market. A motivation for aquiring 
Westinghouse was to increase 
sales in the United States. 
Performance 14) Has Toshiba achieved 
contracts in this market? 
14) Evidence of 
contracts won in this 
market 
14) Toshiba is engaged in new 
construction, maintenance and 
decommissioning in the United 
States. 
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5.11 Comparison of market opportunities 
Toshiba responded calmly to 3/11 by staying in the nuclear power business. While one could 
interpret the company’s calmness as paralysis, my multi-level analyses of the business environment 
in Japan, China and the United States indicate continuing support for nuclear power. Toshiba retains 
a strong foothold in these markets. The company engages in oligopolistic competition in all three 
markets, the threat of buyer power is low as the buyers have few vendors to choose from. The threat 
of supplier power is also low because Toshiba has a vertically integrated business model. New entry 
seldom occurs because it requires a high and long-term investment to enter the nuclear power 
industry. Although nations seek to diversify their energy mix, the threat of substitutes is low 
because it takes decades to phase out nuclear power. Toshiba possesses the technology demanded in 
the three markets and has good relations with the local governments. The institutional variables are 
favorable as well in all three markets. An exception is the public opinion, especially in Japan. 
However, the people’s attitude is evidently a less influential factor compared to the energy policy, 
industrial policy and security policy. 
In Japan, the current prospects for nuclear power are not as great as before 3/11 due to the 
increase of other energy sources but there is significant demand for maintenance, fuel and 
decommissioning. In China, Toshiba has entered the market in collaboration with the local industry. 
While China has purchased reactors from different vendors, Toshiba is uniquely positioned relative 
to its competitors because the country develops its indigenous technology based on Westinghouse’s 
AP1000 and therefore is eager to learn from Toshiba. The situation is delicate as there is a high risk 
that Chinese firms may take over Toshiba’s market share over time. We have seen this before in 
Japan where the Japanese vendors developed their capabilities through collaboration with American 
vendors and eventually acquired them. However, in the short term, China is a promising market for 
Toshiba. In the United States, Toshiba has significant experience through Westinghouse. The 




Table 5.5: Comparison of market opportunities 
 Japan China The United States 
MBV 1a) Oligopolistic 
competition among Toshiba, 
MHI and Hitachi. 
2a) The vendors collaborate 
with eachother as well as 
the government and foreign 
peers. They are also 
committed to supranational 
agreements.  
3a) Buyer power is low. 
Although there are three 
vendors, Hitachi offers only 
the BWR and MHI offers 
only the PWR. Thus, utilities 
seeking either PWRs or 
BWRs have only two 
companies to choose from. 
4a) Supplier power is low 
for Toshiba which has a 
vertically integrated 
business model. In addition, 
there are many suppliers to 
the nuclear industry in 
Japan. 
5a) Entry barriers are 
significant in the nuclear 
industry because it requires 
a high and long-term 
investment. There is no 
evidence of new entry into 
the Japanese market.  
6a) Nuclear power will 
remain part of Japan's 
energy mix although other 
energy sources are being 
promoted as well.  
1b) Several vendors have 
supplied reactors to China. 
However, Toshiba enjoys a 
competitive advantage over 
its rivals as it collaborates in 
a joint venture with the 
Chinese nuclear industry 
which is eager to obtain 
Westinghouse technology. 
2b) The Chinese vendors 
collaborate with vendors 
from several countries to 
learn from them. 
3b) Buyer power is relatively 
high in China as many of the 
established vendors have a 
market share. 
4b) Supplier power is low for 
Toshiba which has a 
vertically integrated 
business model. 
5b) The threat of new entry 
is low in the nuclear industry 
wchich requires a high and 
long-term investment. There 
is no sign of new entry. 
6b) The threat of substitutes 
is low because nuclear 
power is necessary to fill the 
great energy supply gap in 
China. 
1c) Currently, Toshiba competes 
only with Hitachi in this market. 
However, the competitive 
pressure will increase as the 
reactor designs of other vendors 
eventually become approved for 
use in the United States. 
2c) The United States 
collaborates with many countries, 
particularly with Japan through 
the Westinghouse-Toshiba and 
GE-Hitachi collaboration. 
3c) Buyer power is currently low 
because they can only choose 
between two vendors. 
4c) Supplier power is low for 
Toshiba which has a vertically 
integrated business model. 
5c) The incumbents can expect 
competition from Russia, Korea 
and France in the near future. 
6c) Nuclear power will 
likelyremain part of the United 
States' energy mix although 
other energy sources are being 
promoted as well. 
RBV 7a) Toshiba offers the 
technology demanded in 
Japan and has significant 
experience in this market. 
8a) Toshiba has positive 
relations with the local 
government. 
7b) Toshiba offers the 
technology demanded in 
China. In fact, the Chinese 
nuclear industry develops its 
own technology based on 
Westinghouse's AP1000 
reactor and therefore 
depends on collaboration 
with Toshiba to benefit from 
knowledge transfer. 
8b) Toshiba’s partner in 
China is a state owned 
corporation. 
7c) Toshiba offers the technology 
demanded in the United States 
and has significant experience in 
this market through 
Westinghouse. 
8c) Toshiba has positive relations 
with the local government 
through Westinghouse.  
IBV 9a) There is considerable 9b) The general public 9c) There is little opposition to 
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opposition against nuclear 
power in Japan. 
10a) The Japanese energy 
policy supports nuclear 
power. 
11a) The industrial policy 
supports the development 
of a nuclear industry and 
promotion of nuclear 
exports. 
12a) Japan does not 
possess its own nuclear 
weapons but is being 
protected by American 
nuclear weapons. 
knows litte about nuclear 
power and their opinion has 
hardly any influence. 
10b) The energy policy 
supports nuclear power. 
11b) The industrial policy 
supports the development of 
a nuclear industry and 
promotion of nuclear 
exports. 
12b) China has nuclear 
weapons. 
nuclear power in the United 
States. 
10c) The energy policy supports 
nuclear power. 
11c) The industrial policy 
supports the development of a 
nuclear industry and promotion 
of nuclear exports. 
12c) The United States has 
nuclear weapons. 
Strategy 13a) Toshiba Targets the 
Japanese market. 
13b) Toshiba targets the 
Chinese market. A 
motivation for aquiring 
Westinghouse was to 
increase sales in China. 
13c) Toshiba targets the 
American market. A motivation 
for aquiring Westinghouse was to 
increase sales in the United 
States. 
Performance 14a)  Toshiba is engaged in 
maintenance and 
decommissioning in Japan. 
14b) Toshiba is engaged in 
new construction in China. 
14c) Toshiba is engaged in new 
construction, maintenance and 


















Chapter 6 Discussion 
In chapter four, I developed a conceptual model based on relevant peer-reviewed literature. In 
chapter five, I tested the model by applying it in my case study. In this chapter, I discuss the 
appropriateness of the variables in my model based on the findings from the case study.  At the 
industry level, I defined the variables based on Porter’s five forces theory and Barney’s suggestion 
to add collaboration as a sixth force. Yet the case study shows that the nuclear industry competes as 
an oligopoly and the rivals are exceptionally inclined to collaborate with each other. These factors 
compel me to replace Porter’s framework which assumes aggressive interfirm rivalry, with the 
theory of coopetition introduced by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995). Taking simultaneous 
advantage of competition and cooperation is the essence of coopetition. It arises when firms have 
converging interests. That is especially the case under oligopolistic competition (Yami et al., 2010). 
The Areva-MHI alliance is one example of inter-country coopetition, while the JINED consortium 
example shows coopetition in a national context. Replacing Porter’s framework with coopetition 
theory means that the threat of buyer power, supplier power, new entry and substitutes will not be 
analyzed in depth. My analyses of the Japanese, Chinese and American markets show that these 
factors do not impose a considerable threat. Buyer power is low under oligopolistic competition 
which implies that buyers have few options to choose from. Supplier power is low for vendors 
which have a vertically integrated business structure. New entry is rare in the nuclear industry 
because it requires a large, long.term investment. The threat of subsititutes is also low because the 
switching costs are high in the energy sector. Japan’s abrupt replacement of nuclear power with 
imported fossil fuels after 3/11 is a good example. Phasing out nuclear power occurs over a long 
time and may not be possible at all; after Chernobyl, Sweden decided to phase out nuclear power 
(Wober, 1992a), yet 40 per cent of Sweden’s electricity is derived from nuclear power today (WNA, 
05.2016).  
It is clearly advantageous for Toshiba to be vertically integrated. The firm is better able to 
111/220 
manage construction processes when it controls its suppliers. As mentioned in section 5.4, nuclear 
construction often involves delay and cost overrun due to design issues, shortage of skilled labor, 
quality control issues, supply chain issues, poor planning and shortage of finance. Another 
advantage is that vertical integration equips Toshiba with many capabilities so that it can perform 
activities within several business areas. Thus, when the likelihood of orders for new construction is 
low, such as the current situation in Japan, Toshiba survives because it can handle orders for 
maintenance, fuels and decommissioning. Finally, possessing several capabilities means that 
Toshiba can make a comprehensive proposal for construction projects which typically involve many 
aspects. As mentioned in section 5.3, nuclear deals are complex and cover issues such as the nuclear 
fuel cycle and knowledge transfer. Due to vertical integration Toshiba has capabilities along the 
entire nuclear fuel cycle and is able to transfer various kinds of knowledge. Section 5.3 also shows 
that buyers seek diversification in terms of reactor design. Toshiba’s acquisition of Westinghouse 
enabled the company to offer both PWR and BWR reactors and thereby appeal to a larger audience. 
Based on this finding I add vertical integration as a third firm-level variable in my conceptual model 
in addition to technology and market-political ambidexterity. 
The case study shows that the institution-level variables are appropriate. The public opinon 
analyses confirm that decision-makers attempt to cultivate a mindset among their citizens that 
supports nuclear power development. Moreover, they indicate that citizens have few options to 
oppose to their country’s atomic program, most notably in China. Although the public opinion 
factor is relatively weak, I keep it in the model because it influences in an indirect manner. 
Information campaigns intended to shape the public opinion increase the cost of nuclear power, and 
the public opinion may impact on the politicians governing in a democracy. The energy policy, 
industrial policy and security policy are important factors in all the markets that I analyzed. Figure 
6.1 below shows the revised conceptual model.  
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Figure 6.1 Revised conceptual model  














Chapter 7 Concluding remarks 
In this PhD project I investigated the survival strategy for Toshiba's nuclear power business 
following 3/11. The short answer to my research question is that the company has maintained the 
strategy for its nuclear power business and strengthened its global leadership position through 
acquisitions. The reason is that Toshiba feels confident that the disaster’s negative impact is 
temporary. My analyses of the Japanese, Chinese and American markets indeed suggest continuing 
support for nuclear power. These markets represent promising yet different business opportunities. 
In Japan, new construction is unrealistic in the near term but there is strong demand for 
maintenance, fuels and decommissioning. China is building new nuclear power plants, while the 
demand in the United States covers new construction, maintenance, fuels and decommissiong. 
 On a separate note, Toshiba pursued related diversification in the aftermath of 3/11 with its 
entrance into the wind power business. It also pursues product innovation and has developed 
equipment that responds to new needs stemming from the nuclear crisis. 
 In the process of answering the research question, I built a theoretical framework drawing on 
Peng et al.'s (2009) strategy tripod and the factors that drive nuclear power development. My model 
can be used by academics as well as practitioners to analyze the prospects for nuclear power in a 
given country. At the industry level, the most important factor is coopetition analyzing how the 
company simultaneously competes and cooperates with its rivals. At the firm level, the important 
factors are vertical integration, technology and market-political ambidexterity. Finally, at the 
institution level, the important factors are public opinion, although this factor is weaker relative to 
the other factors, namely energy policy, industrial policy and security policy.  
An amendment to Peng's strategy tripod is that it is necessary to apply it in an international 
context because the nuclear industry is a global industry. Thus, the particular national context is to a 
large extent determined by international regulation and agreements of international collaboration. 
The implication is that it can be misleading to say, e.g, 'the Japanese nuclear industry' since what 
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happens in Japan to a great extent is determined by external forces. Furthermore, the strategy-
making of nuclear MNCs such as Toshiba depends on the business opportunities in different 
markets which they arbitrage among. 
 
Future research 
In a future research project, it is relevant to strengthen the conceptual model by integrating more 
literature into the literature review. Furthermore, to apply the model to more markets. In order to 
enhance the universality of the model, it is necessary to investigate the factors shaping the business 
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a: Summary of interviews 
Interview of Mr. Yukata Iikura, President, Institute of Educational Environment 
The purpose of this interview was to learn about the Japanese energy policy and the public opinion on 
nuclear power. I met Mr. Iikura at his office in Tokyo in the afternoon of Jan 27, 2013. Mr. Iikura initially 
explained that energy is a complicated issue because economic growth means increasing energy 
consumption. To support his view, he showed me a graph of the growth of the Japanese population, GDP and 
energy consumption to illustrate that economic growth cannot be achieved without increasing energy 
consumption. Mr. Iikura believes it would be correct to phase out fossil fuels but doing so is not feasible. 
Japan faces the dual challenge of promoting economic growth and preventing an environmental crisis. He 
furthermore believes that changing the industrial structure in Japan is irrelevant because the environment is a 
global problem: “It would help if we stop using these things but that is unrealistic”. He also believes that 
nuclear energy is better than fossil fuels even considering its risks. To support his point, he referred to a 
recent hostage situation at a refinery in Algeria where a number of Japanese workers were killed: “it is 
difficult to say which is worse: generating nuclear power or dispatching workers to the Middle East”. 
 Mr. Iikura is confident that Japan will use more nuclear power than ever before in the future and 
continue to export nuclear technology to countries like Turkey and Vietnam. He also finds that the public 
opinion on nuclear power is currently very influenced by the former Prime Minister Naoto Kan who ruled 
the country at the time of 3/11 and made the nuclear crisis even worse. In his view, there has been an unfair 
and too negative campaign against nuclear power by advocates of renewables. The mass media made it all 
worse. Especially the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi and Tokyo Shimbun. Mr. Iikura explained that these 
newspapers are related to Kan's party, the JDP. The current LDP administration assumes it will take a couple 
of years to reverse the public opinion. 
 
Interview of eight Japanese citizens 
The purpose of this interview of Japanese citizens was to learn about their experience of 3/11. I met them in 
Iwaki where they volunteered in a post-3/11 NGO project. I interviewed them one by one while everyone 
was present. 
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Interviewee 1: I was doing my job as an office clerk when I heard the sound of an earthquake. The tremor 
gradually got worse. I couldn't stand up. I should have run away but without thinking I just stayed and leaned 
on to things. It was my first time to experience such a strong earthquake so I didn’t know what to do. But I 
did not incur any injuries. The other people also hesitated to begin with and did not leave the building at 
once. Some people hid under things. We left the building a bit too late and took no things with us. We moved 
to a big parking lot which is right next to our company. Since we had carried no things with us when we left 
and it was a very cold time we kept saying to each other “it’s cold..” and looked after one another. None of us 
had seen buildings shake this much before. We worried about how severe the earthquake would be because it 
was our first time to experience it. I thought about my grandmother who was living alone. Said to my boss 
that I would like to go and see her, and so I went. In my house, some walls had cracked on the outside, the 
china had fallen out from our cupboards and things like that. We couldn’t use the water, electricity and gas 
for about one month. Now everything is fine again. It is almost like before. 
Interviewee 2: I worked when the earthquake struck. I was alone in the office – as I usually am. Then the 
shaking began and I thought about what to do. It was so strong that I could neither stand nor walk. In fact, 
while I hid under the table, the table also moved. I thought I should die. Then I rushed down the stairs and 
left the building. There were about eight people from my company outside. I felt like I was going to die.  
Interviewee 3: I was doing my job. I work at a factory. When I felt the tremor I was lifting goods on a fork 
lift. I thought it was dangerous and stopped the fork lift. My work place is not in the best condition. The roof 
fell down. We left the building when it was all dark. It was really dangerous. When we got out on the parking 
lot some of the cars were turned upside down, a man fell etc. It was my first time to experience an 
earthquake like this which gradually got worse. I worried about how it would end. When we got outside, all 
the factory workers got together. We made a headcount before getting together with the workers from other 
workplaces. We confirmed that all of us were present. Then I checked my mobile for information about a 
tsunami. I was shocked to see that my beloved Onahama area was flooded by the tsunami. We were together 
for about one or one and a half hour. Before going home we returned to the factory to block the electricity 
and do the things we could do. But it was dangerous to stay there. Compared to other firms in the area we 
were a bit slow to head home. It was difficult to drive because the traffic lights did not work. My home 
turned out to be OK; only one wall was slightly damaged.  
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Interviewee 4: I was shopping at a big mall but when the earthquake came I immediately went outside. It 
wasn’t Iwaki but hatano city and the earthquake was not so strong in this area. It was not as severe as here. 
When the quake was more or less over I went into my car to get gasoline at the gasoline stand. I considered 
the situation. It was pretty bad. Especially the nuclear power plant. So after three days I decided to go to 
Canada. The government kept saying in the news that everything was OK but I had my doubts. My kids are 
in Canada. They said:” Father, Japan is unsafe…come home at once”. So I escaped and got home. At that 
time I only thought about myself. But when I got to Canada I felt really sad because I had escaped when 
everyone in Japan were struggling. In April, Shiga-san was cutting bamboo and needed help so I came back. 
The bamboo project had finished but then he talked about the Sakura project and I said, let’s do it. So that is 
what I have been doing since.  
Interviewee 5: I worked at my company. It is in Yokohama. I had entered the elevator when the tremor 
began. It’s a really big building. The shaking is different in smaller and taller buildings. The meeting room 
shook very much. People hid under the tables.  
Interviewee 6: At that time I was still a student at Kumamoto University so I didn’t feel the earthquake. I saw 
it in the TV news. My plan was to start working in Kanagawa from April 2011 so I worried whether I could 
go or not.   
Interviewee 7: When the earthquake struck I looked at my cell phone. The shop owner told us that it is better 
to leave the shop, so we went outside. Then the shaking got even worse. We couldn’t stand up. The cars 
looked like they were dancing. The power cables shook a lot. I was surprised that the buildings didn’t break 
down. The cars couldn’t drive because many cars had stopped. The office clerk at my company hates 
earthquakes. We couldn’t stand up so I brought chairs to the parking lot and we sat down. Our building didn’t 
tear down but other buildings did. Our roof did break, though. I learned about the nuclear power plant 
accident in the news. I had not imagined that an accident like that could happen. It sounded more and more 
severe in the news. They kept saying that it was OK. So I thought it was. But eventually I couldn’t believe it. 
My brother said he would flee. Then we fled on the third day after the accident. I came back within one week 
but my family stayed for two weeks in Chiba. When I measured for radiation I saw that the level was high. 
And there was nothing here. No water, no goods. They had nothing to sell at the convenience stores. And we 
ran out of gasoline. Wherever we went there was nothing to buy. In the prefecture nearby there was 
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everything. Companies would not supply goods to Iwaki due to the risk of radiation. There was some 
radiation in the other prefectures but not as much as here. They were also little impacted by the earthquake. 
So their life went on as before. In Chiba we could buy gasoline even without having to stand in a queue. In 
Iwaki there was nothing. No matter where we looked for it. For a while there was no point in going to work. 
For a long time we didn’t have water. So it was difficult to make food, use the toilet etc. The evacuees 
received only water and bread for a long time. The prefecture gave them only that. No rice or hot food. It was 
in the gymnasiums of schools. One person from the prefecture looked after them. Then at some point they 
got katsudon (fried pork on rice) for four days in a row. These people had lost family members or their 
homes and they were not feeling well. Usually people say thank you when you give them food but these 
people could not say so. Because they were not well. These people who escaped from the power plant 
accident can still not return. The people from Naraha and such places. They still live in temporary housing. 
Cattle and wild boars now live in the abandoned houses. I would not live there. There is too much radiation. 
The level of radiation has decreased now. It is 0,1-0,3 around here. That is higher than the international 
safety standard. I feel that people are stupid. We shouldn’t have anything to do with nuclear. I did think that 
nuclear power was dangerous even before 3/11. We can fire with wood instead. And we should not live such 
comfortable lives. That doesn’t make us happy. We should slow down a bit. Decrease our energy 
consumption. It’s good in Denmark. You ride the bike. 
I think those politicians who support nuclear power won the election because people are stupid. They 
forget easily. They also won due to issues that are not related to nuclear power. The earlier government was 
not successful. It did not deliver on its promises. So people didn’t vote for these politicians because they 
support nuclear power. And many people didn’t experience the difficulties of the earthquake. Only the people 
who have experienced it understand it. After Chernobyl I soon forgot. I bought a Geiger counter. But soon I 
got used to it and forgot about the accident. We are planting sakura now so that people will not forget the 
accident. We used to say Fukushima – utsukushima (Fukushima – beautiful island). We depend on the money 
from nuclear power plants. No one really wants their town to become a nuclear town but we are concerned 
about putting food on the table. They all receive money from TEPCO in various ways. It is difficult. Get 
your PhD soon and explain about this. People are not good.  
Interviewee 8:  I was mixing concrete when the shaking started. I stopped the machine. The concrete fell 
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down. I just laughed. For about 30 min. Then I went to Onahama. Watched the TV and saw that the tsunami 
had damaged a lot in Sendai. I watched TV nonstop. It was like a movie.  The day after I thought that no one 
probably would go outside but it turned out that everybody came to the office, also those who usually don’t 
come to work. We did what we could do. When they said they were hungry my mother brought them miso 
and onigiri (rice balls). We learned that the nuclear plant was endangered so I fled with my family to Tokyo 
on the third day. It took around 20 hours to get there. My mother had actually prepared to escape already on 
the second day. She stood in our hall. If it wasn’t for the nuclear power plant our place could have been 
rebuilt soon. Now there is a huge work to do with decontamination. The nursery was the most dangerous 
place. They put the contaminated stuff in plastic bags and leave it there. I worry how it will be like in the 
future.  
 
Interview of Mr. Yukata Miki, Manager, Japan Research Institute 
The purpose of this interview was to learn about the Japanese energy policy and the public opinion on 
nuclear power. I met Mr. Miki at his office in Tokyo in the afternoon of Feb 15, 2013. I described my PhD 
project and referred to an article written by Mr. Miki regarding Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects.  We initially talked about Japan’s trading with carbon credits. CDM projects are more popular than 
Joint Implementation (JI) projects because Japan trades more with China and India in general. Nuclear 
energy is not included in the Kyoto Protocol. Hydro energy, wind energy and HFC projects are most popular 
in China. Mr. Miki explained that there is no export benefit because all the parts used are local ones. After 
3/11 the World Bank forecasted that Japan would engage much more in carbon trading but Japan decided to 
leave the Kyoto Protocol. The emissions are increasing but whether the country will offset those using the 
Kyoto Protocol or BOCM or something else, no one knows at the moment. The Japanese government has not 
come with a solution yet. They say they will use BOCM but so far there is no definition of volume, prices 
etc. Both MITI and MOE are involved with carbon trading because it concerns both ministries. In general, 
MITI is more powerful than MOE. The industry in Japan opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, but there was a 
strong international movement in favor of it. The foreign office is really strong, the strongest actually. 
BOCM uses coal fire plants, nuclear, energy efficiency (e.g., aircon and LED). The BOCM is export related 
and targets countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Kenya. The host 
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country receives money and Japanese high quality products at bargain prices. The BOCM is managed by 
MITI and MOE.  
 Mr. Miki explained that China, India, Middle East are likely to increase their use of nuclear power in 
the future while the advanced countries probably will decrease their consumption. The United States has 
decreased its subsidies to nuclear power because it is not economical. Also in Japan, nuclear power is quite 
expensive if the plant has to live up to the new safety requirements. So in the advanced countries, nuclear is 
unlikely to increase. It will rather decrease. In China and India there is an energy gap, so even though nuclear 
is expensive, they have no other option than to use it. There is also the possibility to operate the plants 
cheaply and compromise on safety.  
The goal articulated by the previous government in Japan to phase out nuclear by 2013 is unlikely to 
materialize, according to Mr. Miki. The current LDP government has stated that it will revise this decision. 
The LDP has traditionally supported nuclear. Their party probably won the elections regardless of their 
approach to nuclear. A lot of people wanted to return to the LDP for different reasons. Many of the people 
who voted for the LDP don’t appreciate nuclear power. They just did not want the JDP to continue. 
Moreover, minds change easily. Right after the accident there was a strong resistance to nuclear but as the 
costs of energy increased significantly, many people preferred to resume nuclear power. Prime Minister Abe 
is clearly pro-nuclear and a lot of people think it is OK. 
 Mr. Miki finds that it would be difficult for Japan to change its industrial structure. To gradually 
move from heavy industry to services like England, for instance: “in Japan we have Toyota and the other 
manufacturers. They are part of our identity. I don’t think we can replace them with financial service etc.”, he 
explained.  
 Due to the FIT system, the use of solar has increased a lot in Japan. It is the current policy to 
promote renewables through the FIT system. Wind power is difficult in Japan, he explained: “we don’t have 
the same sort of wind as in Europe. Mitsubishi is the strongest player in this field in Japan but internationally, 
it is probably among the weakest players. Wind power is still quite expensive in Japan, and if we make it 
cheaper, the turnover decreases”.   
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Interview of two executives at Toshiba 
The purpose of this interview was to learn about the impact of 3/11 on Toshiba's energy business. I met the 
executives at their office in Kawasaki on Apr. 14, 2015. They explained that Toshiba was very much 
involved in the reconstruction work after 3/11. Furthermore, that 3/11 had increased Toshiba’s willingness to 
invest in renewables; it was a major motivation to finalize the negotiations with the Korean wind turbine 
manufacturer Unison early and establish a partnership with the company. Toshiba collaborates with partners 
in foreign countries to enhance its global competitiveness. The Mitsui keiretsu which Toshiba is a member of 
is weakening as a result. The executives believe that the Mitsubishi keiretsu is currently the strongest keiretsu 
as it retains many of the original elements such as a trading company.  
 The executives find that collaborating with Asian nationals is more smooth, compared with 
westerners. The reason is that many Asians speak good Japanese and those having experienced studying or 
working in Japan are accustomed to the Japanese working environment. Especially Japanese technicians 
have difficulty speaking a foreign language and it is difficult to communicate through an interpreter. “If there 
was no communication issue international collaboration could be more cost-efficient”.  
They further elaborate that a different cultural DNA prohibits mutual understanding; the Japanese are 
farmers (nomin) who stay at the farm. The Americans are a hunting people (syuryo minzoku).  The 
implication in business, they explain, is that Americans chase high growth rates and soon withdraw from a 
market when growth starts to decline. In contrast, the Japanese hold on to their investments in good times 
and in bad. The shorter distance from Japan is also an advantage of Asian countries compared to western 
countries. They do emphasize, however, that collaborating with Asian partners does involve difficulties. 
South Korean organizations, for example, are more hierarchical and resemble old-fashioned Japanese 
organization. Japanese organizations have become less hierarchical although the respect for age prevails. 
Finally, “our political relations with these countries are rather strained and unlikely to improve”. 
 
b: Public opinion survey 
 















12 A very heavy firecracker for silly children. 
13 ASTRO BOY(ATOM) 
14 Atomic bombs 
15 Atoms For Peaceという洗脳Mind-control byABCC,IAEA,ICRP 
16 Bomb, Power station 
17 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident 





23 Fuck Nuclear 
24 Fukushima 
25 Fukushima disaster 
26 Fukushima disaster 
27 Hiroshima 
28 IAEA 
29 It's better than burning coal for the environment. Much worse than green energy. It is a necessary evil for the 
time being. 
30 missile 
31 Most cost effective way of generating electricity 
32 Neclear bomb 
33 no idia 
34 not sure 
35 Nuclear power 
36 Problem 
37 Three Mile Island 
38 unstable,powerful 
39 useful 
40 We should not use atm energi. We should learn energi plan from Germany. 


























































































125 事故 収拾がつかない 危険 




































































































































251 原子力発電所 核兵器 










































































































































































































































































































537 発電 兵器 エネルギー 
538 発電 爆弾 



































































































































































































































































7 Affordable energy prices 
8 atomic bomb 
9 CO2を排出しない発電技術 
10 do'nt use.because can't control. 
11 e=mc^2 
12 fusion技術を開発すべきであり、日本国内に既存する発電所はすべてdicommissionすべきである。 
13 Got bad impression 
14 I do believe the atomic power needs for Japanese energy security. 
15 is more dangerous in a country that suffers from regular earthquakes and tsunamis 
16 It is not clean energy 
17 IZURE-YAMERU-BEKI. 
18 N/A 
19 necessary for having stable life but at the same time might destroy beeing life. 
20 Need power source but safety measures are critical. 
21 no 
22 not sure 
23 Nuclear power is a problem. 




27 something better to find a way not to rely to 






















































































































































































































































































































































反原発の団体のおかげで 原発をとめていますが、そのために、 東京と大阪で CO2濃度が 
３０パーセント上昇。それにより、 オゾン層の破壊が進むことのほうが 
もっと不安です。オゾン層破壊のほうが 元にもどせないし、太陽からの大量の放射線がふりそそぎ、 
それこそ皮膚がんの人が 増えるでしょう。あと、 化石燃料に今頼っているおかげで、 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Replies to question seven 
 
 Disagree Agree to some extent Agree Not sure 
Nuclear power is 
environmentally 
friendly. 
50% 29 % 12% 8% 
Nuclear power is a 
cheap energy source. 
41% 28% 17% 14% 
Nuclear power is 
dangerous. 
5% 23% 68% 4% 
 
Replies to question eight  
   
 Disagree Agree to some extent Agree Not sure 
In the future, I hope 
that Japan’s idled 
nuclear power plants 
will remain offline. 
21%  24% 47% 8% 
In the future, I hope 
Japan will resume 
nuclear power as soon 
as possible. 
58% 18% 14% 10% 
In the future, I prefer 
that Japan would 
gradually phase out 
nuclear power 
14% 19% 59% 8% 
 
Replies to question nine 
 
 Disagree Agree to some extent Agree Not sure 
I fear for the economic 
consequences if Japan 
does not resume 
nuclear power.  
27%  35% 31% 7% 
I fear for my safety if 
Japan resumes nuclear 
power. 
15% 29% 50% 6% 
 
Replies to question ten 
 
 Yes No 
Did your opinion 
regarding nuclear 
power change after 
3/11? 
61%  39% 
 








6 I was not aware of how much Japan was relying on the new clear power. Yet disagree with keep relying on it 
considering the danger. 
7 It is absolutely not the safest way to generate electricity. 
8 More conerned on safely. 
9 Negative 
10 No opinion 
11 not sure 













22 コントロールできないエネルギーだということを封印していたことを意識しました。 I realised that they 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 No idea 





















37 TEPCO (あまりいいイメージではないけれど） 
38 TEPCO 東京電力 


































70 三菱重工 東芝 日立 東電 関電 四国電力 






















































124 日本電源開発 三菱重工 東芝 アレバ 関西電力・東京電力・中部電力等の電力会社 原燃輸送株式会社 











135 日立 東芝 
























































































































































































































































378 東京電力 および政府と結びついた主な大企業のすべて。 
379 東京電力 三菱重工 
380 東京電力 中部電力 日立製作所 
381 東京電力 悪者のような扱いに使うことはさけて頂きたいです。 
382 東京電力 東芝 
383 東京電力 東芝 
384 東京電力 東芝 GE 











































426 東京電力等 電力九社 
427 東京電気 
428 東京電気 



























































487 東芝 日立 
488 東芝 日立 ゼネラルエレクトロニクス 
489 東芝 日立 三菱 
490 東芝 日立 三菱重工業 
491 東芝 日立 東京電力などの電力会社 
492 東芝 日立。。。 
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493 東芝、 三菱電機 
494 東芝、三菱 













































































570 東電 日立、東芝、日本原電、沖縄電力を除くすべての電力会社、三菱、その株のすべての下請け企業 
571 東電 関電 









































































2 As a media coordinator, I have been to the exclusion zone and other Fukushima areas affected by radiation 
fallout contamination. We are not ready to harness nuclear energy. Simple as that. 
3 Camillaさん、Frankからリンクをもらって参加しました。面白いサーベイでした。土屋理恵 Rie Tsuchiya 
4 DKと日本では人口などが違うので同じやり方は不可能に近いが日本は無駄が多すぎる 
5 Do you know Daniel Aldrich who is an associate professor of political science at the Purdue University? He has 
been conductin some researches regarding Japanese nuclear powers. I had a chance to have a little 
discussionabout the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor right after the earthquake. If you are interesed in nuclear 
power, you may contact Dr. Aldrich. He was a visiting scholar at the Tokyo University and I believe he speaks 





7 good luck ! 
8 good luck :) 
9 http://eikojuku.seesaa.net/article/234928760.html デンマークの皆様の賢明な選択を、尊敬します！ 
10 I'm studying in Kolding, Denmark now. I hope you enjoy staying in Japan and write wonderful PhD thesis! 
Cheers! 
11 ｊ結果を教えてほしい 
12 Lycka till! 
13 nil 
14 Please help to develop better ways to produce energy 



















































52 そもそもこの調査が何を目的にしたものなのかがよくわかりません。なぜこの調査がanalyzing the adaptation 































































































































































































































174 自民党 河野太郎代議士のメルマガはご覧になってますか？とても参考になります。 
175 自然エネルギ－についての 論文の場合 
それぞれの国の自然環境についての考察も必要です。日本の場合には 
原子力発電+自然エネルギ－発電の発展の裏に 住民の生活の保障矢安全より 
企業と政府の金銭滝結びつきがあったことを忘れては判断ができません。 
176 良い研究になるといいですね。 
177 行政と東京電力は、いまも真実を明らかにしていないのではないか。いまのままでは疑心暗鬼にならざるを得
ない。 
178 設問が誘導的である。始めに「原子力発電・原子力は悪いもの」という結論ありき、でアンケートをわざわざ
取る必要性・意味を感じなかった。。 
179 調査の目的が分かりません。 
180 調査の結果を公開していただけるとありがたいです。 
181 調査頑張ってください！ 
182 調査頑張ってください！ 
183 論文頑張ってください。 
184 議論が続くべきです。 
185 貴重なアンケートだと思います。私は近畿に住んでいますが、原子力発電に依存の大きかった関西電力は値上
げをし続け生活の圧迫を余儀なくされています。このアンケートをもとに一刻も早く原子力発電が再稼働する
ことを強く望みます。お身体に気をつけてこれからも頑張ってください。 
186 質問10は福島第一発電所事故の前に原子力に関する意見をもっていたことを前提に作られた質問だと思います
．質問内容を検討する必要があるでしょう． 
187 質問が少し抽象的です。また、設問で「原子力を徐々にやめる」という項目がありますが、「直ちにやめる」
という選択肢があるべきだと思います。 
188 質問事項を、再考してほしい。日本人スタッフも加えて。 
189 軽水炉以外高温ガス炉の可能性についても調査する必要がある。将来、中国がビジネスにする可能性があり、
安全基準について近隣として無関心ではいられない。 
190 関西在住で、福島県の除染事業の為に、福島に来ています。遅々として進まない除染作業を思えば、そもそも
原発が無ければ、と思ってしまいます。 
191 難しい問題ですが、卒論完成まで頑張って下さい。 
192 非常に難しい問題です。長期的には代替エネルギー分野を延ばして廃止出来ればよいと考えますが、短期的に
は原子力に頼らねばならないと思います。 
193 頑張って！＾O＾ 
194 頑張ってください 
195 頑張ってください 
196 頑張ってください 
197 頑張ってください 
198 頑張ってください 
 
